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#### Restrictions are prohibitions

Northglenn 11 (City of Northglenn Zoning Ordinance, “Rules of Construction – Definitions”, http://www.northglenn.org/municode/ch11/content\_11-5.html)

Section 11-5-3. Restrictions. As used in this Chapter 11 of the Municipal Code, the **term "restriction**" shall mean a prohibitive regulation. Any use, activity, operation, building, structure or thing which is the subject of a restriction is prohibited, and no such use, activity, operation, building, structure or thing shall be **authorized by any permit or license**.

### CP

#### TEXT: The Executive Branch should restrict targets of targeted killing operations using remotely piloted vehicles outside declared zones of conflict to individuals identified as leaders of transnational organizations with direct involvement in past or ongoing violent operations against the United States

#### Executive action solves case and avoids our disads

Katyal 06 Neal Kumar Katyal, Yale Law Journal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branch from Within, http://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/115-9/Katyal.pdf

This Essay therefore outlines a set of mechanisms that create checks and ¶ balances within the executive branch. The apparatuses are familiar—separate ¶ and overlapping cabinet offices, mandatory review of government action by ¶ different agencies, civil-service protections for agency workers, reporting ¶ requirements to Congress, and an impartial decision-maker to resolve interagency conflicts. But these restraints have been informally laid down and ¶ inconsistently applied, and in the wake of September 11 they have been ¶ decimated.8¶ A general framework statute is needed to codify a set of practices. ¶ In many ways, the status quo is the worst of all worlds because it creates the ¶ façade of external and internal checks when both have withered. ¶ This Essay’s proposed reforms reflect a more textured conception of the ¶ presidency than either the unitary executivists or their critics espouse. In ¶ contrast to the unitary executivists, I believe that the simple fact that the ¶ President should be in control of the executive branch does not answer the ¶ question of how institutions should be structured to encourage the most robust ¶ flow of advice to the President. Nor does that fact weigh against modest ¶ internal checks that, while subject to presidential override, could constrain ¶ presidential adventurism on a day-to-day basis. And in contrast to the doubters ¶ of the unitary executive, I believe a unitary executive serves important values, ¶ particularly in times of crisis. Speed and dispatch are often virtues to be ¶ celebrated. ¶ Instead of doing away with the unitary executive, this Essay proposes ¶ designs that force internal checks but permit temporary departures when the ¶ need is great. Of course, the risk of incorporating a presidential override is that ¶ its great formal power will eclipse everything else, leading agency officials to ¶ fear that the President will overrule or fire them. But just as a filibuster does ¶ not tremendously constrain presidential action, modest internal checks, buoyed ¶ by reporting requirements, can create sufficient deterrent costs.

### DA 1

#### TPA will pass now despite Reid’s objection

CNI, Chemical News & Intelligence, Jan 30th 2014, Lexis

Dooley served as a member of Congress from 1991 to 2004, representing successively the 17th and 20th districts of California, and he was a leader in the House Democrat caucus on trade issues. "I worked with President Bush and President Clinton in advancing trade liberalisation issues," Dooley said on Thursday, "and in all that time Harry Reid never once supported TPA, so no one should be surprised at his opposition now." As majority leader in the Senate, Reid has considerable power, including the authority to decide what bills will be allowed a full floor vote in the Senate - or will not. His oppostion to fast-track trade authorisation is seen as linked to his close ties with constituents in labour and environmental movements. Those groups oppose fast-track on grounds that US employees must compete with under-represented and low-paid workers in other countries that also have weak or nonexistent environmental controls. the lack of which make production in those nations cheaper. Dooley indicated that despite Reid's opposition to TPA, fast-track trade authorisation could still be approved by Congress. "As in the past, to secure sufficient bipartisan support for TPA, it will require a strong, personal engagement by President Obama and a commitment by him to make this one of his highest priorities," Dooley said. Dooley noted that congressional votes on trade promotion authority "have always passed with just a handful of votes", which is why it is critical that Obama becomes engaged in the legislative process. He noted that Obama has committed to the TTIP and TPP deals and has directed Froman to move aggressively to secure both agreements. "If the president is committed to this, it has always been possible to get trade promotion authority through Congress," Dooley said.

#### Fighting to defend his war power will sap Obama’s capital, trading off with rest of agenda

Kriner, 10 --- assistant professor of political science at Boston University

(Douglas L. Kriner, “After the Rubicon: Congress, Presidents, and the Politics of Waging War”, University of Chicago Press, Dec 1, 2010, page 68-69)

While congressional support leaves the president’s reserve of political capital intact, congressional criticism saps energy from other initiatives on the home front by forcing the president to expend energy and effort defending his international agenda. Political capital spent shoring up support for a president’s foreign policies is capital that is unavailable for his future policy initiatives. Moreover, any weakening in the president’s political clout may have immediate ramifications for his reelection prospects, as well as indirect consequences for congressional races.59 Indeed, Democratic efforts to tie congressional Republican incumbents to President George W. Bush and his war policies paid immediate political dividends in the 2006 midterms, particularly in states, districts, and counties that had suffered the highest casualty rates in the Iraq War. 60

In addition to boding ill for the president’s perceived political capital and reputation, such partisan losses in Congress only further imperil his programmatic agenda, both international and domestic. Scholars have long noted that President Lyndon Johnson’s dream of a Great Society also perished in the rice paddies of Vietnam. Lacking the requisite funds in a war-depleted treasury and the political capital needed to sustain his legislative vision, Johnson gradually let his domestic goals slip away as he hunkered down in an effort first to win and then to end the Vietnam War. In the same way, many of President Bush’s highest second-term domestic proprieties, such as Social Security and immigration reform, failed perhaps in large part because the administration had to expend so much energy and effort waging a rear-guard action against congressional critics of the war in Iraq.61

When making their cost-benefit calculations, presidents surely consider these wider political costs of congressional opposition to their military policies. If congressional opposition in the military arena stands to derail other elements of his agenda, all else being equal, the president will be more likely to judge the benefits of military action insufficient to its costs than if Congress stood behind him in the international arena.

#### Political capital is key to TPA – which solves global leadership and the economy

Thomas F. "Mack" McLarty was chief of staff to President Bill Clinton during the NAFTA ratification fight. Nelson W. Cunningham was also a Clinton White House aide, “A Critical Test of Leadership”, 2/2/14, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/thomas-f-mclarty/a-critical-test-of-leader\_b\_4705623.html

In his State of the Union address last week, President Obama took a good first step in asking Congress to provide the tools he needs to close two of the most ambitious trade deals in U.S. history. But he faces an immediate challenge from within his party that could imperil negotiations, with huge stakes for the U.S. globally and for our economy at home. At issue is Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), which allows the president to send a trade agreement to Congress for an up-or-down vote, without amendments. Many Republicans reflexively oppose granting any request from the administration. But the biggest opposition is coming from Democrats skeptical of the value of free trade. The day after the president's address, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid said he opposed "fast track" authority. His remarks revealed the depth of a gulf among Democrats over trade, and sparked new criticism from Republicans as a sign that the president's party couldn't be lined up behind a major administration initiative. For President Obama, this is a critical test of his leadership. Can he muster enough support for his trade agenda within his own party, and then assemble a bipartisan majority in both houses of Congress? Failure would be a great setback for U.S. prestige internationally, and a dismal signal for the president's remaining three years in office. We've seen this movie before -- and it didn't end well. The last Democratic president to seek fast track authority on trade was Bill Clinton in 1997. The effort collapsed when then House Speaker Newt Gingrich was unable to marshal his Republican majority. It was an opportunity lost, ending a period of bipartisan cooperation on trade and stalling momentum created a few years earlier by the North American Free Trade Agreement. Repeating this history would be a mistake, especially as our economy struggles to create good jobs at high wages. But the president faces an uphill battle. Now is the moment for Democrats to pause and take full measure of the stakes involved in opposing fast track. It's time for Republican supporters of trade to rally. And it is essential that the president and his cabinet exert persistent, focused leadership to persuade the skeptics. President Obama deserves much credit for advancing the most far-reaching trade agenda in a generation. The administration is nearing the finish line in negotiations of the Trans Pacific Partnership, an agreement with 11 Pacific Rim nations, including Japan and perhaps South Korea and others. Simultaneous talks are underway between the United States and the European Union over the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership -- creating an economic NATO and the largest liberalized trade zone in the world. Together, the agreements would lower barriers in markets accounting for more than 60 percent of the global economy. Neither negotiation would survive a failure to renew Trade Promotion Authority, which expired in 2007. TPA reassures our negotiating partners that they will not agree to difficult concessions only to see Congress later force unilateral changes. Under TPA, Congress establishes negotiating goals and must be regularly consulted by the president. In exchange, Congress promises an up-or-down vote without amendment. No major trade legislation has passed Congress in decades without it. President Clinton knew that because trade was so hard, its support had to be bipartisan. To push for NAFTA, he assembled a high-profile war room in the White House, led by a prominent Democrat, Bill Daley, and former Republican Congressman Bill Frenzel. The president worked members tirelessly. The bill eventually passed with 102 Democratic and 132 Republican votes, and a similarly bipartisan total in the Senate. By contrast, the 1997 effort to renew fast-track authority lacked that high-profile White House push -- helping seal its doom. Over the last decades, global trade has proven essential to building employment and reducing inequality at home. One of every five jobs in the United States is tied to exports. More significantly for the long run, 95 percent of the world's customers live outside our borders. While many Americans have concerns about free trade, they say the benefits of U.S. involvement in the global economy outweigh the risks (by a 2-1 margin in a poll last month by the Pew Research Center). Even so, last fall 151 House Democrats signed a letter expressing their opposition to granting President Obama Trade Promotion Authority. Almost three dozen House Republicans followed suit. When the bill to renew TPA was introduced earlier this month, a number of Democratic Senators announced their opposition. They have now been joined by Sen. Reid. The warning signs are clear, but so is the path forward. Now is the time for a full-court press from the White House. President Obama should be clear about the imperative of TPA and make the strong case for trade as a catalyst for job growth. Then he must press his cabinet to the task. Ambassador Froman is a skilled negotiator and advocate. His cabinet colleagues include many effective proponents of free trade and international engagement, including Secretary of State John Kerry, Treasury Secretary Jack Lew, and Commerce Secretary Penny Pritzker. Without a concerted effort, TPA may well fail, embarrassing us abroad, casting a shadow on the president's second term and hurting our economy in the long run. Why not instead show America and the world that the president and Congress, including leaders of his own party, can work together?

***TPA is key to US trade leadership and economic diplomacy—rejection signals isolationism and withdrawal***

**Zoellick, 1/12/14** (Robert Zoellick has served as president of the World Bank Group, U.S. trade representative and deputy secretary of state, Jan. 12, 2014, Wall Street Journal, “Leading From the Front on Free Trade” <http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303933104579302452830547782>, jj)

**America's commitment to free trade will be tested in 2014**. After years of indifference to trade policy, **the Obama administration now has an agenda**. **Congress must decide whether the U.S. will lead in opening markets and creating fair rules for free enterprise in a new international economy**. Where will Republicans stand? **The starting point will be Congress's consideration of *T*rade *P*romotion *A*uthority, which enables the president to negotiate agreements subject to an up-or-down vote by Congress**. Through TPA, Congress sets goals, procedures for working with the executive branch, and controls the details of the enabling legislation. The Obama administration has been slow to press for negotiating authority. Fortunately, Sens. Max Baucus and Orrin Hatch, the Democratic chairman and ranking Republican on trade in the Senate, respectively, and Rep. Dave Camp, Republican chairman in the House, introduced their bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority bill last Thursday. Chairman Baucus would like to move the bill through the Senate Finance Committee this month before his confirmation as ambassador to China. Successful action would offer a substantive thank you to Congress's Democratic leader on trade. The **Obama** administration **hopes to close a Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) deal this year**. Of the 11 other countries in this trade pact, six already have U.S. free-trade agreements, which were negotiated and passed by Republicans. **TPP would add important economies—especially Japan and Vietnam—while modernizing rules and better integrating all 12 economies**. **In addition to the growth benefits, TPP recommits America's strategic economic interests in the Asia-Pacific, complementing the U.S. security presence.** **The U.S. is also combining geoeconomics with geopolitics by negotiating a Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) with the European Union**. **Together, TPP and TTIP could forge modern trade and investment rules with major economies of western and eastern Eurasia**. To offer opportunities for global trade liberalization, the U.S. is also negotiating in the World Trade Organization freer trade for services businesses and a Digital Economy compact that would update the successful Information Technology Agreement of the 1990s. These openings would be especially valuable for middle-income economies that want to boost productivity and reach high incomes through more competitive service and information industries. **The economic record of America's *f*ree-*t*rade *a***greement***s* argues for expansion**. **America's free-trade partners account for about 45% of all U.S. exports**, even though their economies amount to only 10% of global GDP. **On average, in the first five years of a new free-trade agreement, U.S. exports grew three to four times as rapidly as U.S. exports to others**. The **U.S. has a trade surplus with its 20 free-trade partners—in manufacturing, agriculture, and services—instead of the large deficit it runs with the world**. **These trade agreements serve principally to bring down the barriers of other countries, because U.S. restrictions are already relatively low**. U.S. free-trade agreements are also comprehensive—covering not only manufacturing and almost all agriculture, but also services, government procurement and transparency, investment and intellectual property, as well as dispute resolution. **These trade agreements encourage others to move toward greater compatibility with the U.S. economy and legal framework**. Republicans have provided most of the votes in Congress for free-trade accords in the past. Here is why: The deals cut taxes on trade. They expand individual freedom, consumer choice and opportunities for innovation. They reduce governmental barriers. They boost the private sector. **They enhance the rule of law and foster civil society**. **An active trade agenda also *signals* America's interest in the rest of the world at a time others are worried about U.S. withdrawal**. **Free trade boosts development and economic reformers around the world, while supporting U.S. growth. For much of the world, *America's commitment to stability seems more credible if built upon an economic foundation***. ***Economic diplomacy can be the basis for hard, soft and smart power***. Nevertheless, some Republicans are hesitant to grant negotiating authority to the president because they fear he will use it to impose stricter labor and environmental standards he couldn't otherwise get through Congress. But such fears can be addressed by circumscribing those provisions to the core labor and environmental standards that both parties agreed to in recent free trade agreements. Moreover, **such concerns should not prevent Republicans from showing they can govern, lead internationally and extend America's economic power globally through a vibrant private sector**. Republicans should also insist, as they did with President Clinton, that a reasonable number of Democrats in Congress back their president. We still have to see whether the Obama team can translate talk into action. It is not clear that this administration knows how to close deals—and take on its protectionist and isolationist constituencies in labor and manufacturing. Republicans should use TPA—and the process it creates—to set objectives that boost economic growth, pointing out that workers in U.S. export industries earn on average 18% more than other Americans because their labor is more productive. Republicans should also set the intellectual agenda for worker adjustment and jobs policies that help Americans adapt to change, whether triggered by trade or technology. The federal government spends about $18 billion a year on nearly 50 separate employment training programs, run by nine different agencies, with few ever evaluated for results. When the administration sends up trade agreements it should also propose options to transform this often inefficient spending. President **Obama** has tiptoed on trade, but he **is moving in the right direction**. He may hesitate when he recognizes that results require actions. Republicans should be pushing the president to deliver—and ***to make 2014 the year the U.S. reclaimed global leadership on trade.***

***US trade leadership solves extinction***

**Garten, 09** – professor at the Yale School of Management (Jeffrey, “The Dangers of Turning Inward”, 3/5, Wall Street Journal, http://www.business.illinois.edu/aguilera/Teaching/WSJ09\_Dangers\_of\_Turning\_Inward.pdf)

Yet if **historians** look back on today's severe downturn, with its crumbling markets, rising unemployment and massive government interventions, they could well be busy analyzing how globalization -- the spread of trade, finance, technology and the movement of people around the world -- went into reverse. They **would likely point to the growth of economic nationalism as the root cause**. Ordinary protectionism such as tariffs and quotas would be one aspect of this problem, but it won't be the worst of it because a web of treaties and the enforcement capabilities of the World Trade Organization will constrain the most egregious behavior. **Economic nationalism is more insidious because it is broader, more subtle and subject to fewer legal constraints**. It is a frame of mind that casts doubt on the very assumption that we live in a single international market, and that relatively open borders are a virtue. **It is based on a calculation that despite all the talk about economic interdependence, nations can go it alone, and could be better off in doing so**. True economic nationalists want above all to protect capital and jobs in their own countries. They see global commerce not as a win-win proposition but as a contest in which there is a victor and a loser. They are thus not focused on international agreements to open the world economy; to the contrary, they are usually figuring out how to avoid international commercial obligations. **The last time we saw sustained economic nationalism was in the 1930s, when capital flows and trade among countries collapsed, and every country went its own way. World growth went into a ditch, political ties among nations deteriorated, nationalism and populism combined to create fascist governments in Europe and Asia, and a world war took place. It took at least a generation for globalization to get back on track**. There have been some bouts of inwardlooking governmental action since then, such as the early 1970s when the U.S. cut the dollar from its gold base and imposed export embargoes on soybeans and steel scrap. However, the economic conditions were not sufficiently bad for the trend to sustain itself. The kind of economic nationalism we are seeing today is not yet extreme. It is also understandable. The political pressures could hardly be worse. Over the last decade, the global economy grew on average about 4% to 5%, and this year it will come to a grinding halt: 0.5% according to the International Monetary Fund, where projections usually err on the optimistic side. World trade, which has grown much faster than global gross domestic product for many years, is projected to decline this year for the first time since 1982. Foreign direct investment last year slumped by 10% from 2007. Most dramatically, capital flows into emerging market nations are projected to drop this year by nearly 80% compared to 2007. The aggregate figures don't tell the story of what is unraveling in individual countries. In the last quarter of 2008, U.S. GDP dropped by 6.2% at an annual rate, the U.K. by 5.9%, Germany by 8.2%, Japan by 12.7% and South Korea by 20.8%. Mexico, Thailand and Singapore and most of Eastern Europe are also in deep trouble. In every case, employment has been plummeting. So far popular demonstrations against government policies have taken place in theU.K., France, Greece, Russia and throughout Eastern Europe. And the governments of Iceland and Latvia have fallen over the crisis. Governments could therefore be forgiven if they are preoccupied above all with the workers and companies within their own borders. Most officials don't know what to do because they haven't seen this level of distress before. They are living from day to day, desperately improvising and trying to hold off political pressure to take severe measures they know could be satisfying right now but cause bigger damage later. Thinking about how their policies might affect other countries is not their main focus, let alone taking the time to try to coordinate them internationally. Besides, whether it's in Washington, Brussels, Paris, Beijing, Brazilia or Tokyo, it is hard to find many top officials who wouldn't say that whatever measures they are taking that may undermine global commerce are strictly temporary. They all profess that when the crisis is over, they will resume their support for globalization. They underestimate, however, how hard it could be to reverse course. Political figures take comfort, too, from the global institutions that were not present in the 1930s -- the IMF, the World Bank and the World Trade Organization, all of which are assumed to be keeping globalization alive. This is a false sense of security, since these institutions are guided by sovereign countries. Government officials often feel that because they are going to endless crisis summit meetings -- the next big one is in London on April 2, when the world's top 20 nations will be assembling -- that some international coordination is actually taking place. This is mostly an illusion. With a few exceptions, such as the so-called Plaza Agreements of 1984 when currencies were realigned, it is difficult to point to a meeting where anything major has been said and subsequently implemented. But as the pressure on politicians mounts, decisions are being made on an incremental and ad hoc basis that amounts to a disturbing trend. **Classic trade protectionism is on the rise**. In the first half of 2008, the number of investigations in the World Trade Organization relating to antidumping cases -- selling below cost -- was up 30% from the year before. Washington has recently expanded sanctions against European food products in retaliation for Europe's boycott against hormonetreated American beef -- an old dispute, to be sure, but one that is escalating. In the last several months, the E.U. reintroduced export subsidies on butter and cheese. India raised tariffs on steel products, as did Russia on imported cars. Indonesia ingenuously designated that just a few of its ports could be used to import toys, creating a trade-blocking bottleneck. Brazil and Argentina have been pressing for a higher external tariff on imports into a South American bloc of countries called Mercosur. Just this week, the E.U. agreed to levy tariffs on American exports of biodiesel fuel, possibly a first shot in what may become a gigantic trade war fought over different environmental policies -- some based on taxes, some on regulation, some on cap and trade -- being embraced by individual countries. Much bigger problems have arisen in more non-traditional areas and derive from recent direct intervention of governments. The much-publicized "Buy America" provision of the U.S. stimulus package restricts purchases of construction-related goods to many U.S. manufacturers, and although it is riddled with exceptions, it does reveal Washington's state of mind. The bailout of GM and Chrysler is a purely national deal. Such exclusion against foreign firms is a violation of so-called "national treatment" clauses in trade agreements, and the E.U. has already put Washington on notice that it will pursue legal trade remedies if the final bailout package is discriminatory. Uncle Sam is not the only economic nationalist. The Japanese government is offering to help a broad array of its corporations -- but certainly not subsidiaries of foreign companies in Japan -- by purchasing the stock of these firms directly, thereby not just saving them but providing an advantage over competition from non-Japanese sources. The French government has created a sovereign wealth fund to make sure that certain "national champions," such as carparts manufacturer Valeo and aeronautics component maker Daher, aren't bought by foreign investors. Government involvement in financial institutions has taken on an anti-globalization tone. British regulators are pushing their global banks to redirect foreign lending to the U.K. when credit is sorely needed and where it can be monitored. Just this past week, the Royal Bank of Scotland announced it was closing shop in 60 foreign countries. Western European banks that were heavily invested in countries such as Hungary, the Czech Republic and the Baltics have pulled back their credits, causing a devastating deflation throughout Eastern Europe. The Swiss are reportedly considering more lenient accounting policies for loans their banks make domestically as opposed to abroad. This de-globalizing trend could well be amplified by Washington's effort to exercise tight oversight of several big financial institutions. Already AIG's prime Asian asset, American International Assurance Company, is on the block. As the feds take an ever bigger stake in Citigroup, they may well force it to divest itself of many of its prized global holdings, such as Banamex in Mexico and Citi Handlowy in Poland. It appears that new legislation under the Troubled Asset Relief Program will also restrict the employment of foreign nationals in hundreds of American banks in which the government has a stake. Whether or not it goes into bankruptcy, General Motors will be pressed to sell many of its foreign subsidiaries, too. Even Chinese multinationals such as Haier and Lenovo are beating a retreat to their own shores where the risks seem lower than operating in an uncertain global economy. The government in Beijing is never far away from such fundamental strategic decisions. Then there is the currency issue. Economic nationalists are mercantilists. They are willing to keep their currency cheap in order to make their exports more competitive. China is doing just that. A big question is whether other Asian exporters that have been badly hurt from the crisis -- Taiwan, South Korea and Thailand, for example -- will follow suit. Competitive devaluations were a major feature of the 1930s. It's no accident that the European Union has called an emergency summit for this Sunday to consider what to do with rising protectionism of all kinds. **There are a number of reasons why economic nationalism could escalate**. The recession could last well beyond this year. It is also worrisome that the forces of economic nationalism were gathering even before the crisis hit, and have deeper roots than most people know. Congress denied President Bush authority to negotiate trade agreements two years ago, fearing that America was not benefiting enough from open trade, and an effort to reform immigration was ~~paralyzed~~ for years. Globally, international trade negotiations called the Doha Round collapsed well before Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers did. Concerns that trade was worsening income distribution were growing in every major industrial nation since the late 1990s. ***Whenever countries turned inward over the past half-century, Washington was a powerful countervailing force, preaching the gospel of globalization and open markets for goods, services and capital***. As the Obama administration works feverishly to fire up America's growth engines, patch up its financial system and keep its housing market from collapsing further, and as its major long-term objectives center on health, education and reducing energy dependence on foreign sources, the country's preoccupations are more purely domestic than at any time since the 1930s. In the past, American business leaders from companies such as IBM, GE, Goldman Sachs and, yes, Citigroup and Merrill Lynch beat the drum for open global markets. As their share prices collapse, some voices are muted, some silenced. It is not easy to find anyone in America who has the stature and courage to press for a more open global economy in the midst of the current economic and political crosswinds. And given that the global rot started in the U.S. with egregiously irresponsible lending, borrowing and regulation, America's brand of capitalism is in serious disrepute around the world. Even if President Obama had the mental bandwidth to become a cheerleader for globalization, America's do-as-I-say-and-not-as-I-do leadership has been badly compromised. If economic nationalism puts a monkey wrench in the wheels of global commerce, the damage could be severe. The U.S. is a good example. It is inconceivable that Uncle Sam could mount a serious recovery without a massive expansion of exports -- the very activity that was responsible for so much of America's economic growth during the middle of this decade. But that won't be possible if other nations block imports. For generations, the deficits that we have run this past decade and the trillions of dollars we are spending now mean we will be highly dependent on foreign loans from China, Japan and other parts of the world. But these will not be forthcoming at prices we can afford without a global financial system built on deep collaboration between debtors and creditors -- including keeping our market open to foreign goods and services. The Obama administration talks about a super-competitive economy, based on high-quality jobs -- which means knowledge-intensive jobs. This won't happen if we are not able to continue to bring in the brightest people from all over the world to work and live here. Silicon Valley, to take one example, would be a pale shadow of itself without Indian, Chinese and Israeli brain power in its midst. More generally, without an open global economy, worldwide industries such as autos, steel, banking and telecommunications cannot be rationalized and restructured efficiently, and we'll be doomed to have excessive capacity and booms and busts forever. The big emerging markets such as China, India, Brazil, Turkey and South Africa will never be fully integrated into the world economy, depriving them and us of future economic growth. The productivity of billions of men and women entering the global workforce will be stunted to everyone's detriment. Of course, no one would say that globalization is without its problems. Trade surges and products made by low-priced labor can lead to job displacement and increasing income inequality. Proud national cultures can be undermined. But these challenges can be met by reasonable regulation and by domestic policies that provide a strong social safety net and the kind of education that helps people acquire new skills for a competitive world. With the right responses of governments, the benefits should far outweigh the disadvantages. **For thousands of years, globalization has increased global wealth, individual choice and human freedom**. The point is, **economic nationalism**, with its implicit autarchic and save-yourself character, **embodies exactly the wrong spirit and runs in precisely the wrong direction from the global system that will be necessary to create the future we all want**. **As happened in the 1930s, economic nationalism is also sure to poison geopolitics. Governments under economic pressure have far fewer resources to take care of their citizens and to deal with rising anger and social tensions.** **Whether or not they are democracies, their tenure can be threatened by popular resentment. The temptation for governments to whip up enthusiasm for something that distracts citizens from their economic woes -- a war or a jihad against unpopular minorities**, for example -- **is great**. That's not all. **As an economically enfeebled South Korea withdraws foreign aid from North Korea, could we see an even more irrational activity from Pyongyang? As the Pakistani economy goes into the tank, will the government be more likely to compromise with terrorists** to alleviate at least one source of pressure? **As Ukraine strains under the weight of an IMF bailout, is a civil war with Cold War overtones between Europe and Russia be in the cards**? And beyond all that, **how will economically embattled and inward-looking governments be able to deal with the critical issues that need global resolution such as *control of nuclear weapons*, or a treaty to manage *climate change, or* help to the hundreds of millions of people who are now falling back into *poverty?***

### DA 2

#### Moderate republicans will survive primary challenges from the Tea Party now, but it could flip

Strauss, 1/24/14 (Daniel Strauss is a reporter for Talking Points Memo, He was previously a breaking news reporter for The Hill newspaper and has written for Politico, Roll Call, The American Prospect, and Gaper's Block. He has also interned at Democracy: A Journal of Ideas and The New Yorker. Daniel grew up in Chicago and graduated from the University of Michigan with a B.A. in History. At Michigan he helped edit Consider, a weekly opinion magazine, JANUARY 24, 2014, Talking Points Memo, 2014 Could Be A Bad Year For Tea Party Senate Candidates, <http://talkingpointsmemo.com/dc/2014-could-be-a-bad-year-for-tea-party-candidates>)

Stockman, whose tea party bona fides include threatening to impeach President Barack Obama over new gun control restrictions and comparing Obamacare to sexually transmitted diseases, doesn't seem to be making much of a dent in the poll numbers after his last-minute entry into the Senate primary. Stockman couldn't even emerge victorious in a local Texas tea party straw poll and has even recently been missing from congressional votes. And though it's still early in the 2014 cycle, Stockman's lackluster campaign might be indicative of how insurgent tea partiers challengers are faring against establishment Republicans. So far, it's looking increasingly like the so-called tea party wave, which peaked in 2010, might be headed toward a valley this time around. The conservative movement has been able to stake its influence in terms of pushing top Republicans to move to the right, but they haven't always been able to translate that into electoral success. There are even a few House races where incumbent tea partiers face primary challenges from more mainstream Republicans. In the Senate, it's hard to see the most prominent tea party candidates even getting the Republican nomination, as conservative darlings like Christine O'Donnell and Joe Miller did in the past. "Right now, it's not clear to me that we're going to have any of the Senate races where a high-profile incumbent gets bumped off by an insurgent radical tea party type," congressional scholar Norm Ornstein from the conservative American Enterprise Institute told TPM. George Washington political scientist Sarah Binder agreed in an interview with TPM that there's not much territory for the tea party to gain in 2014. "There's always a possibility that there are going to be pockets where the tea party can be more successful but there doesn't seem to be a groundswell of popular enthusiasm like there was in 2010 and somewhat in 2012," Binder said. The most high-profile tea party challenge of the election cycle is the Republican primary for Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell's (R-KY) Senate seat. Bevin has managed to serve as enough of a nuisance to McConnell that the top Senate Republican has had to shape some of his campaign toward protecting his right flank instead of focusing all of his attacks on Secretary of State Alison Lundergan Grimes, the Democratic candidate in the race. But as late as January, Bevin himself admitted his candidacy is still a long shot. "Statistically even now, it's crazy long odds and that by the latest polling among primary voters in the Republican ranks, I'm still behind," Bevin told Politico of his chances of defeating McConnell. Bevin, at times, appeared like he could pose a real threat to McConnell, but now observers don't expect Bevin to win the race. Instead, Bevin has really just served to pressure McConnell to legislate more conservatively. In South Carolina, Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-SC) is facing a handful of opponents in the Republican primary. So far though none of them have been able to move away from the pack and really serve as a danger to Graham, despite the senator's lackluster poll numbers. Graham also has a sizeable warchest that eclipses the funds of any of the candidates in the race. Still, there are a few tea party candidates who have reason to hope. Ben Sasse, one of the top candidates in the Nebraska Senate race for retiring Sen. Mike Johanns' seat for example, has been embraced by conservative outside groups as well as Rep. Paul Ryan (R-WI), who isn't considered a core tea party lawmaker. There hasn't been a huge amount of polling on that race, but Sasse could win. And in Mississippi, recent polling has shown state Sen. Chris McDaniel (R-MS) within striking distance of Sen. Thad Cochran (R-MS) -- despite reports that the tea partier attended a neo-Confederate event, blamed "hip-hop" for gun violence and even voted as a Democrat in 2003. McDaniel has also struggled to keep up in fundraising with Cochran and the incumbent Mississippi senator is still ramping up his re-election campaign. What's less clear in the next few election cycles is what will happen to the tea party senators elected in 2010: Sens. Mike Lee (R-UT), Rand Paul (R-KY) and Ron Johnson (R-WI). Lee has suffered from plummeting poll numbers after the 2013 government shutdown. Paul has strongly hinted at a presidential run in 2016 so he might not run for re-election. Johnson, after a little inspection, could inspire some tea partier in Wisconsin to challenge him next time around. There are still months to go and candidates are still introducing themselves, including some tea party favorites. Outside conservative groups don't sound worried, so far anyway. They argue that they can still help make a dent against incumbent Republicans, and even promise for 2014 primaries to see another "wave year." "Both the number and degree of primary challenges are unprecedented. Whereas 2010 was a conservative wave year manifest in the general election, 2014 will be a wave year in the primaries," The Madison Project's Daniel Horowitz said in an email to TPM. "Each group has its own strengths. FreedomWorks is good at mobilizing the grassroots while we're good at raising money for candidates," Senate Conservatives Fund Executive Director Matt Hoskins told TPM. "When conservatives unite like we've done in Mississippi and Kentucky, we can have a big impact." Tom Borrelli, a senior fellow at FreedomWorks, told TPM that low approval approval numbers on President Barack Obama, Congress and really a "distrust of incumbent lawmakers" will create a groundswell of support for insurgent tea party candidates. "I think it's going to be a year of significant change because most people don't get involved in politics until it really effects them and now we've had millions of people who 'mind your own business, take your kids to soccer practice' have received a letter letting them know their insurance has been canceled," Borrelli said. "So I think there's going to be a big shift." And if there's any place where that shift seems likeliest, it could be for open seats on the horizon: In Oklahoma, for example, veteran tea party candidate Rep. Jim Bridenstine (R-OK) who won his seat from incumbent Rep. Jim Sullivan (R-OK) could jump into the race for outgoing Sen. Tom Coburn's (R-OK) seat. If he were to win that seat, tea partiers and outside groups would hail it as a major victory for the far right. The Senate Conservatives Fund is strongly encouraging Bridenstine, who has not decided whether to run or not, to jump into the race. "Jim Bridenstine is one of the strongest conservatives in Congress, he's the ideal candidate to continue Dr. Coburn's fight against wasteful spending, and we should encourage him to run for the open seat," Hoskins wrote in a fundraising email on Thursday.

#### Plan’s a wedge issue that causes Tea Party success in the midterms as rank-and-file GOP voters rebel against establishment candidates

Silver, ’13 [Nathaniel Read "Nate" Silver is an American statistician and writer who analyzes in-game baseball activity and elections. He is currently the editor-in-chief of ESPN's FiveThirtyEight blog and a Special Correspondent for ABC News. June 11, 2013, 538 – NYT, Domestic Surveillance Could Create a Divide in the 2016 Primaries, <http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/06/11/domestic-surveillance-could-create-a-divide-in-the-2016-primaries/?_r=0>, jj]

A poll released on Monday by the Pew Research Center and The Washington Post found a partisan shift in the way Americans view the National Security Agency’s domestic surveillance programs. In the survey, slightly more Democrats than Republicans said they found it acceptable for the N.S.A. to track Americans’ phone records and e-mails if the goal is to prevent terrorism. By comparison, when Pew Research asked a similar question in 2006, Republicans were about twice as likely as Democrats to support the N.S.A.’s activities. The poll is a reminder that many Americans do not hold especially firm views on some issues and instead may adapt them depending on which party controls the executive branch. When it comes to domestic surveillance, a considerable number of Democrats seem willing to support actions under President Obama that they deemed unacceptable under George W. Bush, while some Republicans have shifted in the opposite direction. What may be just as significant is the way in which attitudes toward the security state could split voters and elected officials within each party — possibly creating a wedge issue in both party primaries in 2016. Politicians who are normally associated with being on the far left and the far right may find common cause with grass-roots voters in their objection to domestic surveillance programs, fighting against a party establishment that is inclined to support them. Take, for example, the House’s vote in May 2011 to extend certain provisions of the Patriot Act — including the so-called library records provision that the government has used to defend the legality of sweeping searches of telephone and e-mail records. The bill passed with 250 yes votes in the House against 153 no votes, receiving more of its support from Republicans. (In the Senate, the bill passed, 72-23, winning majority support from both parties.) However, the House vote was not well described by a traditional left-right political spectrum. In the chart below, I’ve sorted the 403 members of the House who voted on the bill from left to right in order of their overall degree of liberalism or conservatism, as determined by the statistical system DW-Nominate. Members of the House who voted for the bill are represented with a yellow stripe in the chart, while those who voted against it are represented in black. The no votes are concentrated at the two ends of the spectrum. The 49 most liberal members of the House (all Democrats) who voted on the bill each voted against it. But so did 14 of the 21 Republicans deemed to be the most conservative by DW-Nominate. By contrast, 46 of the 50 most moderate Republicans voted for the Patriot Act extension, as did 38 of the 50 most moderate Democrats. Perhaps, you might object, a one-dimensional spectrum doesn’t do a very good job of capturing all the nuances of what it means to be liberal or conservative in America today. In considering the surveillance state, for example, Republicans must weigh their traditional support for aggressive antiterrorism policies against their distrust of government, while Democrats must weigh their trust of Mr. Obama, who so far has been unapologetic for the N.S.A.’s actions, against their concern about civil liberties violations. Or more broadly, what about libertarians who take conservative views on economic policy but liberal views on social policy — or conservative Democrats who support the welfare state but not policies like gay marriage? Where are they represented on the spectrum? I am sympathetic toward these objections as a theoretical matter. Without making this too much of an editorial comment, I find the platforms of both parties to be lacking in philosophical cohesion — why, for example, should views on abortion have much to do with preferences on tax policy? But when it comes to American political parties and their representatives in Congress, partisanship tends to dominate all other considerations. National Journal has a different system for ranking members of Congress from liberal to conservative. It is somewhat less statistically rigorous than DW-Nominate’s system, but it does have the advantage of breaking votes down into three categories: those on economic, social and foreign policy. The correlations between the three policy areas are very high (specifically, they are about 0.9, where 1 would represent a perfect correlation). Members of Congress who take conservative views on economic policy tend almost always to take conservative views on social policy and foreign policy as well, while members who are liberal on one set of issues tend to cast liberal votes on almost all other issues. This does leave the question of how liberal and conservative policy stances are defined. (Support for gun rights, for example, is generally seen as socially conservative rather than socially liberal, even though socially liberal stances are often thought of as promoting the rights of individuals against communities or governments.) Nevertheless, for members of Congress today, a vote on any one issue is highly predictable based upon his votes on other issues. There are extremely few mavericks in Congress who vote on each issue on an independent and nonpartisan basis. DW-Nominate uses a different method to classify Congressional votes. Instead of assigning a subjective definition to each vote as liberal or conservative, it instead uses an automated process called optimal classification. The goal of this process is essentially to explain the highest number of Congressional votes based on a one-dimensional scale, regardless of the content of the legislation that comprises it. Whichever votes are not well explained by this first dimension are then explained by additional dimensions. The process is more intuitive than it might sound. For example, during the 1960s, Congressional votes on civil rights policy toward African-Americans were not very strongly correlated with votes on other types of political issues. (For instance, Southern Democrats were often staunchly opposed to civil rights for blacks while casting very liberal votes on the welfare state.) Thus, you needed at least two dimensions to describe Congressional voting patterns in a reasonably comprehensive way. In recent years, however, this has been much less of a problem: the one-dimensional spectrum explains about 95 percent of Congressional voting, and votes on economic, social and foreign policy are highly correlated. But a few votes still fall outside of the spectrum — the 2011 vote on the Patriot Act among them. If the second dimension no longer represents a distinction between economic and social policy, then what does it reflect? The authors of DW-Nominate are interpreting it to measure a distinction between what they call “establishment” members of Congress and “outsiders.” Here at FiveThirtyEight, I have sometimes used the same labels when describing the ideological space occupied by different candidates during the presidential primaries. Some candidates, like Mitt Romney, run as insider or establishment politicians, offering some iteration of what they say are tried-and-true solutions, while others run as insurgents or outsiders, submitting a more profound critique of politics as usual and claiming they will topple an unacceptable status quo. In general, those politicians who rate as insurgents or outsiders are on the wings of the liberal-conservative scale. The Tea Party, Occupy Wall Street and Ron Paul movements probably all fit into the outsider or insurgent category, for example, even though they inhabit vastly different spaces on the traditional left-right political spectrum. Conversely, moderates in both parties tend to score as establishment politicians. There aren’t very many “radical centrist” members of Congress who offer a pronounced critique of the status quo while also coming down somewhere in the middle on most policy issues. In the case of the Patriot Act vote, the establishment-outsider axis makes nearly as much difference as the liberal-conservative or Democratic-Republican scales. Among the so-called establishment members of the House who voted on the bill, 78 percent voted to extend the Patriot Act, while only 41 percent of the so-called outsiders did, according to DW-Nominate’s classifications. You can find similar patterns in certain votes on policy toward the financial sector — for example, during the various bailout votes that were cast toward the end of 2008. More recently, votes on the federal debt ceiling have taken on some of the same contours. What is the link between the financial votes and those on the surveillance state? In both cases, members of Congress were asked to trust the assertions of elites that significant harms would result if the bills were not enacted: terrorist acts in the event that the Patriot Act was not extended, or financial calamity in the event that the bailout was not passed or the debt ceiling was not raised. As a matter of practice (but not necessarily theory), convincing someone that a future crisis must be averted requires a higher level of persuasion than making the case for a policy that is claimed to ameliorate some extant problem. Members of Congress who are members of their party establishments might be more inclined to trust testimony from financial or national security elites, and therefore might have been easier to pitch on these bills. We should be careful about extrapolating the voting behavior of Congress to policy views among the general public. But as I have suggested, the establishment-outsider divide can loom large in presidential primaries. Particularly within the Republican Party, rank-and-file voters have increasingly lukewarm views of the party leadership. But Democrats will also face a primary after Mr. Obama’s tenure in office. Highly liberal, activist voters who might ordinarily be inclined to critique the status quo could face some awkward questions given that the status quo has featured a Democratic president. Debates on domestic surveillance could serve as proxy battles for these intraparty factions. Senator Rand Paul of Kentucky, perhaps along with other Republican candidates, could use his opposition to surveillance programs to help consolidate the support of libertarian and Tea Party voters, at the risk of alienating national security conservatives. Democratic candidates who criticize the Patriot Act or the N.S.A.’s actions will be finding fault with policies that Mr. Obama has defended – and Mr. Obama will very likely remain quite popular among Democrats three years from now.

#### This costs GOP moderates their seats and swings the election to the Tea Party

PDT 8/7-’13 [Pakistan Daily Times, Republican rift seeping into US foreign policy, <http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2013%5C08%5C07%5Cstory_7-8-2013_pg4_7>, jj]

Old-guard Republicans like Senator John McCain hew to the traditional line that the exertion of American power is the primary force of good in a chaotic world. They advocate supplying weapons to rebels in Syria, aiding Egypt despite the turmoil of the recent military coup, and using all tools at US disposal, including the surveillance of hundreds of millions of citizens, to keep America safe. But insurgent conservatives, led by libertarian-leaning Senators Rand Paul and Ted Cruz, are challenging that orthodoxy, and their influence has become difficult to ignore. A case in point came before the Senate late last week when Paul introduced a measure that would block $1.5 billion in aid to Egypt. His amendment was handily defeated, but not before heated debate between him and McCain over the role of the United States abroad. Notably voting with Paul and 11 other core conservatives was Mitch McConnell, the Senate’s top Republican. Together their vote bucked the position of AIPAC, the pro-Israel lobby that often finds Republican support in Washington. Earlier this year McCain derisively called Cruz and Paul “wacko birds” on the Senate floor, citing their procedural opposition to virtually anything supported by President Barack Obama, including the US budget, immigration reform, drone use, the national health law and foreign aid. “There may be more wacko birds in the Senate than is suspected,” Cruz, 42, sniped back at the 2008 Republican presidential nominee who is 34 years his senior. Cruz passed a big test last month in Iowa, where he was warmly received by several hundred evangelical pastors, a group that carries huge influence over the outcome of the first-in-the-nation primaries. Paul became a hero for many in March when he launched a 13-hour filibuster in the Senate to demand the Obama administration clarify its position on domestic use of drones. Political observers see a test brewing ahead of the presidential race in 2016 and even the mid-term elections in 2014, when voters will be confronted with what appears to be two divergent Republican strains. Michael Steele, a former chairman of the Republican National Committee, said recent ideological clashes have highlighted the “fracturing within the party.” “The question is will the John McCain view prevail ultimately going into 2014, or will the Ted Cruz view prevail?” he told MSNBC. The establishment’s growing unease with the upstarts, Paul led the Republican field in a recent PPP poll on the 2016 race, is likely what fueled a very public war of words late last month between two likely Republican contenders for the White House. New Jersey Governor Chris Christie blasted Paul’s position on domestic surveillance, and House of Representatives lawmakers who nearly de-funded the intelligence program that scoops up telephone records on millions of Americans. “This strain of libertarianism that’s going through both parties right now and making big headlines, I think, is a very dangerous thought,” Christie said at a mayoral panel. Paul shot back that “spying without warrants is unconstitutional.” The two carried on their bickering for days until reaching an uneasy truce. Congressman Peter King, the New York Republican who has chaired the House Homeland Security Committee, warned that the Tea Party favorites could threaten GOP aspirations for taking back the White House, especially if they were running against former secretary of state Hillary Clinton. “I think she’s very strong on foreign policy, and I think that if we nominate someone from our isolationist wing of the party, she’ll destroy them,” King told ABC News, adding that their pushing of the national debate is “harmful to the country.” Conservative columnist Charles Krauthammer argued in his Friday column that the return of conservative isolationism “was utterly predictable.” After years of war in Afghanistan and Iraq, debate over countless drone strikes and the revelations of mass surveillance by the National Security Agency, “the natural tension between isolationist and internationalist tendencies has resurfaced,” he wrote. Thomas Mann, a veteran congressional expert at the Brookings Institution, told AFP that while the Republican Party has largely accommodated the “economic libertarianism” of the Tea Party faithful in Congress,” true isolationists have little support among Republicans in office. “With Americans weary of war, this could begin to change but it would presage a real crackup of the GOP,” he said. afp

#### Continued tea party influence blocks Obama’s climate agenda—electing moderates is key

Huq, ’13 [Saleemul Huq, irector, International Centre for Climate Change and Development, Independent University, Bangladesh, Dhaka, Responding to Climate Change, Comment: the US looks like it’s getting serious on climate change, <http://www.rtcc.org/2013/08/07/comment-the-us-looks-like-its-getting-serious-on-climate-change/>, jj]

It is very clear that President Obama and his team of senior advisers all accept the scale of the climate change problem and recognise the US’s responsibilities. This is in stark contrast to his predecessor President Bush who refused to take any significant action for eight years. During President Obama’s first term of office he tried to bring Congress on board towards a national response to tackling climate change, which proved to be unsuccessful. So in his second term he has decided to take whatever action he can by executive order and without requiring Congressional approval. While I have criticised his Climate Action Plan as being too little too late (when compared to the scale of the problem that has to be tackled), I must acknowledge that it is indeed a significant step forward compared to the past. State leverage The second important personality that is involved is the new Secretary of State (and former Senator) John Kerry who has a long and honourable history of engagement on this issue both at national as well as international levels. Unlike his predecessor, Hilary Clinton, he is very interested in this topic and is determined that the US plays a more positive role at the international level. He has already taken personal charge of US international relations on this topic. The most difficult element of the political landscape in the US on the topic of climate change has always been, and continues to be, the Republican Party, who control the House of Representatives in Congress (and thus can, and do, block any attempts to bring legislation to tackle climate change). Within the Republican Party the climate change denying tendency is led by the Tea Party wing of the party and a handful of Congressmen and Senators. However, even here there is a growing awareness amongst more sensible Republicans that they cannot continue to deny the reality of climate change. An example is the recent article in the New York Times, jointly authored by three former Republican heads of the US Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA), arguing for the Party to take sensible actions to tackle climate change.

#### Obama action on climate solves extinction

Ashok Khosla 9, IUCN President, International Union for Conservation of Nature, A new President for the United States: We have a dream, 1-29-09, http://cms.iucn.org/news\_events/?uNewsID=2595

A rejuvenated America, with a renewed purpose, commitment and energy to make its contribution once again towards a better world could well be the turning point that can reverse the current decline in the state of the global economy, the health of its life support systems and the morale of people everywhere. This extraordinary change in regime brings with it the promise of a deep change in attitudes and aspirations of Americans, a change that will lead, hopefully, to new directions in their nation’s policies and action. In particular, we can hope that from being a very reluctant partner in global discussions, especially on issues relating to environment and sustainable development, the United States will become an active leader in international efforts to address the Millennial threats now confronting civilization and even the survival of the human species. For the conservation of biodiversity, so essential to maintaining life on Earth, this promise of change has come not a moment too soon. It would be a mistake to put all of our hopes on the shoulder of one young man, however capable he might be. The environmental challenges the world is facing cannot be addressed by one country, let alone by one man. At the same time, an inspired US President guided by competent people, who does not shy away from exercising the true responsibilities and leadership his country is capable of, could do a lot to spur the international community into action. To paraphrase one of his illustrious predecessors, “the world asks for action and action now.” What was true in President Roosevelt’s America 77 years ago is even more appropriate today. From IUCN’s perspective, the first signals are encouraging. The US has seriously begun to discuss constructive engagement in climate change debates. With Copenhagen a mere 11 months away, this commitment is long overdue and certainly very welcome. Many governments still worry that if they set tough standards to control carbon emissions, their industry and agriculture will become uncompetitive, a fear that leads to a foot-dragging “you go first” attitude that is blocking progress. A positive intervention by the United States could provide the vital catalyst that moves the basis of the present negotiations beyond the narrowly defined national interests that lie at the heart of the current impasse. The logjam in international negotiations on climate change should not be difficult to break if the US were to lead the industrialized countries to agree that much of their wealth has been acquired at the expense of the environment (in this case greenhouse gases emitted over the past two hundred years) and that with the some of the benefits that this wealth has brought, comes the obligation to deal with the problems that have resulted as side-effects. With equitable entitlement to the common resources of the planet, an agreement that is fair and acceptable to all nations should be easy enough to achieve. Caps on emissions and sharing of energy efficient technologies are simply in the interest of everyone, rich or poor. And both rich and poor must now be ready to adopt less destructive technologies – based on renewables, efficiency and sustainability – both as a goal with intrinsic merit and also as an example to others. But climate is not the only critical global environmental issue that this new administration will have to deal with. Conservation of biodiversity, a crucial prerequisite for the wellbeing of all humanity, no less America, needs as much attention, and just as urgently. The United States’ self-interest in conserving living natural resources strongly converges with the global common good in every sphere: in the oceans, by arresting the precipitate decline of fish stocks and the alarming rise of acidification; on land, by regenerating the health of our soils, forests and rivers; and in the atmosphere by reducing the massive emission of pollutants from our wasteful industries, construction, agriculture and transport systems.

### Solvency

#### Plan’s easily circumvented – executive will define “active zone of hostilities” expansively to avoid the restriction

Lubell & Derejko ’13, \* Dr Noam Lubell is Reader in the Law of Armed Conflict, School of Law, University of Essex, UK, \*\* Nathan Derejko is Director of the Human Rights Clinic and PhD candidate at the School of Law, University of Essex, UK, A Global Battlefield? Drones and the Geographical Scope of Armed Conflict (November 25, 2012). Journal of International Criminal Justice, 2013, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2212185>, jj

Defining the geographical scope of an armed conflict is a matter that carries weight in more ways than one.1 Outside the legal sphere the question might seem like one that requires nothing more than common sense – if two (or more) parties are engaged in battle, then the area of conflict is wherever they are fighting. The reality – or at least the legal reality – is unfortunately one that does not conform to simple formulations. Being ‘at war’ or ‘going to war’ does not necessarily mean that the whole of a state is in fact embroiled in an armed conflict. For example, while most of Iraq became a zone of armed conflict in 2003, life for most people in the United States continued uninterrupted while its troops invaded a country on the other side of the globe. This can even be the case for both states involved, as was seen in the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas conflict between the UK and Argentina.2 The same is true for armed conflicts between a state and an organised armed group, which may be raging in one part of the country with little manifestation in other areas as is evident from the armed conflict between the armed forces of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), which, for more than 20 years, was largely confined to the southern island of Mindanao.3 Clearly then, the actual hostilities do not necessarily correspond with the borders of the states(s) concerned. Another possibility is to base the determination of geographical scope on the existence of actual fighting. In other words, wherever there are hostilities, there is an armed conflict. But this too has its obstacles, including the question of how to determine what should count as hostilities, and whether there must be a temporal consistency within a specific geographical area that would eliminate occasional flare-ups from the scope. These issues will be returned to in greater detail in later sections.

The ever-increasing use of drones as both a means and method in the pursuit of the ‘war on terror’ has given rise to concerns over the emergence of a ‘global battlefield’ whereby the entire planet is subject to the application of the laws of armed conflict and the consequences which flow from it.5 These concerns stem from drone strikes frequently occurring outside the ‘active battlefields’ of Afghanistan and into the border regions of Pakistan and expanding further afield into Yemen and Somalia. Extraterritorial drone strikes against non-state actors have thrust the question of the legal classification and regulation of transnational armed violence to the forefront of international concern and debate.6 Three foundational issues are inherent to such classification and regulation. First, there is the question of whether armed violence between a state and a non-state actor occurring in the territory of more than one state can be classified as a non-international armed conflict (NIAC) for the purposes of IHL. Conflicting opinions exist on this issue, with some commentators asserting that the concept of NIAC itself is by definition an internal armed conflict and therefore the scope of IHL is restricted to the territorial borders of the state experiencing the armed conflict.7 Others however, maintain that a NIAC is defined in contradistinction to an international armed conflict (IAC) and therefore any situation of armed violence that amounts to armed conflict, and is not an IAC, is by default a NIAC irrespective of territorial borders.8 The key criteria for determining the nature of the conflict in this case, is to be based on the legal status of the opposing parties – a conflict between two or more states is international, while a conflict between a state and a non-state armed group (or between armed groups) is non-international.9 For these reasons, and based on more detailed examination elsewhere of the applicable law,10 this work proceeds on the premise that international armed conflicts are those between states, while an armed conflict between a state and an organised armed group should be classified as non-international, even if it includes an extraterritorial manifestation.11 The second issue is then the need for determining the geographical scope of applicability of IHL during NIAC. As will be discussed throughout the course of this paper, while no single provision of IHL explicitly delineates its geographical scope, it is the application and interpretation of the individual provisions contained within IHL that are key to this determination. Although it is uncontested that IHL applies to the conduct of ‘battlefield hostilities’ between the parties to an armed conflict, the territorial parameters of the battlefield and the range of actions that fall within the remit of hostilities are neither defined in conventional IHL nor beyond debate. The third issue concerns the legal basis for and consequences of, crossing an international border during a prevailing armed conflict between a state and an organised armed group. Here divergent opinions exist as to the circumstances that warrant extraterritorial military operations and the legal implications of such operations, in particular and in relation to the second issue, the geographical scope of applicability of IHL.

#### Executive circumvents geographic restrictions, but we still access our disads because the plan causes worse legal confusion

Blank, 13 **–** professor of law at Emory (Laurie, “LEARNING TO LIVE WITH (A LITTLE) UNCERTAINTY: THE OPERATIONAL ASPECTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE GEOGRAPHY OF CONFLICT DEBATE” <http://www.pennlawreview.com/online/161-U-Pa-L-Rev-Online-347.pdf>) LOAC = Law of Armed Conflict

Third, the enforcement and accountability stage of conflict introduces similar challenges as a result of the interaction of a new law of war framework with operational needs during conflict. Accountability for legal violations during armed conflict is an essential component of ensuring LOAC compliance, thus maximizing the law's ability to protect civilians and others hors de combat and to ensure humane treatment, among other goals. Over the past few decades, the remarkable development of an international criminal jurisprudence--through the work of ad hoc tribunals, hybrid tribunals, and the International Criminal Court, among other mechanisms--has demonstrated the vital role that accountability plays in enforcing the law, in bringing justice to the victims, and, in some cases, in helping to promote reconciliation. The application of the law in the courtroom, however, must be operationally relevant in order to serve as a useful guide for commanders in future military operations. If it is not, the likelihood that the law will be seen as irrelevant or too hard to follow is unfortunately far too great and is a serious concern. n30

In the specific context of a law of war framework designed to incorporate additional procedural guarantees and legal regimes in addressing targeting and detention issues across a range of geographic spaces in a transnational conflict, these accountability challenges will loom even larger. First, the relevant legal obligations will be based not only on LOAC but on additional legal regimes as well, such as human rights law or domestic constitutional law, for example. Second, the nature of those obligations and the way in which the various legal regimes relate to each other within this new law of war paradigm will change depending on where, geographically, the relevant conduct takes place. And, as noted above, the lines between geographic areas that drive different legal obligations are not fixed during a conflict with a transnational actor, but rather will shift in accordance with the nature of the threat, the state's response, and other factors. Current cases before the military commissions in the United States already demonstrate the jurisdictional hurdles posed by a conflict whose geographic and temporal parameters are difficult to identify; n31 these challenges will be magnified exponentially if different components of the same conflict trigger different legal obligations as a result of a new framework based on a sliding scale of procedural obligations relative to geographical location and other factors. Furthermore, enforcement of LOAC always helps to guide future decisionmaking by commanders, judge advocates, and others, but the nature of an accountability process in this new law of war framework will unfortunately not foster greater clarity and predictability. Which precedents would apply in which areas, and for how long? Military commanders and other decisionmakers would be left with the unenviable task of sorting through the uncertainty of the legal precedents and judgments or might simply disregard these precedents as not applicable, an equally problematic outcome. As a result, even when a new framework offers the apparent potential for greater procedural protections or other metrics of effectiveness, if it divorces the decisionmaking and, later, the enforcement process from the operational realities of military operations, it is likely to be viewed as irrelevant or, still worse, as doing more harm than good.

***Plan hamstrings military operations---makes terrorism inevitable***

Laurie R. **Blank 12**+, + Director, International Humanitarian Law Clinic, Emory Law School, 2012, William Mitchell Law Review, 38 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 1655, NATIONAL SECURITY: PART II: ARTICLE: TARGETED STRIKES: THE CONSEQUENCES OF BLURRING THE ARMED CONFLICT AND SELF-DEFENSE JUSTIFICATIONS, Lexis, jj

**In contrast, human rights law's requirement that force only be used as a last resort when absolutely necessary for the protection of innocent victims of an attack creates an obligation to attempt to capture a suspected terrorist before any lethal targeting**. n101 **A state using force in self-defense against a terrorist cannot therefore target him or her *as a first resort* but can only do so if there are no alternatives** - **meaning that an offer of surrender or an attempt at capture has been made or is entirely unfeasible in the circumstances**. ***Thus***, if non-forceful measures can foil the terrorist attack without the use of deadly force, then ***the state may not use force in self-defense***. n102 The supremacy of the right to life means that "***even the most dangerous individual must be captured, rather than killed***, **so long as it is practically feasible to do so**, bearing in mind all of the circumstances." n103 **No more, this obligation to capture first rather than kill is not dependent on the target's efforts to surrender; the obligation actually works the other way: the forces** [\*1686] **may not use deadly force except if absolutely necessary to protect themselves or innocent persons from immediate danger, that is, self-defense or defense of others**. As with any law enforcement operation, "the intended result ... is the arrest of the suspect," n104 and therefore **every attempt must be made to capture before resorting to lethal force**.

In the abstract, the differences in the obligations regarding surrender and capture seem straightforward. The use of both armed conflict and self-defense justifications for all targeted strikes without differentiation runs the risk of conflating the two very different approaches to capture in the course of a targeting operation. This conflation, in turn, is likely to either emasculate human rights law's greater protections or undermine the LOAC's greater permissiveness in the use of force, either of which is a problematic result. An oft-cited example of the conflation of the LOAC and human rights principles appears in the 2006 targeted killings case before the Israeli Supreme Court. In analyzing the lawfulness of the Israeli government's policy of "targeted frustration," the Court held, inter alia, that

[a] civilian taking a direct part in hostilities cannot be attacked at such time as he is doing so, if a less harmful means can be employed... . Indeed, among the military means, one must choose the means whose harm to the human rights of the harmed person is smallest. Thus, if a terrorist taking a direct part in hostilities can be arrested, interrogated, and tried, those are the means which should be employed. n105

The Israeli Supreme Court's finding that targeting is only lawful if no less harmful means are available - even in the context of an armed conflict - "imposes a requirement not based in [the LOAC]." n106 Indeed, the Israeli Supreme Court "used the kernel of [\*1687] a human rights rule - that necessity must be shown for any intentional deprivation of life, to restrict the application of [a LOAC] rule - that in armed conflict no necessity need be shown for the killing of combatants or civilians taking a direct part in hostilities." n107 Although the holding is specific to Israel and likely influenced greatly by the added layer of belligerent occupation relevant to the targeted strikes at issue in the case, n108 it demonstrates some of the challenges of conflating the two paradigms.

First, **if this added obligation of less harmful means was understood to form part of the law applicable to targeted strikes in armed conflict, the result would be to disrupt the delicate balance of military necessity and humanity and the equality of arms at the heart of the LOAC**. Civilians taking direct part in hostilities - who are legitimate targets at least for the time they do so - would suddenly merit a greater level of protection than persons who are lawful combatants, a result not contemplated in the LOAC. n109 [\*1688] Second, ***soldiers faced with an obligation to always use less harmful means may well either refrain from attacking the target - leaving the innocent victims of the terrorist's planned attack unprotected - or disregard the law as unrealistic and ineffective***. **Neither option is appealing**. The former undermines the protection of innocent civilians from unlawful attack, one of the core purposes of the LOAC. **The latter weakens respect for the value and role of the LOAC altogether during conflict**, a central component of the protection of all persons in wartime.

#### Effective drone program key to combat terrorism

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Despite President Barack Obama’s recent call to reduce the United States’ reliance on drones, they will likely remain his administration’s weapon of choice. Whereas President George W. Bush oversaw fewer than 50 drone strikes during his tenure, Obama has signed off on over 400 of them in the last four years, making the program the centerpiece of U.S. counterterrorism strategy. The drones have done their job remarkably well: by killing key leaders and denying terrorists sanctuaries in Pakistan, Yemen, and, to a lesser degree, Somalia, drones have devastated al Qaeda and associated anti-American militant groups. And they have done so at little financial cost, at no risk to U.S. forces, and with fewer civilian casualties than many alternative methods would have caused.¶ Critics, however, remain skeptical. They claim that drones kill thousands of innocent civilians, alienate allied governments, anger foreign publics, illegally target Americans, and set a dangerous precedent that irresponsible governments will abuse. Some of these criticisms are valid; others, less so. In the end, drone strikes remain a necessary instrument of counterterrorism. The United States simply cannot tolerate terrorist safe havens in remote parts of Pakistan and elsewhere, and drones offer a comparatively low-risk way of targeting these areas while minimizing collateral damage.

***Plan causes safe havens---Turns 100% of their terror impact***

**Blank, 10** – Emory University School of Law International Humanitarian Law Clinic director

[Laurie, "Defining the Battlefield in Contemporary Conflict and Counterterrorism: Understanding the Parameters of the Zone of Combat," Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law, Vol. 39, No. 1, 9-16-10, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=1677965]

The ramifications of including areas within the zone of combat, such as the accompanying authority to use lethal force as a first resort, raise a variety of policy considerations. The two primary considerations weigh directly against each other and perhaps, as a result, lend credence to the need for a middle ground in defining the zone of combat. First, some argue that creating geographic limits to the battlefield has the problematic effect of granting terrorists a safe haven. For example, a member of al Qaeda can be a legitimate target as a result of continuous participation in hostilities, thus losing any immunity from attack he might have had by dint of being a civilian.105 If the zone of combat is limited geographically to certain areas, then this member of al Qaeda can avoid being targeted—and thus regain civilian immunity, in essence—simply by crossing an international border even while remaining active in a terrorist organization engaged in a conflict with the U.S.106 Geographic limits designed to curtail the use of governmental military force thus effectively grant terrorists a safe haven and extend the conflict by enabling them to regroup and continue their attacks.

### 1NC – Norms

#### Countries won’t model US drone restrictions

Etzioni ’13, Amitai Etzioni is a professor of international relations at George ¶ Washington University and author ¶ of Hot Spots: American Foreign Policy in a Post-Human-Rigid World. March-April 2013  MILITARY REVIEW, The Great Drone Debate, <http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20130430_art004.pdf>, jj

Other critics contend that by the United States ¶ using drones, it leads other countries into making and ¶ using them. For example, Medea Benjamin, the cofounder of the anti-war activist group CODEPINK ¶ and author of a book about drones argues that, “The ¶ proliferation of drones should evoke reﬂection on the ¶ precedent that the United States is setting by killing ¶ anyone it wants, anywhere it wants, on the basis of ¶ secret information. Other nations and non-state entities are watching—and are bound to start acting in ¶ a similar fashion.”60 Indeed scores of countries are ¶ now manufacturing or purchasing drones. There can ¶ be little doubt that the fact that drones have served ¶ the United States well has helped to popularize them. ¶ However, it does not follow that United States ¶ should not have employed drones in the hope that such a show of restraint would deter others. First ¶ of all, this would have meant that either the United ¶ States would have had to allow terrorists in hardto-reach places, say North Waziristan, to either ¶ roam and rest freely—or it would have had to use ¶ bombs that would have caused much greater collateral damage. ¶ Further, the record shows that even when the ¶ United States did not develop a particular weapon, ¶ others did. Thus, China has taken the lead in the ¶ development of anti-ship missiles and seemingly ¶ cyber weapons as well. One must keep in mind ¶ that the international environment is a hostile ¶ one. Countries—and especially non-state actors—¶ most of the time do not play by some set of selfconstraining rules. Rather, they tend to employ ¶ whatever weapons they can obtain that will further ¶ their interests. The United States correctly does ¶ not assume that it can rely on some non-existent ¶ implicit gentleman’s agreements that call for the ¶ avoidance of new military technology by nation X ¶ or terrorist group Y—if the United States refrains ¶ from employing that technology. ¶ I am not arguing that there are no natural norms ¶ that restrain behavior. There are certainly some ¶ that exist, particularly in situations where all parties beneﬁt from the norms (e.g., the granting of ¶ diplomatic immunity) or where particularly horrifying weapons are involved (e.g., weapons of ¶ mass destruction). However drones are but one ¶ step—following bombers and missiles—in the ¶ development of distant battleﬁeld technologies. ¶ (Robotic soldiers—or future ﬁghting machines—¶ are next in line). In such circumstances, the role ¶ of norms is much more limited.

#### No global drone aggression

Singh ’12, Joseph Singh is a researcher at the Center for a New American Security. Aug. 13, 2012, Time, Betting Against a Drone Arms Race, <http://nation.time.com/2012/08/13/betting-against-a-drone-arms-race/>, jj

Bold predictions of a coming drones arms race are all the rage since the uptake in their deployment under the Obama Administration. Noel Sharkey, for example, argues in an August 3 op-ed for the Guardian that rapidly developing drone technology — coupled with minimal military risk — portends an era in which states will become increasingly aggressive in their use of drones.¶ As drones develop the ability to fly completely autonomously, Sharkey predicts a proliferation of their use that will set dangerous precedents, seemingly inviting hostile nations to use drones against one another. Yet, the narrow applications of current drone technology coupled with what we know about state behavior in the international system lend no credence to these ominous warnings.¶ Indeed, critics seem overly-focused on the domestic implications of drone use.¶ In a June piece for the Financial Times, Michael Ignatieff writes that “virtual technologies make it easier for democracies to wage war because they eliminate the risk of blood sacrifice that once forced democratic peoples to be prudent.”¶ Significant public support for the Obama Administration’s increasing deployment of drones would also seem to legitimate this claim. Yet, there remain equally serious diplomatic and political costs that emanate from beyond a fickle electorate, which will prevent the likes of the increased drone aggression predicted by both Ignatieff and Sharkey.¶ Most recently, the serious diplomatic scuffle instigated by Syria’s downing a Turkish reconnaissance plane in June illustrated the very serious risks of operating any aircraft in foreign territory.¶ States launching drones must still weigh the diplomatic and political costs of their actions, which make the calculation surrounding their use no fundamentally different to any other aerial engagement.¶ This recent bout also illustrated a salient point regarding drone technology: most states maintain at least minimal air defenses that can quickly detect and take down drones, as the U.S. discovered when it employed drones at the onset of the Iraq invasion, while Saddam Hussein’s surface-to-air missiles were still active.¶ What the U.S. also learned, however, was that drones constitute an effective military tool in an extremely narrow strategic context. They are well-suited either in direct support of a broader military campaign, or to conduct targeted killing operations against a technologically unsophisticated enemy.¶ In a nutshell, then, the very contexts in which we have seen drones deployed. Northern Pakistan, along with a few other regions in the world, remain conducive to drone usage given a lack of air defenses, poor media coverage, and difficulties in accessing the region.

#### Drones don’t lower the threshold to war

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The Threshold to War-Argument¶ One of the arguments my friend confronted me with is that drones lower the threshold to war. This argument is often being made and particularly within the German debate this has been put forward with deafening repetition, see here and here. (Just one suggestions here, issues of war and warfare is among the areas the church should really shut up about.) In fact, recent publications on that matter by the German churches rather indicate that they have absolutely no clue. Nevertheless the argument has been made and it goes somewhat like this: Because drone strikes do not risk the life of the pilot, the threshold for entering a war is being lowered. There are a number of problems with this hypothesis:¶ 1. The only war currently being fought predominantly with drones is the war on terror or long war, as some prefer to call it. It is important to keep in mind that the onset of this war predates the use of drones. It took a while before drones turned into the instrument of choice in pursuing this war. Drones are a typical example of how warfare can drive innovation, just as the tank was only introduced in World War I after the war started to deal with trench warfare, drones were developed for a particular challenge: the need to limit casualties among non-combatants.¶ 2. For the hypothesis to be true, the threshold for going to war would have had to be lower in the wars the United States or the West were involved in ever since the war on terror began. Now, that certainly is not the case. Neither the war in Iraq, nor the intervention in Libya were launched because drones were available. In fact, both wars were being pursued by and large with the traditional arsenal of modern armies. In response one could limit the argument to saying that drones lowered the threshold in military confrontations that are of a smaller scale, what a little while ago was being dubbed military action other than war. But here again the thesis does not live up to evidence. The U.S. is currently involved in the hunt for warlord Joseph Kony and his Lord's Resistance Army in the Central African Republic (CAR), Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Chad. But this military involvement, which was undertaken only after drones became available, is being executed by special forces, not with drones.¶ 3. Finally, everybody with even the slightest idea of war and warfare knows that wars by their very nature are unpredictable and can easily escalate. When NATO intervened in Kosovo in 1999 it limited itself to an air campaign, yet the danger of eventually having to go in on the ground loomed large. The same danger of escalation is present in any military confrontation, even if the military action is initially being pursued by limited means only. Its the inherent nature of war that they tend to escalate, or as Donald Rumsfeld, the former Secretary of Defence of the United States put it in one of his famous rules: “No plan survives contact with the enemy.” Put differently, any power entering any military scenario needs to be aware that it might not be able to limit the confrontation. And though it might sometimes feel otherwise, most military advisers, and believe it or not, politicians are.

#### No impact --- China is already extremely cautious with drones

* Only our ev accounts for CCP psychology --- they want to avoid international criticism
* They aren’t confident in their drones --- think they are untested and too risky
* They don’t want to set a precedent for using drones in Asia that the US could exploit
* Only wants drones for surveillance

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Beijing, however, is unlikely to use its drones lightly. It already faces tremendous criticism from much of the international community for its perceived brazenness in continental and maritime sovereignty disputes. With its leaders attempting to allay notions that China’s rise poses a threat to the region, injecting drones conspicuously into these disputes would prove counterproductive. China also fears setting a precedent for the use of drones in East Asian hotspots that the United States could eventually exploit. For now, Beijing is showing that it understands these risks, and to date it has limited its use of drones in these areas to surveillance, according to recent public statements from China’s Defense Ministry.¶ What about using drones outside of Chinese-claimed areas? That China did not, in fact, launch a drone strike on the Burmese drug criminal underscores its caution. According to Liu Yuejin, the director of the antidrug bureau in China’s Ministry of Public Security, Beijing considered using a drone carrying a 20-kilogram TNT payload to bomb Kham’s mountain redoubt in northeast Myanmar. Kham had already evaded capture three times, so a drone strike may have seemed to be the best option. The authorities apparently had at least two plans for capturing Kham. The method they ultimately chose was to send Chinese police forces to lead a transnational investigation that ended in April 2012 with Kham’s capture near the Myanmar-Laos border. The ultimate decision to refrain from the strike may reflect both a fear of political reproach and a lack of confidence in untested drones, systems, and operators.¶ The restrictive position that Beijing takes on sovereignty in international forums will further constrain its use of drones. China is not likely to publicly deploy drones for precision strikes or in other military assignments without first having been granted a credible mandate to do so. The gold standard of such an authorization is a resolution passed by the UN Security Council, the stamp of approval that has permitted Chinese humanitarian interventions in Africa and antipiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. China might consider using drones abroad with some sort of regional authorization, such as a country giving Beijing explicit permission to launch a drone strike within its territory. But even with the endorsement of the international community or specific states, China would have to weigh any benefits of a drone strike abroad against the potential for mishaps and perceptions that it was infringing on other countries’ sovereignty -- something Beijing regularly decries when others do it.¶ The limitations on China’s drone use are reflected in the country’s academic literature on the topic. The bulk of Chinese drone research is dedicated to scientific and technological topics related to design and performance. The articles that do discuss potential applications primarily point to major combat scenarios -- such as a conflagration with Taiwan or the need to attack a U.S. aircraft carrier -- which would presumably involve far more than just drones. Chinese researchers have thought a great deal about the utility of drones for domestic surveillance and law enforcement, as well as for non-combat-related tasks near China’s contentious borders. Few scholars, however, have publicly considered the use of drone strikes overseas.¶ Yet there is a reason why the United States has employed drones extensively despite domestic and international criticism: it is much easier and cheaper to kill terrorists from above than to try to root them out through long and expensive counterinsurgency campaigns. Some similar challenges loom on China’s horizon. Within China, Beijing often considers protests and violence in the restive border regions, such as Xinjiang and Tibet, to constitute terrorism. It would presumably consider ordering precision strikes to suppress any future violence there. Even if such strikes are operationally prudent, China’s leaders understand that they would damage the country’s image abroad, but they prioritize internal stability above all else. Domestic surveillance by drones is a different issue; there should be few barriers to its application in what is already one of the world’s most heavily policed societies. China might also be willing to use stealth drones in foreign airspace without authorization if the risk of detection were low enough; it already deploys intelligence-gathering ships in the exclusive economic zones of Japan and the United States, as well as in the Indian Ocean.¶ Still, although China enjoys a rapidly expanding and cutting-edge drone fleet, it is bound by the same rules of the game as the rest of the military’s tools. Beyond surveillance, the other non-lethal military actions that China can take with its drones are to facilitate communications within the Chinese military, support electronic warfare by intercepting electronic communications and jamming enemy systems, and help identify targets for Chinese precision strike weapons, such as missiles. Beijing’s overarching approach remains one of caution -- something Washington must bear in mind with its own drone program.

#### No risk of US/China war---Chinese heg isn’t a threat, economic interdependence checks, miscalc won’t happen and deterrence checks escalation

Art ’10 (Robert J, Christian A. Herter Professor of [International Relations](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Relations) at Brandeis University and Fellow at [MIT Center for International Studies](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MIT_Center_for_International_Studies) Fall, Political Science Quarterly, Volume 125, #3, “The United States and the Rise of China: Implications for the Long Haul” <http://www.psqonline.org/99_article.php3?byear=2010&bmonth=fall&a=01free>, jj)

China does not present the type of security threat to the United States that Germany did to Britain, or Britain to Germany. Americaʼs nuclear forces make it secure from any Chinese attack on the homeland. Moreover, China clearly presents a potentially different type of threat to the United States than the Soviet Union did during the Cold War, because the geopolitics of the two situations are different. The Soviet geopolitical (as opposed to the nuclear) threat was two-fold: to conquer and dominate the economic–industrial resources of western Eurasia and to control the oil reserves of the Persian Gulf. Europe and the Persian Gulf constituted two of the five power centers of the world during the Cold War—Japan, the Soviet Union, and the United States being the other three. If the Soviets had succeeded in dominating Europe and the Persian Gulf through either conquest or political–military intimidation, then it would have controlled three of the five power centers of the world. That would have been a significant power transition. Chinaʼs rise does not constitute the same type of geopolitical threat to the United States that the Soviet Union did. If China ends up dominating the Korean peninsula and a significant part of continental Southeast Asia, so what? As long as Japan remains outside the Chinese sphere of influence and allied with the United States, and as long as the United States retains some naval footholds in Southeast Asia, such as in Singapore, the Philippines, or Indonesia, Chinaʼs domination of these two areas would not present the same type of geopolitical threat that the Soviet Union did. As long as Europe, the Persian Gulf, Japan, India, and Russia (once it reconstitutes itself as a serious great power) remain either as independent power centers or under U.S. influence, Chinese hegemony on land in East and Southeast Asia will not tip the world balance of power. The vast size and central position of the Soviet Union in Eurasia constituted a geopolitical threat to American influence that China cannot hope to emulate. If judged by the standards of the last three dominant power-rising power competitions of the last 100 years, then, the U.S.–China competition appears well placed to be much safer. Certainly, war between the two is not impossible, because either or both governments could make a serious misstep over the Taiwan issue. War by miscalculation is always possible, but the possession of nuclear weapons by both sides has to have a restraining effect on each by dramatically raising the costs of miscalculation, thereby increasing the incentives not to miscalculate. Nuclear deterrence should work to lower dramatically the possibility of war by either miscalculation or deliberate decision (or if somehow such a war broke out, then nuclear deterrence should work against its escalation into a large and fearsome one). Apart from the Taiwan issue or some serious incident at sea, it is hard to figure out how to start a war between the United States and China. There are no other territorial disputes of any significance between the two, and there are no foreseeable economic contingencies that could bring on a war between them. Finally, the high economic interdependence and the lack of intense ideological competition between them help to reinforce the pacific effects induced by the condition of mutual assured destruction. The workings of these three factors should make us cautiously optimistic about keeping Sino-American relations on the peaceful rather than the warlike track. The peaceful track does not, by any means, imply the absence of political and economic conflicts in Sino-American relations, nor does it foreclose coercive diplomatic gambits by each against the other. What it does mean is that the conditions are in place for war to be a low-probability event, if policymakers are smart in both states (see below), and that an all-out war is nearly impossible to imagine. By the historical standards of recent dominant-rising state dyads, this is no mean feat. In sum, there will be some security dilemma dynamics at work in the U.S.–China relationship, both over Taiwan and over maritime supremacy in East Asia, should China decide eventually to contest Americaʼs maritime hegemony, and there will certainly be political and military conflicts, but nuclear weapons should work to mute their severity because the security of each stateʼs homeland will never be in doubt as long as each maintains a secondstrike capability vis-à-vis the other. If two states cannot conquer one another, then the character of their relation and their competition changes dramatically.

### Pakistan

#### Status quo solves Pakistan backlash – Energy cooperation and the Strategic Dialogue forum solve any residual hostility

Xinhuanet, “ Pakistan, U.S. vow broad-based, long-term relations in joint statement”, 10/24/13, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/world/2013-10/24/c\_132827569.htm

ISLAMABAD, Oct. 24 (Xinhua) -- U.S. President Barack Obama and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif have issued a joint statement at the conclusion of Sharif's visit to the United States, expressing their conviction that an enduring U.S.-Pakistan partnership is vital to regional and international security. The two leaders also recognized their shared interest in Pakistan's economic growth and development, regional stability and mutually determined measures to counter terrorism, the joint statement issued by the Foreign Ministry in Islamabad and in Washington said Thursday. "President Obama and Prime Minister Sharif committed themselves to remaining in close contact and to continuing their efforts to build a strong, broad-based, long-term and enduring relationship between the United States and Pakistan that should serve as a foundation for the stability and prosperity of the region and around the globe,"the statement said. The two leaders reaffirmed their strong relationship between the two countries, stressing that their enduring partnership is based on the principles of respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity. "President Obama conveyed appreciation for Pakistan's internal and regional security challenges and affirmed that a peaceful, prosperous and democratic Pakistan was an essential partner for the United States in the advancement of shared goals of peace, security and socio-economic development in South Asia." Both leaders welcomed the resumption of the U.S.-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue and reaffirmed its importance as the suitable framework for guiding bilateral relationship. The dialogue was suspended in 2010 due to certain issues including the U.S. unilateral operation to kill Osama bin Laden and American raid that had killed 26 soldiers. President Obama gave the assurance that the United States would strongly support efforts to enlarge and strengthen Pakistan's economy, particularly in the energy sector, as this sector could play a critical role in ensuring the well-being and prosperity of the people of Pakistan, the statement said. President Obama noted that U.S. assistance in the energy sector has added over 1,000 megawatts of power to Pakistan's national grid, helping over 16 million Pakistanis. The U.S. president commended the resolve of the government and people of Pakistan, armed forces and law enforcement agencies to defeat terrorists and praised Pakistan for its military campaign. President Obama thanked Sharif for Pakistan's efforts to help defeat al-Qa'ida, and both Leaders expressed their deep appreciation for the sacrifices of military personnel and civilians in the fight against terrorism and extremism, the joint statement said.

#### Drone tension inevitable but it doesn’t collapse Pakistan relations

Curtis 7-15-’13, Lisa Curtis is a senior research fellow at the Heritage Foundation. July 15, 2013, The National Interest, Pakistan Makes Drones Necessary, <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/pakistan-makes-drones-necessary-8725>, jj

The U.S. will need to keep a close eye on the tribal border areas, where there is a nexus of terrorist groups that threaten not only U.S. interests but also the stability of the Pakistani state. Given that Pakistan is home to more international terrorists than almost any other country and, at the same time, has one of the fastest growing nuclear arsenals, the country will remain of vital strategic interest for Washington for many years to come.¶ Though the drone issue will continue to be a source of tension in the relationship, it is doubtful that it alone would derail ties. The extent to which the United States will continue to rely on drone strikes ultimately depends on Islamabad’s willingness to develop more decisive and comprehensive counterterrorism policies that include targeting groups like the Haqqani Network.

#### Pakistan stability up

The Nation 1/5/14, Stability luring investors to focus on Pakistan: WSJ, <http://www.nation.com.pk/business/05-Jan-2014/stability-luring-investors-to-focus-on-pakistan-wsj>, jj

ISLAMABAD - The investors are heading to Pakistan to benefit from a newly elected business-friendly government that is rolling out an economic programme to aid the struggling economy, the Wall Street Journal reported. In its report published, the American daily said the benchmark index traded in the financial capital Karachi jumped 49.4pc last year, ranking as one of the world’s top performers. The market jumped another 2.8pc Thursday, the first trading day of 2014. The report said the rally is also part of a broad move by money managers, willing to take on high risks in frontier markets across the globe on hopes of juicy returns that beat traditional emerging markets. That bet paid off handsomely in 2013 with countries including Argentina, Venezuela and Vietnam also scoring big gains although they also have a history of volatile movements and sudden declines. The report observed that the catalyst in Pakistan was the election in May of the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz led by Nawaz Sharif, a business-friendly politician. It is the first time in the nation’s history an elected government has handed over power to another, raising expectations for improved political stability. Flows from foreign investors into Pakistan reached $283 million from the beginning of May, the month of the election, to the end of 2013, according to the National Clearing Company of Pakistan. Global investors have also snapped up Pakistani government bonds with yields, which move inversely to prices, falling to 7.54pc recently from as high as 11.69pc in April on the 10-year bond. In a further sign of growing confidence, the government said last month it is also aiming to sell billions of rupee debt aimed at the Pakistani diaspora. A spokesman for the finance ministry said there is currently no specific timeframe on the issuance of the bonds. It said that the optimism stems from the government paying off $5 billion in debt that was weighing on the energy sector, freeing up funds at fuel importers and power producers and distributors. The country also agreed to a long-term bailout loan of at least $6.6 billion from the International Monetary Fund to avoid a potential balance of payments crisis. The government has in addition announced a far reaching privatization programme which will include the national airline and electricity producers. The energy move was important given the country is plagued by electricity shortages, while the oil and gas sector accounts for nearly a third of the benchmark index in Karachi. The largest company on the index, energy firm Oil and Gas Development Co. rose 43.5% last year. “Given that the general impression of the new government has been corporate friendly that is a very strong factor that made people more optimistic about Pakistan,” said Mattias Martinsson, chief investment officer and partner at fund company Tundra Fonder in Stockholm, which runs a $30 million Pakistan fund. For all the gains however, the market is small with the market capitalization of the companies listed in Karachi at around $52 billion, according to securities firm Foundation Securities research. That compares to neighboring India where the companies on the Bombay Stock Exchange are valued at around $1.1 trillion. “Pakistan as a market has very many companies that are trading below their fair value, but as it goes you get distracted by other more important markets,” said Arnout van Rijn, chief investment officer at Robeco Asia Pacific in Hong Kong, who manages the $1.2 billion Robeco Asia-Pacific Equities fund. The market has been up since the end of 2008 however, with shares soaring 329pc to the end of 2013 - despite the country being hit by terrorism, the economy nose-diving and Karachi suffering law and order situation during that period. Some investors say that those companies that survive both a weak economy and regular violence throughout the country are well run, resilient and especially appealing. Unilever Pakistan Foods Ltd, a unit of the consumer goods giant, shot up 116pc last year. “When you have to deal in this kind of environment, I think you have to be extremely good as management to deal with it and survive,” said Thomas Vester, fund manager at Lloyd George Management, who runs the firm’s frontier market investments, and manages assets worth $656 million as of Oct. 31. And the relative political stability now is encouraging more investors to focus on the country whose population of around 180 million makes it the sixth most populous country in the world and a potential draw for those betting on rising incomes and more consumer spending. The market remains cheap even after the strong run-up earlier this year - currently trading at over nine times trailing 12 month earnings - a common valuation measure used by stock analysts. “Pakistan has a fairly diverse economy with a large and young population that needs to be fed and supplied basic infrastructure such as electricity,” said Caglar Somek, global portfolio manager at Caravel Management in New York, which manages around $650 million.

#### Pakistan resilient

Sunil Dasgupta '13 Ph.D. in political science and the director of UMBC's Political Science Program and a senior fellow at Brookings, 2/25/13, "How will India respond to civil war in Pakistan," East Asia Forum, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/02/25/how-will-india-respond-to-civil-war-in-pakistan/

Bill Keller of the New York Times [has described Pakistani president Asif Ail Zardari](http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/18/magazine/bill-keller-pakistan.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0) as overseeing ‘a ruinous kleptocracy that is spiraling deeper into economic crisis’. But in contrast to predictions of an unravelling nation, British journalist-scholar [Anatol Lieven argues](http://www.anu.edu.au/vision/videos/6291/) that the Pakistani state is likely to continue muddling through its many problems, unable to resolve them but equally predisposed against civil war and consequent state collapse. Lieven finds that the strong bonds of family, clan, tribe and the nature of South Asian Islam prevent modernist movements — propounded by the government or by the radicals — from taking control of the entire country.¶ Lieven’s analysis is more persuasive than the widespread view that Pakistan is about to fail as a state. The formal institutions of the Pakistani state are surprisingly robust given the structural conditions in which they operate. Indian political leaders recognise Pakistan’s resilience. Given the bad choices in Pakistan, they would rather not have anything to do with it. If there is going to be a civil war, why not wait for the two sides to exhaust themselves before thinking about intervening? The 1971 war demonstrated India’s willingness to exploit conditions inside Pakistan, but to break from tradition requires strong, countervailing logic, and those elements do not yet exist. [Given the current conditions](http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/12/30/pakistans-bleak-outlook-lightened-by-the-game-changer-with-india/) and those in the foreseeable future, India is likely to sit out a Pakistani civil war while covertly coordinating policy with the United States.

#### Powers will work together to stabilize the region—security and economic incentives

Gresh 12 (Dr. Geoffrey F., Assistant Professor of International Security Studies at National Defense University, “Russia, China, and stabilizing South Asia”, 3/12, http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/03/12/russia\_china\_and\_stabilizing\_south\_asia)

As the U.S. begins to withdraw troops from Afghanistan, Russia and China have both declared a desire to increase their military presence throughout Central and South Asia. This new regional alignment, however, should not be viewed as a threat to U.S. strategic national interests but seen rather as concurrent with strategic and regional interests of the United States: regional peace, stability and the prevention of future terrorist safe havens in ungoverned territories. As China and Russia begin to flex their military muscles, the U.S. military should harness their expanded regional influence to promote proactively a new period of responsible multilateral support for Afghanistan and Pakistan. This past December it became clearer that Russia had begun to re-assert its regional presence when the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) granted Russia the veto power over any member state's future decision to host a foreign military. CSTO members, including Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, have become increasingly valuable U.S. partners in the Northern Distribution Network after Pakistan shut down U.S. military supply routes running from the south into Afghanistan when NATO troops killed 24 Pakistani soldiers last November in the border area of Salala. Though it appears the route may soon open again, the United States must still adopt a new strategy that works more closely with Russia and the CSTO to maintain the Northern Distribution Network long into the future, which currently accounts for about 60 percent of all cargo transiting Central Asia en route to Afghanistan. Certainly, the U.S. risks being unable to control many aspects of the Northern Distribution Network as it withdraws from the region, and this may in turn adversely affect Afghanistan's future success. However, if the United States remains concerned about leaving the region to a historically obdurate regional rival like Russia, it should also bear in mind that Russia has a vital strategic interest in the future stability of the region. Russia has approximately 15 million Muslims living within its borders, with an estimated 2 million Muslims in Moscow. Russia is fearful of what occurs on its periphery and wants to minimize the spread of Muslim extremism that may originate from an unstable Afghanistan or Pakistan. In addition, Russia does not want regional instability that threatens its oil and gas investments. In particular, Russia wants to ensure that it continues to influence the planning and implementation of the potentially lucrative natural gas pipeline that may one day traverse Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. In a recent meeting with Pakistani Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov discussed Russia's commitment to preserving peace and stability throughout § Marked 18:20 § the AfPak region, and rejected the use of violence by al-Qaeda and its affiliates that aim to undermine the current Afghan government. Furthermore, he pledged to bolster bilateral ties and work cooperatively with Pakistan to achieve stability in Afghanistan. A newly-elected President Vladimir Putin also recently wrote in a campaign brief that "Russia will help Afghanistan develop its economy and strengthen its military to fight terrorism and drug production." It is not lost on the U.S. government that Russia is proposing to succeed where the U.S. has struggled. However, if Russia does succeed in helping establish a secure Afghanistan and Pakistan that can prevent the spread of bases for terrorism then it is a victory for everyone. Aside from Pakistan, and in line with promoting security throughout the region, Russia announced recently that it will provide $16 million to Kyrgyzstan to assist with border security in the south. Russia also agreed recently to pay $15 million in back rent for its four military facilities across the country, including an air base, a torpedo test center on Lake Issyk-Kul, and a communications center in the south. Further, Russia signed a security pact with Tajikistan last fall to extend its basing lease for 49 years, in addition to a bilateral agreement that will enable Russia to become more integrated into Tajikistan's border security forces that oversee an 830-mile border with Afghanistan. Providing similar types of U.S. aid and security support will also help ensure that the valuable Northern Distribution Network remains open and secure for supply lines into Afghanistan. If the northern trade routes are shut down it would adversely affect aid arriving to Afghanistan and therefore jeopardize the stability of Afghanistan and the region. It would also be in opposition to Russia's regional interests. Rather than citing these examples in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan as a demonstration of how the U.S. will soon lose out in the region to a resurgent Russia, policymakers can view them as an indication of how Russian interests align with the U.S. to help maintain regional security. More importantly, if Russia wants to take a more active future role in Central Asia, the U.S. should address this shift and work directly with Russia and other CSTO members to ensure that the Northern Distribution Network remains operational in the distant future. Certainly, the U.S. should not be naïve to think that Russia will not at times oppose U.S. regional interests and that there will not be significant areas of conflict. In 2009, Russia tried to convince then President of Kyrgyzstan Kurmanbek Bakiyev to terminate the U.S. contract for its base in Manas. In this case, the U.S. fended off the threat of expulsion successfully through promises of increased U.S. military and economic aid. Continuing to maintain significant amounts of aid to the Central Asia Republics will therefore provide additional incentives to ensure the U.S. is less vulnerable to Russian whims, while at the same time remaining present and active for the benefit of regional security and the maintenance of the Northern Distribution Network. Another powerful regional player, China, also has a vested interest in the stability of the AfPak region, and has already begun to play a more active security role. It was reported this past January, for example, that China intends to establish one or more bases in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Subsequently, at the end of February, Beijing played host to the first China-Afghanistan-Pakistan trilateral dialogue to discuss regional cooperation and stability. Due to China's shared borders and vibrant trade with both Afghanistan and Pakistan -- not to mention China's estimated 8 million Turkic-speaking Muslim Uyghurs living in western Xinjiang Province -- it has a direct interest in ensuring that both Afghanistan and Pakistan remain stable long into the future. Bilateral trade between China and Pakistan, for example, increased 28 percent in the past year to approximately $8.7 billion. China also signed an oil agreement with Afghanistan in December that could be worth $7 billion over the next two decades. Additionally, China is concerned about the rise of its Uyghur separatist movement that maintains safe havens in both countries, in addition to the spread of radical Islam. The United States should push China to become more actively engaged in Pakistan's security affairs as China has a direct interest in moderating radicalism in Pakistan and keeping it stable. Indicative of Pakistan's strategic value to China, since 2002 China has financed the construction and development of Pakistan's Gwadar deep water port project. China has contributed more than $1.6 billion toward the port's development as a major shipping and soon-to-be naval hub, which is located just 250 miles from the opening of the Persian Gulf. A Pakistan Supreme Court decision in 2011 enabled China to take full control of Gwadar from a Singapore management company further establishing China's firm position in the Pakistani port city. The creation of a new Chinese military network in Pakistan between Gwadar and the FATA would enable China to oversee the transit and protection of Chinese goods and investments that travel from both the coast and interior through the Karakorum corridor to China's Xinjiang Province. China already has an estimated 4,000 troops in Gilgit Baltistan, part of the larger and disputed Kashmir, and just recently it was reported after a January 2012 trip by Pakistani Army Chief General Ashfaq Kayani to China that Pakistan is considering leasing Gilgit Baltistan to China for the next 50 years. Such a move would indeed escalate tensions with India to the south, but from a Pakistani perspective, China would be positioned better than it already is to assist with any future Pakistani national security concerns. And from a Chinese perspective, it would improve their ability to monitor any illicit Uyghur activities aimed at inciting further rebellion in western China. With interest comes responsibility, and in the wake of the recent reports predicting the establishment of a more robust Chinese military network across Pakistan, it is time that China begins to supplement its increased involvement in Pakistan by helping to maintain peace and stability throughout the entire AfPak region. Certainly after fighting two long wars, the United States can no longer be the sole world power responsible for the region, and both China and Russia have been U.S. security free-riders for too long. They have benefited financially while NATO continues to lose soldiers and accrue a massive war debt. After 11 years of war, it is time the United States work more proactively with Russia, China, Pakistan and the Central Asian Republics to create solutions for the future stability and collective security of the region. Indeed, we may not have a choice, and the United States should embrace the transformation of a new era in Eurasia's heartland.

#### No impact – security upgrades

Ansari, 1/15/14 [“Study Highlights Improvements in Pakistani Nuclear Safety”, Usman, <http://www.defensenews.com/article/20140115/DEFREG03/301150021/Study-Highlights-Improvements-Pakistani-Nuclear-Safety>]

ISLAMABAD — Pakistan is the most improved nuclear weapon state when it comes to securing its nuclear assets, according to the 2014 Nuclear Threat Initiative Nuclear Materials Security Index. Analysts credit this to Pakistan’s efforts to safeguard nuclear facilities and material, as well as to increase transparency, though there is room for improvement. The report puts Pakistan in the top 10 of improved states out of a total of 25 surveyed, but the most improved of the nine nuclear weapon states. The report states Pakistan “demonstrated the largest improvement of any nuclear-armed state. Pakistan is taking steps to update its nuclear security regulations and to implement nuclear security best practices.” “Pakistan has been very transparent about its obligations and the steps taken to meet its international commitments, being a party to international conventions related to safety and security,” said Mansoor Ahmed of Quaid-i-Azam University’s Department of Defence and Strategic Studies, who specializes in Pakistan’s national deterrent and delivery program. “Pakistan’s safety and security architecture and procedures are internationally recognized and appreciated in spite of the unusually microscopic spotlight on the country’s nuclear program.” These consist of “human and personnel reliability programs, multilayered physical security of various nuclear facilities and assets, safety oversight and compliance through the autonomous [Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority] nuclear material accounting and control procedures.” In terms of physical security, Ahmed highlights the establishment of a specially trained 25,000 strong nuclear security force “to enhance physical security of fixed sites.” Pakistan’s profile with the Nuclear Threat Index states that efforts to improve the safety of Pakistan’s nuclear assets added nine points in the “security and control measures” criteria. “Pakistan’s improvement is primarily due to an increased score for on-site physical protection resulting from new laws and regulations requiring licensees to provide physical protection to nuclear sites and on-site reviews of security,” the report states. The physical security of nuclear facilities was reviewed by the Army chief, Gen. Raheel Sharif, during a Jan. 10 visit to the Strategic Planning Division (SPD). The SPD oversees all aspects of the civil and military applications of atomic energy in addition to the development, security, storage, deployment and employment of warheads, delivery systems and strategic forces, as well as Pakistan’s space programs. Former Australian defense attaché to Islamabad, Brian Cloughley, whose recent fourth edition of his “History of the Pakistan Army” includes a new chapter covering Pakistan’s nuclear assets and surrounding issues, said the nuclear facilities are safe and secure from attack. He even highlights that the US leadership and Indian military leadership have expressed similar opinions in the past, and attributes much of this to the force tasked with ensuring the physical security of the nuclear assets. “The protection force is well-trained and effective, so I consider that while there should, of course, be no relaxation in security measures, there is no reason to be concerned that there will be acquisition of nuclear material by terrorists,” Cloughley said. “One area where improvement might be needed is emergency preparedness and response in case of a nuclear accident, where both India and Pakistan lack institutional capacity as it requires specialized medical facilities, logistics and post-disaster management and rehabilitation capabilities,” Ahmed said. “This is an area which is of a nonsensitive nature, and both countries have signed an Agreement to Reduce the Risk of Nuclear Accidents in 2007 and reaffirmed it for another five years in 2012, but no publicly known practical measures are believed to have been taken by either side on a cooperative or unilateral basis.” The report states Pakistan could improve by “strengthening its laws and regulations for physical security of material during transport to reflect the latest [International Atomic Energy Agency] nuclear security guidelines, and for mitigating the insider threat” through personnel reporting “suspicious behavior and requiring constant surveillance of areas of facilities where nuclear material is located.” Analysts agree, however, that the danger from a physical attack on Pakistan’s nuclear assets often quoted in Western media is exaggerated.

#### No nuclear retaliation

Neely 3/21/13 Meggaen Neely is a research intern for the Project on Nuclear Issues, Center for Strategic & International Studies, 3/21/13, Doubting Deterrence of Nuclear Terrorism, <http://csis.org/blog/doubting-deterrence-nuclear-terrorism>, jj

Because of the difficulty of deterring transnational actors, many deterrence advocates shift the focus to deterring state sponsors of nuclear terrorism. The argument applies whether or not the state intended to assist nuclear terrorists. If terrorists obtain a nuclear weapon or fissile materials from a state, the theory goes, then the United States will track the weapon’s country of origin using nuclear forensics, and retaliate against that country. If this is U.S. policy, advocates predict that states will be deterred from assisting terrorists with their nuclear ambitions.¶ ¶ Yet, let’s think about the series of events that would play out if a terrorist organization detonated a weapon in the United States. Let’s assume forensics confirmed the weapon’s origin, and let’s assume, for argument’s sake, that country was Pakistan. Would the United States then retaliate with a nuclear strike? If a nuclear attack occurs within the next four years (a reasonable length of time for such predictions concerning current international and domestic politics), it seems unlikely.¶ ¶ Why? First, there’s the problem of time. Though nuclear forensics is useful, it takes time to analyze the data and determine the country of origin. Any justified response upon a state sponsor would not be swift. Second, even if the United States proved the country of origin, it would then be difficult to determine that Pakistan willingly and intentionally sponsored nuclear terrorism. If Pakistan did, then nuclear retaliation might be justified. However, if Pakistan did not, nuclear retaliation over unsecured nuclear materials would be a disproportionate response and potentially further detrimental. Should the United States launch a nuclear strike at Pakistan, Islamabad could see this as an initial hostility by the United States, and respond adversely. An obvious choice, given current tensions in South Asia, is for Pakistan to retaliate against a U.S. nuclear launch on its territory by initiating conflict with India, which could turn nuclear and increase the exchanges of nuclear weapons.¶ ¶ Hence, it seems more likely that, after the international outrage at a terrorist group’s nuclear detonation, the United States would attempt to stop the bleeding without a nuclear strike. Instead, some choices might include deploying forces to track down those that supported the suicide terrorists that detonated the weapon, pressuring Pakistan to exert its sovereignty over fringe regions such as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, and increasing the number of drone strikes in Waziristan. Given the initial attack, such measures might understandably seem more of a concession than the retaliation called for by deterrence models, even more so by the American public.¶ ¶ This is not an argument against those technologies associated with nuclear forensics. The United States and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) should continue their development and distribution.¶ ¶ Instead, I question the presumed American response that is promulgated by deterrence advocates. By looking at possibilities for a U.S. response to nuclear terrorism, a situation in which we assume that deterrence has failed, we cast doubt on the likelihood of a U.S. retaliatory nuclear strike and hence cast doubt on the credibility of a U.S. retaliatory nuclear strike as a deterrent. Would the United States launch a nuclear weapon now unless it was sure of another state’s intentional sponsorship of nuclear terrorism? Any reasonable doubt of sponsorship might stay the United States’ nuclear hand. Given the opaqueness of countries’ intentions, reasonable doubt over sponsorship is inevitable to some degree. Other countries are probably aware of U.S. hesitance in response to terrorists’ use of nuclear weapons. If this thought experiment is true, then the communication required for credible retaliatory strikes under deterrence of nuclear terrorism is missing.

#### Zero risk of Indo Pak nuclear war

Economic Times 5-17-11 (“No chance of Indo-Pak nuclear war despite 'sabre rattling': Pak nuclear scientist A Q Khan” <http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2011-05-17/news/29552014_1_nuclear-blackmail-nuclear-secrets-india-and-pakistan>, jj)

NEW YORK: Pakistan's disgraced nuclear scientist A Q Khan has said that despite "sabre rattling" between Islamabad and New Delhi, there is no chance of a nuclear war between the two neighbours. Khan, who has been accused of selling nuclear secrets to Iran, Libya and Syria, wrote in Newsweek magazine that nuclear weapons in both countries had prevented war for the last 40 years. "India doesn't need more than five weapons to hurt us badly, and we wouldn't need more than 10 to return the favour," he said. "That is why there has been no war between us for the past 40 years." "India and Pakistan understand the old principle that ensured peace in the Cold War: mutually assured destruction," he said. "The two (India and Pakistan) can't afford a nuclear war, and despite our sabre rattling, there is no chance of a nuclear war that would send us both back to the Stone Age," he said. He claimed that Pakistan had to invest in a nuclear programme "to ward off nuclear blackmail from India".

#### No Indian intervention

Sunil Dasgupta '13 Ph.D. in political science and the director of UMBC's Political Science Program and a senior fellow at Brookings, 2/25/13, "How will India respond to civil war in Pakistan," East Asia Forum, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/02/25/how-will-india-respond-to-civil-war-in-pakistan/

In 2013, prospects of another [civil war in Pakistan](http://tribune.com.pk/story/487017/the-2013-jitters/) — this time one that pits radical Islamists against the secular but authoritarian military — have led once again to questions about what India would do. What would trigger Indian intervention, and who would India support?¶ **In the context of a civil war between Islamists and the army in Pakistan**, **it is hard to imagine Pakistani refugees streaming into India and triggering intervention as the Bengalis did in 1971**. **Muslim Pakistanis do not see India as a refuge**, and Taliban fighters are likely to seek refuge in Afghanistan, especially if the United States leaves the region.¶ A more selective spillover, such as the increased threat of terrorism, is possible. **But a civil war inside Pakistan is more likely to** [**train radical attention on Pakistan itself**](http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/12/12/extremism-in-pakistan-the-more-things-change/) **than on India.**¶In fact, the real problem for India would be in Afghanistan. India has already staked a claim in the Afghan endgame, so if Islamists seek an alliance with an Afghan government favoured by India, New Delhi’s best option might be to side covertly with the Islamists against the Pakistani army. But this is unlikely, because for India to actually side with Islamists, US policy in Pakistan and Afghanistan would have to change dramatically.¶ Conversely, for India to back the Pakistani army over the Islamists, Indian leaders would need to see a full and verifiable settlement of all bilateral disputes with India, including Kashmir, and/or the imminent fall of Pakistani nuclear weapons into the hands of Islamists.¶ In the first case, [a Kashmir resolution is not only unrealistic](http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/09/14/india-and-pakistan-a-decade-since-operation-parakram/), but also likely to weaken the legitimacy of the Pakistani army itself, jeopardising the army’s prospects in the civil war. In the second case, Indian leaders would need to have independent (non-US/UK) intelligence, or alternatively see US action (such as a military raid on Pakistani nuclear facilities) that convinces them that nuclear weapons are about to pass into terrorist hands. Neither of those triggers is likely to exist in the near future.¶ As it is, India and Pakistan have gone down to the nuclear edge four times — in 1986, 1990, 1999 and 2001–02. In each case, India responded in a manner that did not escalate the conflict. Any incursion into Pakistan was extremely limited. An Indian intervention in a civil war in Pakistan would be subject to the same limitations — at least so long as the Pakistani army maintains its integrity.¶ Given the new US–India ties, the most important factor in determining the possibility and nature of Indian intervention in a possible Pakistani civil war is Washington. If the United States is able to get Kabul and Islamabad to work together against the Taliban, as it is trying to do now, then India is likely to continue its current policy or try to preserve some influence in Afghanistan, especially working with elements of the Northern Alliance.¶ India and Afghanistan already have a strategic partnership agreement in place that creates the framework for their bilateral relationship to grow, but the degree of actual cooperation will depend on how Pakistan and the Taliban react. If Indian interests in Afghanistan come under attack, New Delhi might have to pull back. The Indian government has been quite clear about not sending troops to Afghanistan.¶ If the United States shifts its policy to where it has to choose Kabul over Islamabad, in effect reviving the demand for an independent Pashtunistan, India is likely to be much more supportive of US and Afghan goals. The policy shift, however, carries the risk of a full-fledged proxy war with Pakistan in Afghanistan, but should not involve the prospect of a direct Indian intervention in Pakistan itself.¶ India is not likely to initiate an intervention that causes the Pakistani state to fail.

# 2NC

## Solvency

### Warfighting DA---2NC

#### The disad turns the entire case---legally codifying geographic limits causes the U.S. to circumvent the ban by relying on even worse legal justifications---that’s clearly net worse for both norms and allied perception

Geoffrey Corn 13, Professor of Law and Presidential Research Professor, South Texas College of Law, 2013, “Geography of Armed Conflict: Why it is a Mistake to Fish for the Red Herring,” International Legal Studies, 89 INT’L L. STUD. 77 (2013)

**\*\*NOTE**: “Sub rosa” denotes secrecy or confidentiality – Wikipedia

The law of conflict regulation is arguably at a critical crossroads. If threat drives strategy, and strategy drives the existence of armed conflict, the concept of TAC seems an unavoidable reality in the modern strategic environment. Opponents of TAC will continue to argue for limiting armed conflict to the well–accepted inter–State or intra–State hostilities frame-works, but this would only drive States to adopt sub rosa uses of the same type of power under the guise of legal fictions. Concepts such as self–defense targeting, or internationalized law enforcement, might avoid the armed conflict characterization, but they would do little to resolve the un-derlying uncertainties associated with TAC. Even worse, they would inject regulatory uncertainty into the planning and execution of military counter-terror operations, and expose those called upon to put themselves in harm’s way to protect the State to legal liabilities based on inapposite legal norms.

#### Plan divorces the scope of armed conflict from operational reality—dooms warfighting

Geoffrey Corn 13, Professor of Law and Presidential Research Professor, South Texas College of Law, 2013, “Geography of Armed Conflict: Why it is a Mistake to Fish for the Red Herring,” International Legal Studies, 89 INT’L L. STUD. 77 (2013)

History demonstrates that the scope of armed conflict—whether inter-national or non-international—is threat driven. Strategic reality indicates that States engaged in armed conflict will, and in fact often must, “take the fight to the enemy.” But this does not mean that other considerations, principally diplomatic and political, are not also relevant to the actual scope of military operations associated with an armed conflict. Like so many oth-er aspects of international law, authority rarely imposes obligation, and States take into account a variety of diplomatic, military, and policy consid-erations when choosing when and where to assert combat power against an enemy. One element in this equation is always the tactical, operational, and strategic value of attacking a particular lawful target. This value assessment must be balanced against second and third-order negative consequences of exercising attack authority. In the “hot zone” context, this analysis is cen-tral to the tactical and operational targeting process, where commanders routinely refrain from attacking a lawful target because they conclude doing so will not be worth the costs attendant in attack.49 At the strategic level, when the target is identified outside the “hot zone,” diplomatic conse-quences of asserting military power in the territory of another State must be included among these “costs.” Because such costs are so significant, States often refrain from exercising this authority.

### 2NC Safe Haven Link

#### Geographic restrictions doom counter-terror- safe havens

Majidyar, 13 -- American Enterprise Institute senior research associate

[Ahmad, “We Need Military Authorization Until Al-Qaida Is No Longer a Threat,” June 17th, http://www.usnews.com/debate-club/should-the-authorization-for-use-of-military-force-be-repealed/we-need-military-authorization-until-al-qaida-is-no-longer-a-threat]

It is therefore premature and dangerous to repeal or significantly restrict the AUMF at this point, since it would undercut the effectiveness of U.S. counterterrorism efforts to deal with al-Qaida-related emerging threats worldwide. Suggestions to incorporate temporal and geographical limitations into the AUMF are also ill-advised. Confining the law to a specific number of countries or terrorist groups would give the enemy more freedom of action and allow it to create new fronts and sanctuaries in areas immune from U.S. counterterrorism operations. In his counterterrorism policy speech three weeks ago, President Obama promised to continue a "series of persistent, targeted efforts to dismantle specific networks of violent extremists that threaten America." In the absence of the AUMF, such actions would become untenable and devoid of a legal basis. At present, the AUMF provides the administration with adequate authorities to pursue the war. Until al-Qaida and associated forces are degraded to a level where they pose no substantial national security threat to the United States, the law should not be repealed or replaced.

#### Safe havens key to global operations

CRT, 6 [Country Reports on Terrorism, annual report published by the U.S. Department of State, "Chapter 3 -- Terrorist Safe Havens," 4-28-6, www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2005/, accessed 8-19-13, mss]

Physical safe havens provide security for many senior terrorist leaders, allowing them to plan and to inspire acts of terrorism around the world. The presence of terrorist safe havens in a nation or region is not necessarily related to state sponsorship of terrorism. In most instances cited in this chapter, areas or communities serve as terrorist safe havens despite the government’s best efforts to prevent this. Denying terrorists safe haven plays a major role in undermining terrorists’ capacity to operate effectively, and thus forms a key element of U.S. counterterrorism strategy as well as the cornerstone of UN Security Council Resolution 1373 that was adopted in September 2001. UNSCR 1373 specifically targets terrorists’ ability to move across international borders and find safe haven, to solicit and move funds, and to acquire weapons; it also calls on states that do not have laws criminalizing terrorist activity and support to enact such laws.

#### Restricting targeting killing outside of zones of active hostilities means the US can’t strike in Pakistan or Yemen.

JCSL 13 [Journal of Conﬂict & Security Law, Vol. 18 No. 1, p. 1-2, “Deterrence Revisited?” Oxford University Press Journals]

The other mentioned issue is that of drones (unmanned aerial vehicles), not in the case of information gathering but when used for targeted killings. In reading the legal justifications, one comes to the conclusion that there remains much ambiguity regarding the applicable rules of international law. With regard to using drones outside a zone of armed conflict, with regard to Al Qai’da and its associates, the opinion within the Obama Administration appears to be that this is permitted under the President’s Authorization for Use of Military Force against al-Qa’ida—the 2001 authorization adopted after the 9/11 attack. The Department of Justice White Paper 1 argues that case. It is focused primarily on the targeted killing of a US citizen abroad who is regarded as an Al Qa’ida operative. The position taken is that the USA is in a non-international armed conflict with al-Qa’ida. ‘Any U.S. operation would be part of this non-international armed conflict, even if it were to take place away from the zone of active hostilities.’ Stretching this argument, it is put forth that the USA is allowed to defend itself whenever it concludes that individuals are part of al-Qa’ida, or associated with it, by targeting these individuals wherever they are found. This appears to be the current legal reasoning for the broad use of targeted killings by drones in places like Yemen or Pakistan. As in the case of cyber warfare, the criteria in making these decisions are secret. And, similar to the cyber weapons issue, this development is the result of technological advancements that have led to new types of weapons.

### SS key

#### Effective drone program key to combat terrorism

Byman ’13, DANIEL BYMAN is a Professor in the Security Studies Program at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and a Senior Fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution. Foreign Affairs, July/August 2013, Why Drones Work: The Case for Washington’s Weapon of Choice, online

Despite President Barack Obama’s recent call to reduce the United States’ reliance on drones, they will likely remain his administration’s weapon of choice. Whereas President George W. Bush oversaw fewer than 50 drone strikes during his tenure, Obama has signed off on over 400 of them in the last four years, making the program the centerpiece of U.S. counterterrorism strategy. The drones have done their job remarkably well: by killing key leaders and denying terrorists sanctuaries in Pakistan, Yemen, and, to a lesser degree, Somalia, drones have devastated al Qaeda and associated anti-American militant groups. And they have done so at little financial cost, at no risk to U.S. forces, and with fewer civilian casualties than many alternative methods would have caused.¶ Critics, however, remain skeptical. They claim that drones kill thousands of innocent civilians, alienate allied governments, anger foreign publics, illegally target Americans, and set a dangerous precedent that irresponsible governments will abuse. Some of these criticisms are valid; others, less so. In the end, drone strikes remain a necessary instrument of counterterrorism. The United States simply cannot tolerate terrorist safe havens in remote parts of Pakistan and elsewhere, and drones offer a comparatively low-risk way of targeting these areas while minimizing collateral damage.

#### Turns the Pakistan advantage

Foust ’12, Joshua Foust is a fellow at the American Security Project and the author of Afghanistan Journal: Selections from Registan.net. He is also a member of the Young Atlanticist Working Group. 9-26-’12, The Atlantic, Targeted Killing, Pro and Con: What to Make of U.S. Drone Strikes in Pakistan, <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/09/targeted-killing-pro-and-con-what-to-make-of-us-drone-strikes-in-pakistan/262862/>, jj

In the short run, there aren't better choices than drones. The targets of drone strikes in Pakistan sponsor insurgents in the region that kill U.S. soldiers and destabilize the Pakistani state (that is why Pakistani officials demand greater control over targeting). They cannot simply be left alone to continue such violent attacks. And given the Pakistani government's reluctance either to grant the FATA the political inclusion necessary for normal governance or to establish an effective police force (right now it has neither), there is no writ of the state to impose order and establish the rule of law.¶ Drones represent the choice with the smallest set of drawbacks and adverse consequences. Reports like Living Under Drones highlight the need for both more transparency from the US and Pakistani governments, and for drawing attention to the social backlash against their use in Pakistan. But they do not definitively build a case against drones in general. Without a better alternative, drones are here to stay.

***Targeting low-level militants is key to all aspects of counter-terror***

Gregory **McNeal 13**, Associate Professor of Law, Pepperdine University, 3/5/13, “Targeted Killing and Accountability,” <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1819583>

This becomes obvious when one considers that national security bureaucrats will look beyond criticality and vulnerability, and also engage in network-based analysis. **Network-based analysis looks at terrorist groups as nodes connected by links**, and assesses how components of that terrorist network operate together and independently of one another.143 **Contrary to** popular **critiques of the targeting process that liken it to a “haphazardly prosecuted assassination program,”** in reality **modern targeting involves applying pressure to various nodes and links within networks to disrupt and degrade their functionality**.144

**To effectively pursue a network-based approach, bureaucrats rely** in part **on** what is known as “**pattern of life analysis**” which involves “connecting the relationships between places and people by tracking their patterns of life.” This analysis draws on the interrelationships among groups “to determine the degree and points of their interdependence,” it assesses how activities are linked and looks to “determine the most effective way to influence or affect the enemy system.”145 While the enemy moves from point to point, reconnaissance or surveillance tracks and notes every location and person visited. **Connections between the target, the sites they visit, and the persons they interact with are documented**, built into a network diagram, and further analyzed.146 Through this process **links and nodes in the enemy's network emerge**.147 The analysis charts the “social, economic and political networks that underpin and support clandestine networks,”148 identifying key decision-makers and those who support or influence them indirectly.149 This may mean that analysts will track logistics and money trails, they may identify key facilitators and non-leadership persons of interests, and they will exploit human and signals intelligence combined with computerized knowledge integration that generates and cross-references thousands of data points to construct a comprehensive picture of the enemy network.150 “This analysis has the effect of taking a shadowy foe and revealing his physical infrastructure . . . as a result, **the network becomes more visible and vulnerable,** thus **negating the enemy’s asymmetric advantage of denying a target**.”151

**Viewing targeting in this way demonstrates how** ***seemingly low-level individuals*** **such as couriers and other “middle-men” in** decentralized networks such as **al Qaeda are** ***oftentimes critical to the successful functioning of the enemy organization***.152 **Targeting these individuals can** “***destabilize clandestine networks*** **by compromising large sections of the organization**, **distancing operatives from direct guidance, and impeding organizational communication and function**.”153 Moreover, because clandestine networks rely on social relationships to manage the trade-off between maintaining secrecy and security, **attacking key nodes can have a detrimental impact on the enemy’s ability to conduct their operations**.154 Thus, **while some individuals may seem insignificant to the outside observer,** **when considered by a bureaucrat relying on network based analytical techniques**, **the elimination of a seemingly low level individual might have an** ***important impact on an enemy organization***. Moreover, because terrorist networks rely on secrecy in communication, individuals within those networks may forge strong ties that remain dormant for the purposes of operational security.155 This means that **social ties that appear inactive or weak to a casual observer such as an NGO, human rights worker,** journalist, or even a target’s family members ***may in fact be strong ties within the network***.156 Furthermore, because terrorist networks oftentimes rely on social connections between charismatic leaders to function, disrupting those lines of communication can significantly impact those networks.157

#### Signature strikes key to disrupt Al Qaeda

Mudd 5-24-’13, Philip Mudd was a senior official at the CIA and the FBI. He is now director of global risk at SouthernSun Asset Management. MAY 24, 2013, Foreign Policy, “Fear Factor”, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/05/24/fear_factor_signature_strikes>, jj

The impact of armed drones during the decade-plus of this intense global counterterrorism campaign is hard to overestimate: Without operational commanders and visionary leaders, terror groups decay into locally focused threats, or disappear altogether. Targeted strikes against al Qaeda leaders and commanders in the years immediately after 9/11 deprived the group of the time and stability required to plot a major strike. But the London subway attacks in July 2005 illustrated the remaining potency of al Qaeda's core in the tribal areas of Pakistan. The threat was fading steadily. But not fast enough.¶ So-called signature strikes -- in which target selection is based not on identification of an individual but instead on patterns of behavior or unique characteristics that identify a group -- accelerated this decline for simple reasons. Targeting leadership degrades a small percentage of a diffuse terror group, but developing the tactical intelligence required to locate an individual precisely enough to stage a pinpoint strike, in a no-man's land half a world away, is time-consuming and difficult. And it's not a perfect science; the leaders of groups learn over time how to operate more securely. Furthermore, these leaders represent only a fraction of the threat: Osama bin Laden might have been the public face of al Qaeda, but he was supported by a web of document-forgers, bombmakers, couriers, trainers, ideologues, and others. They made up the bulk of al Qaeda and propelled the apparatus that planned the murder of innocents. Bin Laden was the revolutionary leader, but it was the troops who executed his vision.¶ Signature strikes have pulled out these lower-level threads of al Qaeda's apparatus -- and that of its global affiliates -- rapidly enough that the deaths of top leaders are now more than matched by the destruction of the complex support structure below them. Western conceptions of how organizations work, with hierarchal structures driven by top-level managers, do not apply to al Qaeda and its affiliates. These groups are instead conglomerations of militants, operating independently, with rough lines of communication and fuzzy networks that cross continents and groups. They are hard to map cleanly, in other words. Signature strikes take out whole swaths of these network sub-tiers rapidly -- so rapidly that the groups cannot replicate lost players and their hard-won experience. The tempo of the strikes, in other words, adds sand to the gears of terror organizations, destroying their operational capability faster than the groups can recover.¶ There are other rationales for these attacks, though. Part of the reason signature strikes have become so prominent in this global counterterror war is, simply put, geography. Local terrorist groups only become international threats if they have leadership that can execute a broad, globalist vision, and if that leadership has the time and space to plot without daily distractions from armies and security services -- as in safe havens like Yemen, Somalia, the Sahel, and the tribal areas of Pakistan. These are exactly the places where the United States cannot apply conventional force and where local governments lack the capability or will to counter the threat. Exactly the places where drones offer an option to eviscerate a growing terror threat that has a dispersed, diffuse hierarchy. The places where signature strikes have proven effective.¶ With more capable security partners, the brutal destruction from drones above might come from more conventional operations on the ground. But, by definition, safe havens aren't penetrable by capable security services.¶ There is an intangible factor that reinforces the effectiveness of signature strikes: the fear factor, coupled with the suspicions and paranoia that result from organizations searching desperately among their ranks to find out who is providing the Americans information so detailed that we can wreak such havoc over such a long period of time. Time and again, intelligence has clearly told us that the adversary dreads these operations -- lethal strikes that come anytime, anywhere, and that eliminate entire swaths of organizations. And these same organizations then turn around and further degrade their operational capability by engaging in savage hunts for leaks.¶ Despite such success, questions about how we should employ them -- or whether we should use them at all -- are coming to dominate debates about signature strikes. When do they end? And is it appropriate to strike groups of people not because we can identify a dangerous individual terrorist among them, but instead simply because a cluster of people bears clear hallmarks -- the "signature" -- that is associated with a terror group. This emerging debate will be colored, rightly, by the fact that, in just a decade, drone technology has proliferated. The technology and its use has far outpaced the development of policy that balances national security, morality, and the certainty that whatever precedent we set will be used, and abused, by the rogues and despots who no doubt will acquire this capability.¶ Before the pendulum swings too far in the other direction, though, away from the unquestionably aggressive use of drones by two consecutive presidents and toward a model that imposes tight limits, we are going to have to answer a simple question or two: When the president receives information that a new group -- maybe not a terror organization, but an evolving militant group -- is plotting to strike America at home or abroad, what do we do? If we strike too soon, we risk alienating a local population and increasing its motivation to target New York. If we strike too late, a nascent group of violent extremists will become operational, a lesson we learned too well 12 years ago. So take off the table the 20th-century notion that drones will become part of a more conventional military structure; they won't. The question for the 21st century is easy to state but hard to answer: Given the lessons of 9/11 and Iraq, when should a president choose preemption? And where? What are the rules for this new war?

### Ext – Definition

#### And, the plan text is extremely vague – that was in CX – that guarantees circumvention

Mitchell, Assistant Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law, 9

(Jonathan, Jan, “Legislating Clear-Statement Regimes in National- Security Law,” http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=jonathan\_mitchell)

The challenge for these efforts to strengthen the War Powers Resolution and FISA¶ is that any future ambiguous statute will provide rope for executive-branch lawyers to¶ concoct congressional “authorization” for the President’s actions, no matter what¶ restrictions or interpretive instructions Congress provides in framework legislation. None¶ of these proposed reforms will disable the executive from using its expansive theories of¶ constitutional avoidance and implied repeal to provide a veneer of legality for the¶ President’s actions, and to minimize the prospect of future criminal sanctions and¶ political reprisals against executive-branch employees.

#### More ev

Lubell & Derejko ’13, \* Dr Noam Lubell is Reader in the Law of Armed Conflict, School of Law, University of Essex, UK, \*\* Nathan Derejko is Director of the Human Rights Clinic and PhD candidate at the School of Law, University of Essex, UK, A Global Battlefield? Drones and the Geographical Scope of Armed Conflict (November 25, 2012). Journal of International Criminal Justice, 2013, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2212185>, jj

As is evident from the earlier analysis, the unqualified extension of IHL to the whole of the state experiencing an armed conflict is both an unnecessary and potentially dangerous application of IHL. Equally problematic however is restricting the scope of IHL to the primary geographical sphere of hostilities (the so called ‘hot-zone battlefield’), which not only produces counter-intuitive results, but is also not supported by conventional IHL or existing jurisprudence. The application of IHL is dependent upon the existence of an armed conflict, which necessitates the manifestation of hostilities, and IHL regulates those hostilities, wherever they spread. This appreciation however does not endorse the concept of a ‘global battlefield’ whereby the entire planet is subject to the application of IHL. In assessing whether IHL applies to a particular drone strike, the foundational analytical step is determining the existence of an armed conflict between the state carrying out the strike and the armed group being targeted (general nexus to an armed conflict). In addition, as neither the battlefield nor hostilities necessarily relocate with individuals who were previously on it or engaged in them, it must also be determined that these individuals are in fact directly participating in hostilities and therefore do not enjoy civilian protection from attack (including the requirement of belligerent nexus). Drone strikes do not necessarily extend the battlefield; those that occur against legitimate targets within an already existing conflict are by default occurring in an area to which the conflict participation has already spread. Notwithstanding, there are a number of considerable legal (in addition to policy, ethical and other areas) aspects which will serve to restrict drone strikes. First, in many cases the existence of armed conflict between the striking state and the targeted group can be cast in doubt; nowhere is this clearer than in the so-called global war on terror or war on Al-Qaida (as opposed to the distinct conflict in Afghanistan). The nexus to an existing and identifiable conflict meeting the threshold requirements for classification as such, to which the state and group are Party, must exist; if there is no armed conflict to which the drone strikes are attached, then in most cases the legitimacy for direct lethal strikes will disappear. With no armed conflict, IHL will not apply, and the only remaining framework for regulating force will be that of law enforcement as found in international human rights law, which has a far more restrictive – although not absolutely prohibitive – regulatory approach to lethal force. Second, even if an armed conflict exists, the status of the individuals must be such that renders them to have lost protection under IHL. Third, resorting to force on the territory of another state must also be justified by, and taken in accordance with, the rules of the ius ad bellum. Unless acting with consent of State B,104 with UN Security Council authorisation,105 or under conditions satisfying the test for action in self-defence,106 any such strike would likely be in violation of the ius ad bellum, regardless of its compliance with IHL. It is therefore the ius ad bellum, rather than the ius in bello, which will more often serve as the primary barrier to prevent the precipitous spread of armed conflict to new territories. Finally, the legality of a particular drone strike may also be influenced by the interplay with international human rights law, whether confined to the territory of a single state or extraterritorial.107 While in no way beyond debate, human rights law may prove more influential in its interplay with IHL the further away from the battlefield a drone strike occurs.108 Moreover, the lack of transparency regarding the decision making process and the targets, and the scant information from the ground as to the consequences of the strikes, turn any attempt at assessing the legality and seeking accountability into a gruelling task.109 Notwithstanding, while all these and other possible rules regulating the force are issues that deserve further attention, the principle focus of this paper was on the geographical scope of applicability of IHL during drone strikes. This analysis has demonstrated that IHL is not in and of itself pre-determined as applying to a limited geographical scope, and its applicability is designed to follow the prevailing hostilities wherever they may spread, rather than vice versa.

### HVT

#### Circumvention inev—nobody knows how to legally define “high value target”---and it proves they kill flex because it would take forever to identify targets

Cronogue, 12 (Graham Cronogue\*, \* Duke University School of Law, J.D. expected 2013; University of North Carolina B.A. 2010, Spring, 2012, Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law, NOTE: A NEW AUMF: DEFINING COMBATANTS IN THE WAR ON TERROR, 22 Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L. 377, Lexis, jj)

Another significant difficulty lies in discerning when a person who interacts with the organization becomes a part of the organization. Terrorist groups often intentionally hide their members' identities, roles, and statuses in the group. This secrecy and deception make it difficult to tell not only who is in the organization but also what level of affiliation each individual really has with the organization. Many members of al-Qaeda were not directly involved in the planning and, given the "cell" structure of al-Qaeda, may not have even known about the attack. Despite this difficulty, both the Bush and Obama administrations have applied the AUMF to prosecute and fight many individuals who were not part of or involved in the attack.

Applying the AUMF to all al-Qaeda members makes sense for several practical and legal reasons. First, these individuals voluntarily joined an organization that planned 9/11 and is subject to the AUMF. Their membership and support could easily have encouraged or facilitated the commission of the attacks in less direct ways. Next, requiring that the individual member of the organization had a sufficient nexus to the attack would make the term "organization" redundant, as any individual with such a nexus would always fall under the "persons" prong as well. The term "organization" generally refers to the collective group of individuals; thus "organization" should be read broadly to include every member. Furthermore, trying to differentiate between the members in secretive organizations who knew about the attack from those who did not would be extremely difficult. Not only would these individuals have an incentive to misrepresent, but also the organizations have a strong incentive to hide their command structure and organization. Requiring the President to look into each member's level of involvement would be overly cumbersome and would make other statutory terms redundant.

### Ext – Exec. Circumvents

#### Executive will invoke self-defense to carry out the attacks anyway

Jennifer Daskal, Fellow and Adjunct Professor, Georgetown Center on National Security and the Law, Georgetown University Law Center, April 2013, ARTICLE: THE GEOGRAPHY OF THE BATTLEFIELD: A FRAMEWORK FOR DETENTION AND TARGETING OUTSIDE THE "HOT" CONFLICT ZONE, 161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1165

n76. Some commentators have responded to the concern about safe havens by noting that grave threats can still be dealt with as a matter of self-defense, even if there is no law-of-war basis for the use of force or detention without charge. See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, Self-Defense Targetings of Non-State Actors and Permissibility of U.S. Use of Drones in Pakistan, 19 J. Transnat'l L. & Pol'y 237, 238-41 (2010) ("An armed attack by a non-state actor ... can trigger the right of self-defense...even if selective responsive force directed against a non-state actor occurs within a foreign country."). And in fact, the United States has itself increasingly invoked self-defense, along with law-of-war authorities, as justifying targeted killings in places such as Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia. See Brennan, Harvard Law School Remarks, supra note 9. But the rules governing the use of force in self-defense outside the context of armed conflict are arguably even more unsettled than those with respect to the use of force based on the law of war. The United States, for example, has argued for a "flexible interpretation of imminence." See id. ("We are finding increasing recognition in the international community that a more flexible understanding of "imminence' may be appropriate when dealing with terrorist groups ... ."); see also DOJ White Paper, supra note 17, at 7 (adopting a broad definition of "imminent"). Such a framework presumably would allow it to target high-level leaders even if there were no evidence that they were participating in or coordinating a specific, imminent attack. A self-defense rationale could easily result in the aforementioned concern of "war everywhere," albeit pursuant to a different legal framework. Brooks, supra note 22.

#### Area restrictions will trigger constitutionality debates. Causes circumvention

Raven-Hansen & Banks 94—Professor of Law @ George Washington University & Professor of Law @ Syracuse University [Peter Raven-Hansen & William C. Banks, “Pulling the Purse Strings of the Commander in Chief,” Virginia Law Review, Vol. 80, No. 4 (May, 1994), pp. 833-944]

The first is the Vietnam War, an undeclared but congressionally authorized war that Congress sought repeatedly to control and ultimately to end by exercising its power of the purse.13 Area restrictions on force deployments during the war raised the issue whether Congress, by exercise of its power of the purse, unconstitutionally interfered with the authority of the President as Commander in Chief to conduct the Vietnam War.14 President Nixon's apparent circumvention of these restrictions also raised questions regarding the statutory scope of national security appropriation restrictions in light of executive practice and customary national security law. Finally, President Ford's apparent disregard of the end-the-war restrictions in ordering the 1975 evacuations from Southeast Asia and in responding to the seizure of the Mayaguez15 raised the statutory questions again and also presented the issue whether Congress had impermissibly interfered with a customary or implied constitutional power of the President to order rescue operations.

More recently, the Iran-Contra Affair raised many similar questions and several new ones. The executive branch secretly financed military aid to the Contras in Nicaragua, in apparent contravention of the Boland Amendments-a series of appropriation restrictions on aid to the Contras.16 The enactment of no fewer than thirteen such restrictions raised anew the question of the proper construction and duration of appropriation restrictions, and their constitutional scope vis-a-vis the President in national security. pg. 837

#### Plan’s arbitrary geographical restraint will be ignored—perception of threat drives where the battlefield is not law

Geoffrey Corn 13, Professor of Law and Presidential Research Professor, South Texas College of Law, 2013, “Geography of Armed Conflict: Why it is a Mistake to Fish for the Red Herring,” International Legal Studies, 89 INT’L L. STUD. 77 (2013)

TAC=Transnational Armed Conflict

The debate over conflict typology raises this question: is the TAC con-cept inherently invalid? Put another way, is the invocation of unrestricted geographic scope for an armed conflict against a non-State opponent the true focal point of objection to this typology? The latter proposition may explain why some experts now seek to impose an implied geographic limi-tation on the conduct of operations within the framework of TAC—such as an implied constraint to what some scholars have labeled “hot zones” of military operations.18 Ultimately, however, seeking to identify and impose a geographic restriction detached from the threat dynamics triggering the use of combat power is a false solution to the concerns of operational over-breadth associated with TAC. Such limitation is a futile endeavor, for the developing axiomatic reason that once a State commits to the use of force as a remedy against such a transnational non-State threat—like all other conflicts in history—the dynamics of the threat itself will be the predomi-nant consideration in defining the scope of operations.

This latter premise frustrates some international law scholars. They in-sist that the first step in defining the geographic scope of military opera-tions is to assess the internationally permissible geography of armed con-flict. Strategy, they posit, must yield to international legal constraint.19

This is undoubtedly the “correct” ideological starting point: law impos-es its own geography—the geography of permissible policy maneuver space. Decisions related to when, where and how to use instruments of national power are not made in a legal vacuum. Rather, domestic and inter-national law significantly impact these decisions. Legal advisors inform pol-icy decisions by providing the policymaker with the left and right bounda-ries of permissible conduct. This framework is far more complex on the more specific issue of geography of armed conflict. Even assuming interna-tional law categorically constrains permissible strategy options (an assump-tion that ignores the reality that States periodically choose to violate inter-national law in order to achieve vital national security objectives), the rele-vant law must be unequivocal. On the question of conflict geography,

however, this is not the case. It involves a complex intersection of jus ad bellum,20 neutrality,21 and jus in bello principles.22

None of these sources categorically define a geographic constraint on the execution of combat operations within the context of an ongoing non-international armed conflict. Instead, they combine to provide a general outline of acceptable State action, sometimes by analogy (such as the effort to extend neutrality principles to the inapposite context of non-international armed conflict), or sometimes more directly (such as the in-vocation of the principle of military necessity as a source of authority to adopt a threat-based scope of combat operations). On the geography of conflict question, the net outcome is anything but an unequivocal interna-tional legal standard that nullifies the validity of a threat–driven scope of military operations. This is unsurprising. The entire TAC concept is an evolution of existing LOAC principles, as is the exercise of national self-defense in response to a transnational non-State threat. Thus, international law has yet to settle on an issue as complex as permissible geography of operations conducted in response to the threat of international terrorism.

Seeking to identify some legally mandated geographic boundary for armed conflict of any type is, thus, a genuine Red Herring.23 Armed conflict is a threat driven concept, arising when the threat necessitates resort to combat power, and extending to wherever the operational and tactical op-portunity to produce a militarily valuable effect on the enemy arises. There are examples of States choosing not to expand the scope of conflicts simp-ly because such an opportunity arose. However, other factors impact such decisions, and it would be an error to equate decisions to refrain from ex-ercising authority with an inherent legal prohibition against such exercise.

The scope of TAC—like that of any armed conflict—must be threat driven for a reason. Admittedly, there exists a perceived and actual risk of an overzealous and overbroad assertion of LOAC–based authority to at-tack and disable threat operatives inherent in the combined effect of TAC as a theory of armed conflict typology and a threat–driven scope interpreta-tion. Nonetheless, States must avoid attempts to identify or impose some per se geographic limitations on this type of armed conflict. Any authority overreach (invoking the power to incapacitate through an application of LOAC principles), triggered by extending the concept of armed conflict to transnational non-State threats, will be more effectively mitigated by focus-ing on the traditional dynamics of lawful wartime action and tailoring or adjusting traditional sources of LOAC authority to meet the unique chal-lenges of this type of armed conflict. Chief among these particular chal-lenges are, one, ensuring that the targeting process adequately accounts for the complexity of threat identification in this inherently unconventional environment; and two, ensuring that preventive detention processes suffi-ciently address the unique scope and nature of this type of armed conflict. Focusing on these two practical challenges will produce a better balance between national security realities and the individual interests of potential objects of State action than would be achieved by attempting to confine that action to an arbitrary “hot zone.”

#### More ev

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This spatial limitation posited by the critics existed alongside a separate but also commonly held legal view among the advocacy community: a disinclination to concede that the United States was engaged in a war on terrorism against transnational actors in the legal sense of armed conflict, no matter that it was called a NIAC or anything else. This nonspatial argument had, of course, spatial implications because what took place outside the two conventional conflicts was not governed by the law of armed conflict. Participating in these debates, I became persuaded for a while that the best way to understand attacks on nonstate terrorist groups outside the conventional war zones, whatever legally these terms meant if anything (given that they did not derive from the relevant treaty texts), was to reach to naked self-defense as the legal basis for the use of force. For a time, then, my legal view was that there was some kind of legal geography of war but that the use of force outside it, including by civilian agents such as those in the CIA, could nonetheless be lawful as the exercise of self-defense. Eventually, however, I became persuaded that, although the naked self-defense argument is a genuine possibility, under today’s circumstances, the groups and actors being targeted in places such as Yemen are part of the preexisting and ongoing NIAC under the traditional standard of “conduct of hostilities,” and thus it is not necessary at this point to reach to naked self-defense. Speaking generally, however, the Obama administration’s rejection of the global war on terror permits the traditional conduct of hostilities standard to reemerge as the touchstone for applying the laws of war. Likewise, assertions of a formal legal geography of war recede along with the global war on terror in the peculiar, functionally “nonhostilities” way in which the Bush administration conceived it.

### A2: Signal Solves/Sufficient

#### Compliance is key to check domestic and international backlash – otherwise the plan just creates rising expectations that inevitably falter.

Chesney, Professor in Law, University of Texas School of Law, 14

(Robert, January, “Postwar,” Harvard National Security Journal / Vol. 5, http://harvardnsj.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Chesney-Final.pdf)

Three stand out as particularly important and likely to be impacted by a formal shift to a postwar model. First, consider the domestic political climate. This does not mean partisan politics as such, though this can matter, too. Rather, “domestic politics” simply refers to the influence of American public opinion on the calculations of legislators and Executive Branch officials. On that dimension, what impact might follow from a formal proclamation recognizing an end to the armed conflict with al Qaeda? Such a move would be widely publicized and endlessly discussed in the media, and for at least some members of the public, it would likely alter baseline assumptions regarding the sorts of activities they might expect to see the government engaging in for counterterrorism purposes going forward. The continued use of military detention would surely seem incongruous to many, for example, or at least it would begin to seem increasingly so as time passed. Likewise, the further use of armed attacks—whether using drones, manned aircraft, or some other weapons platform— would also be surprising to some under the postwar rubric.

Such incongruities would not necessarily spark a negative reaction in every quarter. Those who would prefer not to move to a postwar model, after all, might be pleasantly surprised by them. But there is little doubt that incongruous actions would generate a negative reaction in at least some quarters, and it is possible that the negative reaction would in fact be substantial—particularly if the surrounding circumstances contributed to a perception that the government must have been acting hypocritically all along in proclaiming an end to the armed conflict. Of course, insofar as incongruous actions are conducted in secret—a quite likely state of affairs for a postwar model, given the extensive reliance on the CIA and Joint Special Operations Command to conduct lethal operations on a covert or clandestine basis even while still under the armed-conflict model75—the constraining impact of public opinion would be substantially muted. Even then, though, the possibility of eventual public disclosure would remain, as the Snowden affair in the summer of 2013 reminds us. Government officials operating in the shadow of these considerations could be expected to take them into account, even if they would not be dispositive. In that sense, domestic political considerations would be more constraining in the postwar context than they are under the status-quo model of armed conflict.

Something similar can be said about the constraining impact of diplomatic considerations. “Diplomatic considerations” refers broadly to the full spectrum of actions other governments might take in order to express displeasure with American policy, whether out of actual disagreement or in response to their own domestic political considerations. There are many possibilities in addition to the easily belittled example in which a state merely expresses displeasure, privately or publicly. A given country may be in a position to decrease cooperation on security issues (decreased sharing of intelligence, for example, or withdrawal of personnel from a joint deployment), or it might reduce or refuse valuable cooperation on unrelated subjects. Two points follow from all this. First, proclaiming the end to the armed conflict with al Qaeda unquestionably will be very well-received in most foreign capitals and among most foreign populations. Second, if the U.S. government ended up persisting in the use of military detention or lethal force for counterterrorism purposes despite such a proclamation, it seems likely that the aforementioned diplomatic costs will be higher than is currently the case, for the same reasons of incongruity and surprise mentioned above in the context of domestic politics. This suggests that diplomatic pressure, too, will be more constraining postwar than currently.

#### Circumvention turns signal—War powers legislation inevitably controversial- undermines the perception of the plan—especially since Obama vetoes

Alan Greenblatt NPR.org writer 6-16-2011 <http://www.npr.org/2011/06/16/137222043/why-the-war-powers-act-doesnt-work>

Party Vs. Principle Both Hamilton and Adams say the War Powers Act is being used primarily as a political cudgel against Obama. "Is the War Powers Act about protecting the power of Congress relative to the president, or about the two political parties?" asks Noah Feldman, a professor of international law at Harvard University. While some members of Congress may use the law to criticize the president for political reasons, others will defend a president of their own party — even those who had invoked the War Powers Act the last time the other party held the White House. "It doesn't matter if you're [George W.] Bush or Obama, you want more power in the White House," Feldman says. "Everyone in Congress wants to protect Congress, but they also want to protect the president of their party." Power Of The Purse As a result, Congress never manages to speak with one voice and insist en masse to the courts that a president is in violation of the War Powers Act.

#### Only fixed purpose is perceived internationally

Winik ’91 (Jay, Senior Research Fellow, Nat’l Defense U, Washington Quarterly, Autumn, via InformaWorld)

The U.S. stake In speaking and acting with one voice is enormous. Two former secretar- ies of state, themselves of different political parties and holding different political Ideologies, have warned: "The American national purpose must at some point be fixed. If it is redefined—or even subject to redefinition—with every Footnotes at end at article. change In Administration in Washington, the United States risks becoming a factor of in- constancy in the world. \* \* \* Other nations— friend or adversary—unable to gear their policies to American steadiness will go their own way, dooming the United States to growing irrelevancy.2" THE NEED FOR BIPARTISANSHIP IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER The urgent need for creating a new biparti- sanship is also an acknowledgment of the changed international system. In the early 1950s. the United States produced 52 percent of the world's gross national product. It en- joyed a nuclear monopoly and was without question the world's preponderant power militarily. The past 40 years, however, have witnessed a relative decline in U.S. wealth, dictating that the United States can no longer simply overwhelm any problem with its vast national resources. Economic reali- ties have also changed domestic political re- alities. forcing the- country to make very real choices between guns and butter and to establish its priorities. Indeed, in the ab- sence of a bipartisan consensus on the role of the United States in the world, public senti- ment-including among certain foreign pol- icy elites—is already calling for the United States to turn inward. The fact is. however, that the twilight of the Cold War actually creates a greater need for bipartisanship as the United States con- fronts a more anarchical International sys- tem. The transition of the postwar blocs from East-West bipolarity to multipolarity will significantly alter the structure of the international arena, making conflict more, not less, likely. With the passage of time, Japan and a re- united Germany will almost certainly emerge as more assertive and independent actors pursuing their own national Interests. China will continue to be a major player on the world stage and will have great sway over world events. Furthermore, as the two superpowers continue on the path of arms control and scale down their military efforts, as anticipated, the gap between their capa- bilities and those of rising powers will dimin- ish significantly. Additionally, by the year 2000. at least a handful of new countries will possess long-range delivery systems and weapons of mass destruction, and greater numbers of countries, including rogue states that do not adhere to or respect traditional standards of deterrence, will possess crude but nonetheless similarly daunting weapons. These countries will be capable of terrorizing other states or of sowing general chaos in the international system. The result will be a new international sys- tem characterized by highly dynamic Inter- action and. over time, shifting alliances and Interests more akin to the strife-ridden Eu- ropean balance of power system than the twentieth-century system, in which peace has been enforced by the nuclear balance of terror between the two superpowers. Al- though the risk of cataclysmic nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union is at its lowest point in history and Is likely to remain so. It is far from certain that this new international structure will be more stable than the one it replaces. Fixed lines between allies and adversaries will blur, and alliances will shift with greater regularity across different issues. At the same time, these changes will occur against the backdrop of a Soviet Union in decay. Itself a potential cause of vast insta- bility: the existence of nuclear weapons; and rising nationalistic, religious, and ethnic strife stretching from Europe to the Middle October 3, 1991 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—SENATE 25239 East to Southeast Asia. To use Kaiser Wil- helm's words, the world may once again be made safe for “jolly little wars," the dif- ference this time being the existence of weapons of mass destruction. There are few— and really no—parallels in history to serve as a model or paradigm for guiding U.S. pol- icymakers in an international setting of this kind. Thus, at a time when bipartisanship is at its lowest ebb, U.S. policymakers are now being challenged in more ways intellectu- ally, politically, diplomatically, and mili- tarily than during the past 40 years. The United States does have the resources to continue to play a major world role and to deal with its domestic problems at the same time, although admittedly those resources are now constrained. In addition, when one looks at military, economic, and even cul- tural factors, the United states has no chal- lenger to its position as the preeminent world power should it choose this role. The problem for the United States is clearly not that epitomized by the apocalyptic cries of the "decline school” as portrayed by Paul Kennedy—that is, decline following upon "imperial overstretch."\* Rather, the prob- lem the United States faces Is an inter- national system in flux, characterized by the diffusion of military capabilities and power abroad, all of which will create far more complex, nuanced, and unpredictable chal- lenges. In the future, deterrence of conflict will be more difficult, and U.S. defense plan- ners and diplomats will have to address the capabilities and intentions of a wide array of actors far beyond that of the Soviet Union alone. Threats to U.S. Interests and those of its allies will often appear ambiguous, fall- ing In the greyer areas of "not war. not peace." Rather than following the well-de- flned and clearly understood rules of the road that largely governed U.S.-Soviet rela- tions. the U.S. political system will have to react to the varied crises of the new world order. Even when working at Its smoothest, it will have difficulty doing so effectively. Small-scale Sarajevos and Munlchs may well be the norm, and their prevention or con- tainment will require a cohesive nation, act- ing with a clear and consistent voice in the international arena, which will only happen if a new bipartisanship is forged. Thus. It Is demonstrably clear that, in the absence of bipartisanship, dealing with the new International system will be difficult at best and at times next to impossible. Friends and foes alike, watching U.S. indecision at home, will not see the United States as a credible negotiating partner, ally, or deter- rent against wanton aggression. This is a recipe for increased chaos, anarchy, and strife on the world scene. The appeal, then, to recreate anew as the hallmark of U.S. ef- forts abroad the predictability and resolve that can only come from bipartisanship at home is as critical as during the perilous days following World War II.

## Norm

### 2NC – Drone Prolif Adv – No Model

#### Zero chance of precedent setting – other countries don’t act based on the United States policy

Wright 12 [Robert Wright, finalist for the Pulitzer Prize, former writer and editor at The Atlantic, “The Incoherence of a Drone-Strike Advocate” NOV 14 2012, <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/11/the-incoherence-of-a-drone-strike-advocate/265256/>]

Naureen Shah of Columbia Law School, a guest on the show, had raised the possibility that America is setting a dangerous precedent with drone strikes. If other people start doing what America does--fire drones into nations that house somebody they want dead--couldn't this come back to haunt us? And haunt the whole world? Shouldn't the U.S. be helping to establish a global norm against this sort of thing? Host Warren Olney asked Boot to respond.¶ Boot started out with this observation:¶ I think the precedent setting argument is overblown, because I don't think other countries act based necessarily on what we do and in fact we've seen lots of Americans be killed by acts of terrorism over the last several decades, none of them by drones but they've certainly been killed with car bombs and other means.¶ That's true--no deaths by terrorist drone strike so far. But I think a fairly undeniable premise of the question was that the arsenal of terrorists and other nations may change as time passes. So answering it by reference to their current arsenal isn't very illuminating. In 1945, if I had raised the possibility that the Soviet Union might one day have nuclear weapons, it wouldn't have made sense for you to dismiss that possibility by noting that none of the Soviet bombs dropped during World War II were nuclear, right?¶ As if he was reading my mind, Boot immediately went on to address the prospect of drone technology spreading. Here's what he said:¶ You know, drones are a pretty high tech instrument to employ and they're going to be outside the reach of most terrorist groups and even most countries. But whether we use them or not, the technology is propagating out there. We're seeing Hezbollah operate Iranian supplied drones over Israel, for example, and our giving up our use of drones is not going to prevent Iran or others from using drones on their own. So I wouldn't worry too much about the so called precedent it sets..."

#### No causal link between U.S. drone doctrine and other’ countries choices---means can’t set a precedent

Kenneth Anderson 11, Professor of International Law at American University, 10/9/11, “What Kind of Drones Arms Race Is Coming?,” <http://www.volokh.com/2011/10/09/what-kind-of-drones-arms-race-is-coming/#more-51516>

New York Times national security correspondent Scott Shane has an opinion piece in today’s Sunday Times predicting an “arms race” in military drones. The methodology essentially looks at the US as the leader, followed by Israel – countries that have built, deployed and used drones in both surveillance and as weapons platforms. It then looks at the list of other countries that are following fast in US footsteps to both build and deploy, as well as purchase or sell the technology – noting, correctly, that the list is a long one, starting with China. The predicament is put this way:

Eventually, the United States will face a military adversary or terrorist group armed with drones, military analysts say. But what the short-run hazard experts foresee is not an attack on the United States, which faces no enemies with significant combat drone capabilities, but the political and legal challenges posed when another country follows the American example. The Bush administration, and even more aggressively the Obama administration, embraced an extraordinary principle: that the United States can send this robotic weapon over borders to kill perceived enemies, even American citizens, who are viewed as a threat.

“Is this the world we want to live in?” asks Micah Zenko, a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. “Because we’re creating it.”

By asserting that “we’re” creating it, this is a claim that there is an arms race among states over military drones, and that it is a consequence of the US creating the technology and deploying it – and then, beyond the technology, changing the normative legal and moral rules in the international community about using it across borders. In effect, the combination of those two, technological and normative, forces other countries in strategic competition with the US to follow suit. (The other unstated premise underlying the whole opinion piece is a studiously neutral moral relativism signaled by that otherwise unexamined phrase “perceived enemies.” Does it matter if they are not merely our “perceived” but are our actual enemies? Irrespective of what one might be entitled to do to them, is it so very difficult to conclude, even in the New York Times, that Anwar al-Awlaki was, in objective terms, our enemy?)

It sounds like it must be true. But is it? There are a number of reasons to doubt that moves by other countries are an arms race in the sense that the US “created” it or could have stopped it, or that something different would have happened had the US not pursued the technology or not used it in the ways it has against non-state terrorist actors. Here are a couple of quick reasons why I don’t find this thesis very persuasive, and what I think the real “arms race” surrounding drones will be.

Unmanned aerial vehicles have clearly got a big push from the US military in the way of research, development, and deployment. But the reality today is that the technology will transform civil aviation, in many of the same ways and for the same reasons that another robotic technology, driverless cars (which Google is busily plying up and down the streets of San Francisco, but which started as a DARPA project). UAVs will eventually move into many roles in ordinary aviation, because it is cheaper, relatively safer, more reliable – and it will eventually include cargo planes, crop dusting, border patrol, forest fire patrols, and many other tasks. There is a reason for this – the avionics involved are simply not so complicated as to be beyond the abilities of many, many states. Military applications will carry drones many different directions, from next-generation unmanned fighter aircraft able to operate against other craft at much higher G stresses to tiny surveillance drones. But the flying-around technology for aircraft that are generally sizes flown today is not that difficult, and any substantial state that feels like developing them will be able to do so.

But the point is that this was happening anyway, and the technology was already available. The US might have been first, but it hasn’t sparked an arms race in any sense that absent the US push, no one would have done this. That’s just a fantasy reading of where the technology in general aviation was already going; Zenko’s ‘original sin’ attribution of this to the US opening Pandora’s box is not a credible understanding of the development and applications of the technology. Had the US not moved on this, the result would have been a US playing catch-up to someone else. For that matter, the off-the-shelf technology for small, hobbyist UAVs is simple enough and available enough that terrorists will eventually try to do their own amateur version, putting some kind of bomb on it.

Moving on from the avionics, weaponizing the craft is also not difficult. The US stuck an anti-tank missile on a Predator; this is also not rocket science. Many states can build drones, many states can operate them, and crudely weaponizing them is also not rocket science. The US didn’t spark an arms race; this would occur to any state with a drone. To the extent that there is real development here, it lies in the development of specialized weapons that enable vastly more discriminating targeting. The details are sketchy, but there are indications from DangerRoom and other observers (including some comments from military officials off the record) that US military budgets include amounts for much smaller missiles designed not as anti-tank weapons, but to penetrate and kill persons inside a car without blowing it to bits, for example. This is genuinely harder to do – but still not all that difficult for a major state, whether leading NATO states, China, Russia, or India. The question is whether it would be a bad thing to have states competing to come up with weapons technologies that are … more discriminating.

### 2NC – Drone Prolif – No Impact

#### Drone prolif doesn’t shift the calculus – won’t cause wars

Singh ’12, Joseph Singh is a researcher at the Center for a New American Security. Aug. 13, 2012, Time, Betting Against a Drone Arms Race, <http://nation.time.com/2012/08/13/betting-against-a-drone-arms-race/>, jj

Instead, we must return to what we know about state behavior in an anarchistic international order. Nations will confront the same principles of deterrence, for example, when deciding to launch a targeted killing operation regardless of whether they conduct it through a drone or a covert amphibious assault team.¶ Drones may make waging war more domestically palatable, but they don’t change the very serious risks of retaliation for an attacking state. Any state otherwise deterred from using force abroad will not significantly increase its power projection on account of acquiring drones.¶ What’s more, the very states whose use of drones could threaten U.S. security – countries like China – are not democratic, which means that the possible political ramifications of the low risk of casualties resulting from drone use are irrelevant. For all their military benefits, putting drones into play requires an ability to meet the political and security risks associated with their use.¶ Despite these realities, there remain a host of defensible arguments one could employ to discredit the Obama drone strategy. The legal justification for targeted killings in areas not internationally recognized as war zones is uncertain at best.¶ Further, the short-term gains yielded by targeted killing operations in Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen, while debilitating to Al Qaeda leadership in the short-term, may serve to destroy already tenacious bilateral relations in the region and radicalize local populations.¶ Yet, the past decade’s experience with drones bears no evidence of impending instability in the global strategic landscape. Conflict may not be any less likely in the era of drones, but the nature of 21st Century warfare remains fundamentally unaltered despite their arrival in large numbers.

#### Their “drone war” arg is profoundly alarmist

Ashley S. Boyle ’12, is an Adjunct Junior Fellow at the American Security Project, July 13, 2012, American Security Project, The US and its UAVs: Addressing Legality and Overblown Scenarios, <http://americansecurityproject.org/blog/2012/the-us-and-its-uavs-addressing-legality-and-overblown-scenarios/>, jj

One of the touchstones in the current US drones dialogue is the the legality of lethal drone strikes. Despite claiming the strikes are legally permissible, Administration officials have not yet cited any legal statute in justifying the use of drones in extraterritorial targeted killings. Critics argue that this failure to provide legal justification implicates the US in violating international legal frameworks on interstate force and national sovereignty. Furthermore, critics claim that US drone programs in Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen set a dangerous precedent that could lead to any nation with strike-capable drones employing similar tactics in a “global drone war.”¶ While the international community has the right to demand that the US provide a legal foundation for drone strikes, it should be understood that the US has a strategic interest in not providing any such justification. Similarly, the argument that US drone strikes are establishing a dangerous precedent is reasonable. However, extrapolating this assertion to a scenario of global drone warfare is not only alarmist and distracting, but has no factual basis at present.¶ The matter of legal justification for US drone strikes is straightforward. Critics have long claimed that US drone strikes violate laws on interstate force and sovereignty in that strikes are conducted extraterritorially in non-combat zones.¶ While laws governing the use of interstate force bar the use of force in another nation’s territory at times of peace, under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, a nation has “the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence [sic]” until the UN Security Council takes action. Article 51 applies if either the targeted state agrees to the use of force in its territory by another nation or the targeted state, or a group operating within its territory, was responsible for an act of aggression against the targeting state.¶ These conditions are mutually exclusive; only one must be satisfied to justify a unilateral extraterritorial use of force by a UN Member. In the cases of Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen, both conditions are satisfied: all three countries have consented, explicitly or otherwise, to the US operating drones within their territories, and all three are “safe havens” for groups that have launched violent attacks against the US and US interests.¶ If the US is well within its right to conduct drone strikes within these nations, why, then, does it not simply invoke Article 51 as a means of justification and end the legality debate?¶ It is of strategic value for the US to refrain from providing justification because to acknowledge any legal framework is to implicitly agree to be bound by its terms. By remaining formally unaccountable to international frameworks, the US can operate unimpeded by the red tape of the international legal community. From any angle, such a strategy is in the best interest of US national security. It is also important to note that a lack of public justification does not mean the US is not acting in accordance with international legal frameworks.¶ While there is no question that the US has used drones, it is hardly alone in wielding the technology. Approximately fifty nations possess and use drones. However, Wikipedia informs us that of these nations, only twelve have lethal drones of which only three nations – China, Iran, and Russia – may be of concern.¶ Possessing the technology is only one part of the picture. Nations must also have the capabilities to maintain and operate these aircraft, as well as an intelligence network that informs their surveillance or strike activities. The supporting systems required to operate drones is greatly underestimated, and it is difficult to see China, Iran, or Russia having the resources or desire to launch expansive drone programs in the short- to mid-term. While the long-term picture always requires discussion, alarmist messages about impending drone wars are just that: alarming and unfounded.¶ The US has a legitimate reason and legal right to conduct operations using drones in Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen. While the lack of an explicit justification may not garner credibility, the US has a national security imperative to act in its best interests. Remaining disassociated from specific legal frameworks ensures a strategic flexibility that could otherwise be constrained.¶ Finally, the international community must be realistic about the threat of a global drone war. Such a scenario requires that nations possess the technology, the resources, and the motives to mire themselves in international conflict. Not only is this unlikely in the short- to mid-term and factually unsubstantiated, the argument distracts from a debate that should aim to design a more intelligent strategy for US drone programs. It is better that efforts be directed toward constructive efforts than at strangulating any hope for an informed dialogue.

#### The US has been cautious with drones, and China and Russia could just be reckless using any other weapon

Anderson 5-24-’13, Kenneth Anderson is a law professor at Washington College of Law, American University, a research fellow of the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, a Non-Resident Visiting Fellow at the Brookings Institution, and a blogger. May 24, 2013, Real Clear Politics, The Case for Drones, <http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2013/05/24/the_case_for_drones_118548.html>, jj

This critique often leads, however, to the further objection that the American use of drones is essentially laying the groundwork for others to do the same. Steve Coll wrote in the New Yorker: “America’s drone campaign is also creating an ominous global precedent. Ten years or less from now, China will likely be able to field armed drones. How might its Politburo apply Obama’s doctrines to Tibetan activists holding meetings in Nepal?”¶ The United States, it is claimed, is arrogantly exerting its momentary technological advantage to do what it likes. It will be sorry when other states follow suit. But the United States does not use drones in this fashion and has claimed no special status for drones. The U.S. government uses drone warfare in a far more limited way, legally and morally, and entirely within the bounds of international law. The problem with China (or Russia) using drones is that they might not use them in the same way as the United States. The drone itself is a tool. How it is used and against whom—these are moral questions. If China behaves malignantly, drones will not be responsible. Its leaders will be.

#### The US has created a norm that permission to use drones in foreign territory is required --- checks the impact. They also don’t solve reckless use of manned aircraft

Leuck ’12, Paul is a 2010 graduate of the University of Notre Dame. His main interests are foreign policy and political and social issues in the Middle East and the broader Muslim world. After graduation he did a fellowship in Yemen until the growing unrest forced an early return. He previously studied for a semester in Cairo and is working at an international development company in the DC area. Policy Mic, Drones: Why Americans Shouldn't Worry About Them, <http://www.policymic.com/articles/21556/drones-why-americans-shouldn-t-worry-about-them>, jj

One commonly expressed concern about drones is that America is setting a dangerous standard by which other countries will conduct warfare. What if China decides to use drones to eliminate dissidents in neighboring countries? This sort of speculation falls flat for two reasons. First, in countries like Yemen and Pakistan, the United States has permission from those governments to use drones. Unless China secured similar agreements, such an action would be an act of war. Second, China already has manned aircraft that are perfectly capable of targeting dissidents if China so chose. Fear that a foreign power would use drones to attack American soil are even more far-fetched. Foreign drones, just like any other foreign military aircraft, would never be able to enter American airspace without being intercepted or shot down by U.S. air defenses.

### 2NC --- Drone Wars

#### Syria proves no drone wars---they’re useless against any adversary with an air defense system

Audrey Kurth Cronin 9-2, Professor of Public Policy at George Mason University, 9/2/13, “Drones Over Damascus,” http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139889/audrey-kurth-cronin/drones-over-damascus

For the past four years, Americans have been preoccupied with drone technology as a cheap, low-risk, and discriminate way to eliminate emerging global threats without getting entangled in protracted conflicts. The U.S. government has even dramatically changed its military force structure to make armed drones a lynchpin of U.S. power projection. Yet these weapons have been virtually useless in the last two conflicts that the United States has faced, first in Libya and now in Syria. Why is that?

Broadly speaking, the United States has used armed drone strikes overseas in two ways: during war and to prevent war. Battlefield use of weaponized drones is not new (it dates back to World War I), and is fairly ubiquitous. A spring 2013 report by the U.S. Air Force estimated that unmanned aircraft fired about a quarter of all missiles used in coalition air strikes in Afghanistan in the early part of this year. Drones have proved remarkably effective at providing reconnaissance to U.S. troops on the ground, protecting them from enemy attacks, and reducing civilian casualties. When used within a war, in other words, drones are a great way to give U.S. soldiers an edge.

Armed drones have a preventive role to play, as well. They can keep terrorist threats at bay, and thus reduce the chance that Washington will need to send troops to battle insurgents in faraway places. Since 2009, U.S. counterterrorism efforts have involved hundreds of remote-controlled strikes by unmanned aerial vehicles. These were meant to prevent attacks on the United States and its allies by al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other groups. In these cases, the argument goes, discriminate targeting to prevent such attacks beats invading countries after them.

Prevention has thus become a watchword of U.S. policy, but its logic has rarely been applied to belligerent states. The international community had plenty of warning that the Syrian government might use chemical weapons, and now Syrian President Bashar al-Assad has apparently employed sarin gas to kill thousands of civilians. Photographs of rows of children left dead and videos of civilians running in fear have shocked the world. The last time the gas was used -- in Japan by Aum Shinrikyo, a terrorist group, to kill 13 people on the Tokyo subway -- pales in comparison with the recent slaughter in Syria. Could the United States have deployed its drone fleet to destroy Syrian arsenals or to kill those planning to make use of them before this happened?

The answer is no. Armed drones have serious limitations, and the situation in Syria lays them bare. They are only useful where the United States has unfettered access to airspace, a well-defined target, and a clear objective. In Syria, the United States lacks all three.

First, the airspace. So far, armed drones have been used either over countries that do not control their own airspace (Somalia, Mali, Afghanistan) or where the government has given the United States some degree of permission (Yemen, Pakistan). Those circumstances are rare. When the foe can actually defend itself, the use of armed drones is extraordinarily difficult and could constitute an act of war -- one that could easily draw the United States into the heart of a conflict.

Drones are slow and noisy; they fly at a low altitude; and they require time to hover over a potential target before being used. They are basically sitting ducks. Syria has an air force and air defenses that could easily pick American drones out of the sky. The only real way for the United States to use them would be to first destroy Syrian planes and anti-aircraft batteries. But that would be no different from a full-scale intervention and would negate the tactical advantage of remote strikes. In other words, the conditions under which armed drones are effective as preventive weapons are limited. And the more drones are used for prevention and during war, the more state belligerents will take note of that fact, and will make sure that those conditions are never met on their own territory.

Second, the target. Using armed drones against the Syrian government’s enormous chemical weapons stockpiles would have risked causing the very release of deadly agents that the United States was trying to avoid. Drones are precise but not perfect. Like cruise missiles, their effectiveness mainly depends upon the quality of their targeting information. Worse, an imperfect attack could inadvertently give the Assad government political cover to use the weapons with impunity. Assad could blame the release of chemical weapons on a misfired U.S. drone strike. Since U.S. drones are deeply despised in the Middle East, that argument could enjoy wide hearing.

Perhaps the United States might instead have tried to target chemical weapons delivery systems or tried to kill the people who were loading or moving them. But intelligence has been insufficient for such delicate operations. And even if U.S. officials got it right, a remote drone attack would have risked giving the rebels access to remaining stockpiles of chemical weapons or delivery systems. As the United States knows, some of those group are connected to al Qaeda. In such a mess of a situation, and especially in the presence of Syria’s large arsenal, there is no alternative to putting humans on the ground to secure dangerous, volatile weapons. Drones –- or cruise missiles, for that matter -- cannot do it.

Third, the objective. The United States wants to punish the Assad regime for using chemical weapons against the Syrian people and to prevent them from being used again. Drone attacks are ill suited for this purpose. They are unlikely either to inflict sufficient pain or to deter other tyrants from following Assad’s lead. A broader objective is to reinforce the global norm against the use of chemical weapons, and such a lofty goal can only be accomplished with a robust international response.

In a politically complex environment -- one in which the United States is not at war and the targets are unclear -- armed drones are really not all that useful. They might seem like a cool new tool to many observers and policymakers, but the horrible predicament in Syria reveals the sharp limitations of the technology -- and the serious problem of relying upon it so heavily in the U.S. force structure. Rather than looking for a quick technological fix, U.S. policymakers should invest more in good analysis and robust human assets on the ground, so as to sort friend from foe. The United States can take the pilot out of the aircraft, but it cannot remove human judgment, risk, and willpower from war -- especially if it plans to keep intervening in murky conflicts in the Middle East.

### China

#### No impact --- China is already extremely cautious with drones

* Only our ev accounts for CCP psychology --- they want to avoid international criticism
* They aren’t confident in their drones --- think they are untested and too risky
* They don’t want to set a precedent for using drones in Asia that the US could exploit
* Only wants drones for surveillance

Erickson & Strange 5-23-’13, ANDREW ERICKSON is an associate professor at the Naval War College and an Associate in Research at Harvard University’s Fairbank Center. Follow him on Twitter @andrewserickson. AUSTIN STRANGE is a researcher at the Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute and a graduate student at Zhejiang University. May 23, 2013, Foreign Affairs, China Has Drones. Now What?, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136600/andrew-erickson-and-austin-strange/china-has-drones-now-what>, jj

Beijing, however, is unlikely to use its drones lightly. It already faces tremendous criticism from much of the international community for its perceived brazenness in continental and maritime sovereignty disputes. With its leaders attempting to allay notions that China’s rise poses a threat to the region, injecting drones conspicuously into these disputes would prove counterproductive. China also fears setting a precedent for the use of drones in East Asian hotspots that the United States could eventually exploit. For now, Beijing is showing that it understands these risks, and to date it has limited its use of drones in these areas to surveillance, according to recent public statements from China’s Defense Ministry.¶ What about using drones outside of Chinese-claimed areas? That China did not, in fact, launch a drone strike on the Burmese drug criminal underscores its caution. According to Liu Yuejin, the director of the antidrug bureau in China’s Ministry of Public Security, Beijing considered using a drone carrying a 20-kilogram TNT payload to bomb Kham’s mountain redoubt in northeast Myanmar. Kham had already evaded capture three times, so a drone strike may have seemed to be the best option. The authorities apparently had at least two plans for capturing Kham. The method they ultimately chose was to send Chinese police forces to lead a transnational investigation that ended in April 2012 with Kham’s capture near the Myanmar-Laos border. The ultimate decision to refrain from the strike may reflect both a fear of political reproach and a lack of confidence in untested drones, systems, and operators.¶ The restrictive position that Beijing takes on sovereignty in international forums will further constrain its use of drones. China is not likely to publicly deploy drones for precision strikes or in other military assignments without first having been granted a credible mandate to do so. The gold standard of such an authorization is a resolution passed by the UN Security Council, the stamp of approval that has permitted Chinese humanitarian interventions in Africa and antipiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. China might consider using drones abroad with some sort of regional authorization, such as a country giving Beijing explicit permission to launch a drone strike within its territory. But even with the endorsement of the international community or specific states, China would have to weigh any benefits of a drone strike abroad against the potential for mishaps and perceptions that it was infringing on other countries’ sovereignty -- something Beijing regularly decries when others do it.¶ The limitations on China’s drone use are reflected in the country’s academic literature on the topic. The bulk of Chinese drone research is dedicated to scientific and technological topics related to design and performance. The articles that do discuss potential applications primarily point to major combat scenarios -- such as a conflagration with Taiwan or the need to attack a U.S. aircraft carrier -- which would presumably involve far more than just drones. Chinese researchers have thought a great deal about the utility of drones for domestic surveillance and law enforcement, as well as for non-combat-related tasks near China’s contentious borders. Few scholars, however, have publicly considered the use of drone strikes overseas.¶ Yet there is a reason why the United States has employed drones extensively despite domestic and international criticism: it is much easier and cheaper to kill terrorists from above than to try to root them out through long and expensive counterinsurgency campaigns. Some similar challenges loom on China’s horizon. Within China, Beijing often considers protests and violence in the restive border regions, such as Xinjiang and Tibet, to constitute terrorism. It would presumably consider ordering precision strikes to suppress any future violence there. Even if such strikes are operationally prudent, China’s leaders understand that they would damage the country’s image abroad, but they prioritize internal stability above all else. Domestic surveillance by drones is a different issue; there should be few barriers to its application in what is already one of the world’s most heavily policed societies. China might also be willing to use stealth drones in foreign airspace without authorization if the risk of detection were low enough; it already deploys intelligence-gathering ships in the exclusive economic zones of Japan and the United States, as well as in the Indian Ocean.¶ Still, although China enjoys a rapidly expanding and cutting-edge drone fleet, it is bound by the same rules of the game as the rest of the military’s tools. Beyond surveillance, the other non-lethal military actions that China can take with its drones are to facilitate communications within the Chinese military, support electronic warfare by intercepting electronic communications and jamming enemy systems, and help identify targets for Chinese precision strike weapons, such as missiles. Beijing’s overarching approach remains one of caution -- something Washington must bear in mind with its own drone program.

#### No risk of US/China war---Chinese heg isn’t a threat, economic interdependence checks, miscalc won’t happen and deterrence checks escalation

Art ’10 (Robert J, Christian A. Herter Professor of [International Relations](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Relations) at Brandeis University and Fellow at [MIT Center for International Studies](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MIT_Center_for_International_Studies) Fall, Political Science Quarterly, Volume 125, #3, “The United States and the Rise of China: Implications for the Long Haul” <http://www.psqonline.org/99_article.php3?byear=2010&bmonth=fall&a=01free>, jj)

China does not present the type of security threat to the United States that Germany did to Britain, or Britain to Germany. Americaʼs nuclear forces make it secure from any Chinese attack on the homeland. Moreover, China clearly presents a potentially different type of threat to the United States than the Soviet Union did during the Cold War, because the geopolitics of the two situations are different. The Soviet geopolitical (as opposed to the nuclear) threat was two-fold: to conquer and dominate the economic–industrial resources of western Eurasia and to control the oil reserves of the Persian Gulf. Europe and the Persian Gulf constituted two of the five power centers of the world during the Cold War—Japan, the Soviet Union, and the United States being the other three. If the Soviets had succeeded in dominating Europe and the Persian Gulf through either conquest or political–military intimidation, then it would have controlled three of the five power centers of the world. That would have been a significant power transition. Chinaʼs rise does not constitute the same type of geopolitical threat to the United States that the Soviet Union did. If China ends up dominating the Korean peninsula and a significant part of continental Southeast Asia, so what? As long as Japan remains outside the Chinese sphere of influence and allied with the United States, and as long as the United States retains some naval footholds in Southeast Asia, such as in Singapore, the Philippines, or Indonesia, Chinaʼs domination of these two areas would not present the same type of geopolitical threat that the Soviet Union did. As long as Europe, the Persian Gulf, Japan, India, and Russia (once it reconstitutes itself as a serious great power) remain either as independent power centers or under U.S. influence, Chinese hegemony on land in East and Southeast Asia will not tip the world balance of power. The vast size and central position of the Soviet Union in Eurasia constituted a geopolitical threat to American influence that China cannot hope to emulate. If judged by the standards of the last three dominant power-rising power competitions of the last 100 years, then, the U.S.–China competition appears well placed to be much safer. Certainly, war between the two is not impossible, because either or both governments could make a serious misstep over the Taiwan issue. War by miscalculation is always possible, but the possession of nuclear weapons by both sides has to have a restraining effect on each by dramatically raising the costs of miscalculation, thereby increasing the incentives not to miscalculate. Nuclear deterrence should work to lower dramatically the possibility of war by either miscalculation or deliberate decision (or if somehow such a war broke out, then nuclear deterrence should work against its escalation into a large and fearsome one). Apart from the Taiwan issue or some serious incident at sea, it is hard to figure out how to start a war between the United States and China. There are no other territorial disputes of any significance between the two, and there are no foreseeable economic contingencies that could bring on a war between them. Finally, the high economic interdependence and the lack of intense ideological competition between them help to reinforce the pacific effects induced by the condition of mutual assured destruction. The workings of these three factors should make us cautiously optimistic about keeping Sino-American relations on the peaceful rather than the warlike track. The peaceful track does not, by any means, imply the absence of political and economic conflicts in Sino-American relations, nor does it foreclose coercive diplomatic gambits by each against the other. What it does mean is that the conditions are in place for war to be a low-probability event, if policymakers are smart in both states (see below), and that an all-out war is nearly impossible to imagine. By the historical standards of recent dominant-rising state dyads, this is no mean feat. In sum, there will be some security dilemma dynamics at work in the U.S.–China relationship, both over Taiwan and over maritime supremacy in East Asia, should China decide eventually to contest Americaʼs maritime hegemony, and there will certainly be political and military conflicts, but nuclear weapons should work to mute their severity because the security of each stateʼs homeland will never be in doubt as long as each maintains a secondstrike capability vis-à-vis the other. If two states cannot conquer one another, then the character of their relation and their competition changes dramatically.

#### No Senkaku impact

Their evidence is hype --- just saber rattling

Despite CCP transition --- they wouldn’t start conflict because they know it would be unwinnable --- US gets drawn in --- too expensive --- theyre content to hype the conflict to stoke nationalism but will stop short of war

Economic interdependence checks

Only our ev speaks to China’s perception --- don’t see energy gains from conflict as outweigh financial costs

Negotiations will work --- common interests --- China has already said it supports diplomacy

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September, Policy Mic, Senkaku Islands Dispute: Do Not Believe the Hype, China and Japan Are Not About to Go to War, <http://www.policymic.com/articles/14910/senkaku-islands-dispute-do-not-believe-the-hype-china-and-japan-are-not-about-to-go-to-war>, jj)

The world is abuzz with the rising tensions between China and Japan in the East China Sea, where the two are quarreling over the energy-rich Senkaku Island chain (known as the Diaoyu Islands in China). Complicating the issue is a similar dispute between South Korea and Japan over another energy rich island chain in the East Sea/Sea of Japan, known as Takeshima in Japan and Dokdo in South Korea. Add this to the already tense territorial relationship between various states in the Asia-Pacific region which include the Philippines, Thailand, India, and Vietnam, and it is no wonder many are discussing the prospects of outright military conflict erupting in the region.

But despite the rhetoric and saber rattling, the prospects for conflict are less than those who sell the news would have you believe.

Most troubling to observers are the anti-Japanese demonstrations that have been flaring up across China and a naval "show of force" by the Chinese navy into Japanese controlled waters. But it is important to keep this all in perspective. China’s economy is slowing and the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is preparing for a change in leadership. What’s more, the CCP has been at the receiving end of a lot of criticism in the wake of the Gu Kailai murder trial and its revelation of wide-spread corruption by her husband, Bo Xilai, a high-ranking CCP official. There is also the bizarre case of the son of another high-ranking CCP official, Ling Jihua, who died after he crashed his Ferrari while naked and in the company of two women. The CCP derives a great deal of its legitimacy from the country’s impressive economic performance over the past 30 or so years. With the economy slowing and the perception that the ruling party is corrupt, out of touch, and incompetent, while in the midst of a power transition, it becomes easy to see why the CCP may benefit from ratcheting up nationalist sentiment, particularly against its long-time rival Japan. It is unlikely the Chinese government would allow the situation to escalate to a point of actual conflict. Not only does China have important economic relations with its neighbors, including Japan, it knows it is a conflict it cannot win.

The rise in tensions in the South China Sea come in midst of America’s "Pacific pivot" – a large scale multi-dimensional strategic realignment of military, economic, and political resources to the Asia-Pacific region that began in earnest in November 2011. The United States is looking to build an institutional framework in the region similar to the one it created in Europe after World War II. At the center of this framework is, arguably, a need to "contain" China, or at least strongly influence its strategic calculus as it modernizes its military and becomes a more assertive regional and global power. Should the situation in the region come to blows, China is well aware that those it would be fighting have military alliances and agreements with the United States. Fighting Japan or South Korea is one thing. Fighting the United States is another. Fighting any combination of the U.S. and another regional power – particularly Japan – is simply un-winnable.

More important when considering the prospects for conflict in the region is the simple financial calculus: states go to war when the cost of doing so is less than the perceived rewards. While these islands may be rich in energy resources, it is unlikely that they exceed the economic and political costs of a war between any of these countries. A war between Japan and China would be a crippling blow to an already fragile global economy, particularly to the economies of those states involved. NATO taking out Libya could be done on the cheap; war between China and Japan cannot. It is not for nothing that China has already stated it would not use force to resolve territorial issues in the region. China and Japan may be flexing their muscles a bit, but both know it is in their best interests to resolve differences through negotiation, not war.

## Pak

**2NC---Pakistan**

***Pakistan knows it can’t change US drone policy – which is why they are expanding relations to other sectors – literally zero risk of spillover***

**The Express Tribune**, “An evolving US-Pakistan Relationship”, **October 25th** 2013, http://tribune.com.pk/story/621981/an-evolving-us-pakistan-relationship/

Prime Minister Nawaz **Sharif’s meeting** in Washington **with** President Barack **Obama has**, of course, **been closely watched**. **The meeting marks the first face-to-face interaction between the two men** since Nawaz was elected to power in May this year ***and obviously holds considerable significance*** given how central Pakistan-US relations are to the region, and developments within our own country too, where the battle with militancy continues and debate rages over just how the issue should be dealt with. Ties with the US are, of course, also central in terms of our floundering economy and the $1.6 billion in aid quietly handed over by Washington just ahead of Sharif’s arrival in the US capital will have been received with relief. There were also other good signs, with the Pakistan’s prime minister and his wife both warmly received by their hosts. But beyond the formalities of any such trip, it is of course, the actual talks themselves which are most significant. At a joint media talk with President Obama after they ended, Prime Minister **Sharif said they had proceeded along positive lines** and tensions had been cleared. This, of course, is good news and we must hope the gains made now can translate into a more lasting relationship of cooperation between the two nations. But reading a little more carefully between the lines, i**t is also obvious there were disagreements.** While Mr **Sharif, of course under immense pressure over the issue from home, made it a point to mention** in his remarks that ***the matter of drones*** had been discussed, Obama made no reference to the matter. From this **we can assume that the US has no real intention of changing its policy** on the matter. As has been the case in the past, it seems unprepared to alter its stand on the question. And a report published by The Washington Post, just as the two leaders went into talks, said that **for years Pakistan had secretly endorsed the US drone policy.** The detailed article backed by documentation referred to requests from Pakistan for specific targets to be hit and also mentioned US concerns of links between militant insurgents and Pakistan’s ISI. Identification found on the bodies of some militants was mentioned as proof of this. The report will, of course, only add further fuel to the drone fire. Given all this, **we wonder if it was really worth wasting so much breath on the drone issue.** After all, we know perfectly well, for all the pretence to the contrary, that **we cannot really do much to alter Washington’s stance on this.** In real terms, we are not equal partners; ***Pakistan today is dependent on the US and cannot do without it***. This is a fact. ***We really have no power to stop the drones***, so rather than focusing on things that lie out of reach, it may have been more sensible to aim for those that can be grasped. Kashmir, an issue also raised by the Pakistan’s prime minister, is too one about which little can be done, though President Obama did emphasise the need for better relations to be built between Pakistan and India for the sake of regional stability and balance. Regional matters were also brought up by Vice-President Joe Biden who brought up the transitional phase coming up in Afghanistan during his discussions with Mr Sharif.

***Pakistan’s demands to stop drones are just posturing – cooperation is resilient***

Heather **Maher, 10/23**-’13, Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, Expectations Modest As Sharif Meets Obama, <http://www.rferl.org/content/us-pakistan-drones-terrorism/25145090.html>, jj

Hathaway says **he won't get much satisfaction from Obama on that request**. "***For political reasons, he has to raise the drone issue with President Obama, even though he already knows that Obama is not simply going to agree to no more drone usages in Pakistan***," he says. "**Obama will say to him**, 'Mr. Prime Minister, **I understand your position, however, so long as militant groups are using sanctuaries in Pakistan to launch attacks against U.S. soldiers, I'm obligated to do everything I can to safeguard American lives.' So they will have to disagree on this**." **There are areas of agreement between the United States and Pakistan, including economic cooperation, the desire for stability in Afghanistan, and better ties between Pakistan and India**. U.S.-Pakistani relations have suffered in recent years for many reasons, including the killing of two Pakistanis by a CIA contractor in Lahore, the accidental killing of 24 Pakistani troops in a U.S. air strike, and a secret U.S. military raid inside the country to kill Osama bin Laden. Analysts say Wednesday's meeting will set a new tone in the relationship and reestablish channels of communication that have been lost. For his part, Sharif said that ***relations between his country and the United States "have stood the test of time" and "always weathered the occasional storm***."

#### Drone tension inevitable but it doesn’t collapse Pakistan relations

Curtis 7-15-’13, Lisa Curtis is a senior research fellow at the Heritage Foundation. July 15, 2013, The National Interest, Pakistan Makes Drones Necessary, <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/pakistan-makes-drones-necessary-8725>, jj

The U.S. will need to keep a close eye on the tribal border areas, where there is a nexus of terrorist groups that threaten not only U.S. interests but also the stability of the Pakistani state. Given that Pakistan is home to more international terrorists than almost any other country and, at the same time, has one of the fastest growing nuclear arsenals, the country will remain of vital strategic interest for Washington for many years to come.¶ Though the drone issue will continue to be a source of tension in the relationship, it is doubtful that it alone would derail ties. The extent to which the United States will continue to rely on drone strikes ultimately depends on Islamabad’s willingness to develop more decisive and comprehensive counterterrorism policies that include targeting groups like the Haqqani Network.

#### Cooperation up despite drones---no collapse coming

Robert D. Lamb is senior fellow and director of the Program on Crisis, Conflict, and Cooperation at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, 1/2/14, Pakistan in 2014: Time ripe for a virtuous cycle?, <http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2014/01/02/pakistan-in-2014-time-ripe-for-a-virtuous-cycle/>, jj

During U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel’s meetings last month with Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and new Chief of Army Staff Gen. Raheel Sharif, the two countries traded familiar complaints: for Pakistan, the continuing U.S. drone strikes against targets in Pakistan’s sovereign territory; for the United States, the ongoing use of Pakistani territory as a safe haven for Taliban, Haqqani network, and other militants fighting in Afghanistan. But they also reaffirmed the importance of the partnership, given their shared concern over the very real threats to Pakistan’s stability: armed militants attacking Pakistani state targets, sectarian and political violence increasing intercommunal tensions, terrorist groups threatening India with cross-border attacks and increasing on-again-off-again tensions with its larger neighbor, and devastating energy and economic crises that keep tens of millions of Pakistanis in poverty and threaten Pakistan’s social cohesion. Pakistan is a country that is too big to fail: its population is large, it has nuclear weapons, and its extremist groups have international connections. Instability there would affect too many international security concerns to ignore. These threats are not going away any time soon. The next 12 months will be a critical period as the United States will withdraw most (and potentially all) of its troops from Afghanistan by the end of 2014. That drawdown will have significant – and unpredictable – effects within Pakistan and on the U.S.-Pakistan relationship. The challenge will be to get beyond the frustrations and disagreements and find ways to cooperate as the opportunities to do so arise. The good news is that opportunities do exist beyond security cooperation. Leaders of both countries would do well to pursue policies and investments that can start to reverse the economic crisis and build relationships giving more people a stake in stability.

**Pakistan Supports Drones/A2: Kickout**

***Pakistan has to act like they’re kicking us out---but if they were going to, they would have already***

Gregory **McNeal 13**, Associate Professor of Law, Pepperdine University, 3/5/13, “Targeted Killing and Accountability,” <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1819583>

Granted, “lawyers at the State Department, including top legal adviser Harold Koh, believe this rationale veers near the edge of what can be considered permission” and are concerned because “[c]onducting drone strikes in a country against its will could be seen as an act of war.”62 Nevertheless, the notion of consent is one that is hotly debated by opponents of targeted killings. The Bureau of Investigative Journalism reports that Pakistan “categorically rejects” the claim that it tacitly allows drone strikes in its territory63 and in the same New York

Times article discussed above an official with Pakistani intelligence “said any suggestion of Pakistani cooperation was ‘hogwash.’”64 However, ***these protests lack credibility*** as Pakistan ***has not exercised its rights under international law*** to prevent strikes by asking the U.S. to stop, intercepting American aircraft, targeting U.S. operators on the ground, or lodging a formal protest with the UN General Assembly or the Security Council. If the strikes are ***truly without consent***, are a violation of Pakistani sovereignty, and are akin to acts of war, one would ***expect something more*** from the Pakistani government. With regard to Yemen, the question of consent is far clearer as Yemeni officials have gone on the record specifically noting their approval of U.S. strikes.65

***Reforms to the targeting process resolved Pakistan’s governmental objections---no chance of a breach in relations***

**WSJ 11** – Wall Street Journal, 11/4/11, “U.S. Tightens Drone Rules,” http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204621904577013982672973836.html

Adm. Mullen argued that the CIA needed to be more selective. Then-Defense Secretary Robert Gates feared that the Pakistanis, if pushed too hard, would block the flow of supplies to troops in Afghanistan, officials said.

For Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who has supported the CIA's strikes in the vast majority of cases, the biggest focus has been to ***make sure political ramifications are properly assessed*** to avoid a situation where the political opposition in Pakistan becomes so great that the country's current or future leaders decide to bar the drones outright.

Independent information about who the CIA kills in signature strikes in Pakistan is scarce. The agency tells U.S. and Pakistani officials that there have been very few civilian deaths—only 60 over the years. But some senior officials in both governments privately say they are skeptical that civilian deaths have been that low.

Some top officials in the White House meetings this summer argued for a broader reassessment. "The question is, 'Is it even worth doing now? We've got the key leadership in al Qaeda, what is it that we're there for now?" one of the officials recalled some advisers asking.

The White House review culminated in a Situation Room meeting with Mr. Obama in June in which he reaffirmed support for the program.

But changes were made. Mr. Obama instituted an appeals procedure to give the State Department more of a voice in deciding when and if to strike. If the U.S. ambassador to Pakistan objected to a strike, for example, the CIA director or his deputy would first try to talk through their differences with the ambassador. If the conflict was unresolved, the secretary of state would appeal directly to the CIA director. If they couldn't reach agreement, however, the CIA director retained the final say.

Since the changes were made, officials say internal tensions over the strikes have eased and agencies were acting more in concert with each other.

### 2NC – Pakistan Stable

#### Pakistan’s stabilizing---drone strikes are declining as precision increases---the status quo resolves their whole advantage

Cameron Munter 9-30, professor of practice in international relations at Pomona College, served as a U.S. Foreign Service Officer for nearly three decades, was Ambassador to Pakistan 2010-2012, 9/30/13, “Guest Post: A New Face in the U.S.-Pakistani Relationship,” http://justsecurity.org/2013/09/30/cameron-munter-pakistan-relations/

In doing so, however, we have made the image of a soldier or a drone the image of America’s strategic vision for Pakistan and the region. As 2014 approaches, and American troops end their combat mission in Afghanistan; as drone strikes in the Pakistani tribal areas appear to be fewer in number and more precise in targeting; as the general trends of the U.S. “pivot toward Asia” become clear, the soldier and the drone will be less common. Even though the President’s commitment to U.S. security does not waver, the reminders of his commitment will be fewer and far between – at least it would seem, seen from the street in Pakistan.

Will that face of America – the M-16 and flak jacket, the film of a predator strike – remain, or can we replace it with something else? A different face of commitment, one that Americans have supported throughout the last decade but which has, in the Pakistani media (fairly or not) been shoved aside by the violence in the tribal areas and unrest throughout the country? That other commitment has been enormous expenditure by the U.S. government in support of economic growth, building schools, replacing crops destroyed by floods, refurbishing power plants, and improving health delivery services, to name just a few achievements. But few Pakistanis believe this aid has made a difference. Instead, they associate us only with the manifestations of the war on terror.

In the coming month this can change. No, it should not just be a PR campaign to convince Pakistanis of our commitment to what they care about (not just what we care about). Certainly, PR is necessary, but lacking a new face, it won’t be sufficient. It will require two things.

First, on the policy level, we must use the changes in 2014 to wrest U.S. policy toward Pakistan from its current status as derivative of the war in Afghanistan. Of course, Pakistan has an enormous role to play in security arrangements of the region in years to come. Its relationship to India, to China, to Iran, and of course to Afghanistan are very important as the international community seeks to find a just and equitable peace in the region. But we should make every effort to consider Pakistan’s needs. Not just the needs of the Pakistani military and intelligence leadership, important as they are. Rather, the needs of a country of nearly 200 million people whose stability and prosperity will be essential to the long-term stability and prosperity of the entire region. Pakistan’s success is not a guarantee of regional peace; but Pakistani failure is certainly a guarantee of regional strife.

Second, on a practical level, we should provide a face of American commitment that we know, through decades of effort, is welcome. Polling shows consistently that while most Pakistanis are angry at America (citing security policies as the reason), most Pakistanis – across the political spectrum, rural and urban, young and old – want a better relationship with us. Why? Because despite all the searing problems of the last decade, they admire us: they admire our educational institutions, our business acumen, our commitment to philanthropy. And here, I believe, they can find the practical partners to renew Pakistani understanding of American commitment to the relationship. Universities, businesses, foundations. Students and teachers, businesspeople and investors, donors and grassroots workers. These are the faces of the relationship in which America can play to its strengths, and in doing so, help build a successful Pakistan that is so necessary for us to achieve our own strategic interests in South Asia and beyond.

Recent press articles highlight just how worried we’ve been about Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. And we should be worried. We need to know if that arsenal can be misused or fall into the wrong hands. But even a massive surveillance effort, while necessary, will be insufficient. We need to take modest but purposeful measures to help Pakistan remain stable. That’s not the same as focusing so overwhelmingly on immediate security concerns. We also need to engage in Pakistani politics, economics, society, where we have a much stronger hand to play than we perhaps realize.

Certainly, such changes cannot take place overnight. After all, the main reason that we see so few American university professors or businesspeople in Pakistan is that it’s still considered too dangerous. Yes, Pakistan’s government must take on the terrorist challenge, and it is enormous. And when Pakistan’s new Interior Minister propose plans to make the best use of Pakistan’s internal security forces, we should engage with him and take seriously any requests for help. But I believe we have a chance to do so, a chance afforded by the potential change in the face of America in Pakistan: difficult as it is, painful as our experiences in Pakistan have been, let’s listen to them and see if their plans to tackle terrorism have a place for our help. It’s certainly in our interest and theirs. Who knows? If Pakistan’s new leadership is able to make real progress against terrorism, there may be another new face – a face of a Pakistan that is not the negative image so common in recent years, but a Pakistan where people of good will are determined to succeed, and ask the help of an old friend in doing so.

#### China intervening to stabilize Pakistan

Xinhua, ’13 (“China to support Pakistan in realizing stability, better development: premier,” http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-05/23/c\_132403944.htm, bgm)

The Chinese government will unswervingly stick to its friendly policy toward Pakistan and support the South Asian nation in realizing stability and better development, visiting Chinese Premier Li Keqiang said here Thursday. Li was speaking during a meeting with Pakistani military leaders including Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee General Khalid Shameem Wynne, Chief of Army Staff General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, Chief of Naval Staff Muhammad Asif Sandila and Chief of Air Staff Marshal Tahir Rafique Butt. "The Pakistani military is not only an important force in maintaining security and stability in Pakistan, but also a firm supporter of the China-Pakistan friendship," said Li. The friendship between China and Pakistan is unbreakable thanks to not only the efforts of generations of leaders of both sides and the fervent support of the two peoples, but also the in-depth development of the ties between the two militaries, Li said. He urged the international community to help Pakistan overcome difficulties and cope with challenges under the premise of respecting its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. As a good neighbor, friend and partner, China pays close attention to the development of situation in Pakistan and respects the development path chosen by the Pakistani people in accordance with their national situations, Li said. China supports concerned parties in Pakistan to jointly contribute to maintaining political stability, developing economy and improving people's livelihood in the fundamental interests of the nation, Li said, adding China is willing to provide assistance to Pakistan within its capability.

#### No Pakistan coup – it’s media hype, democracy is high, and military won’t intervene

Brulliard 12 (Karin, Editor, “In Pakistan, coup looms but does not strike,” Washington Post, 1-23, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-01-23/world/35440253\_1\_ashfaq-kayani-president-asif-ali-zardari-nawaz-sharif)

Just days ago, the rumblings of a familiar process seemed underway in Pakistan: The squeezed civilian government berated the looming military. The army darkly warned of consequences. A new general assumed control of a brigade known for helping to oust past governments. The president flew overseas. A coup d’etat was coming, the Pakistani media screamed. Except that it did not. Instead, Pakistan again defaulted to what is also becoming a familiar ritual. Having survived the forecast collapse, the government lurched closer to becoming the first-ever elected regime to finish its term. And public debate ensued about whether Pakistan is witnessing a veiled military power grab — or whether this coup-prone nation’s nascent democracy might be growing real roots. “There is an enlarged democratic space,” said Raza Rumi, a newspaper columnist who counts himself among the optimists. “So this is an interesting moment. The government may or may not survive . . . but the assertion of the civilians is inspiring.” The current political crises, involving a memo scandal and graft allegations, feature elements that have helped bring down previous civilian governments: avaricious politicians, baying opposition parties, pliant judges and a failing economy that is said to worry the generals. But many analysts say the tools of past coups, such as tanks and state media blackouts, could not work in today’s Pakistan, where the news media and the judiciary have emerged as new power centers. That has given Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani and President Asif Ali Zardari surprising confidence to publicly challenge the army in what feels like a heavily watched bluffing game. One senior official in the ruling Pakistan People’s Party, speaking on the condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the matter, confidently said the party does not “see the chances of direct army intervention.” The military, for starters, has its own problems. Gen. Ashfaq Kayani, chief of the Army, has strived to restore the armed forces’ public image since a decade of military rule ended in 2008, but it has faced unprecedented domestic criticism after the U.S. raid to kill Osama bin Laden. A resilient Islamist insurgency leaves generals little down time to manage the economy, said one military official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because the official was not authorized to discuss the matter publicly. “The military is so overstretched and preoccupied fighting the militants,” said retired Lt. Gen. Talat Masood, a prominent defense analyst. “It’s a full-time occupation.” Influence today is spread more widely than in past eras, analysts say. In recent years, Pakistan has sprouted a slew of sensationalist and scrappy news outlets that, while generally rabidly anti-government, would be reluctant to endorse a uniformed regime that could corral their reach and profits. Parliament has become less deferential to the military, and the main opposition party, led by Nawaz Sharif, is no friend of the army, which overthrew him in 1999. The main coup deterrent, some argue, is an emboldened Supreme Court, which has assumed an activist, almost messianic public role. Like the media and the army, it has displayed clear antipathy toward the government by keenly pursuing alleged corruption cases. Those include dated money laundering allegations against Zardari, over which the court has threatened to dismiss Gilani. But the court was also restored after a struggle against Gen. Pervez Musharraf, the former dictator, and appears unlikely to give legal blessing to a military takeover. “This was not the case before. The courts were very happy and eager to play along with dictators,” Rumi said.

### resil

#### Pakistan resilient

Sunil Dasgupta '13 Ph.D. in political science and the director of UMBC's Political Science Program and a senior fellow at Brookings, 2/25/13, "How will India respond to civil war in Pakistan," East Asia Forum, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/02/25/how-will-india-respond-to-civil-war-in-pakistan/

Bill Keller of the New York Times [has described Pakistani president Asif Ail Zardari](http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/18/magazine/bill-keller-pakistan.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0) as overseeing ‘a ruinous kleptocracy that is spiraling deeper into economic crisis’. But in contrast to predictions of an unravelling nation, British journalist-scholar [Anatol Lieven argues](http://www.anu.edu.au/vision/videos/6291/) that the Pakistani state is likely to continue muddling through its many problems, unable to resolve them but equally predisposed against civil war and consequent state collapse. Lieven finds that the strong bonds of family, clan, tribe and the nature of South Asian Islam prevent modernist movements — propounded by the government or by the radicals — from taking control of the entire country.¶ Lieven’s analysis is more persuasive than the widespread view that Pakistan is about to fail as a state. The formal institutions of the Pakistani state are surprisingly robust given the structural conditions in which they operate. Indian political leaders recognise Pakistan’s resilience. Given the bad choices in Pakistan, they would rather not have anything to do with it. If there is going to be a civil war, why not wait for the two sides to exhaust themselves before thinking about intervening? The 1971 war demonstrated India’s willingness to exploit conditions inside Pakistan, but to break from tradition requires strong, countervailing logic, and those elements do not yet exist. [Given the current conditions](http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/12/30/pakistans-bleak-outlook-lightened-by-the-game-changer-with-india/) and those in the foreseeable future, India is likely to sit out a Pakistani civil war while covertly coordinating policy with the United States.

#### Pakistan resilient – no risk of becoming failed state

Price, ’13 (Dr. Gareth, Senior Research Fellow, interviewed by ISN, Asia Programme at Chatham House, “State Weakness and Internal Instability in Pakistan,” 7/24, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?lng=en&id=165903, bgm)

Gareth Price: Pakistan is often described as a fragile, or even a failed state. But while it has many systemic and structural problems – in the areas of security and governance, for instance – this narrative is an oversimplification. In many ways, Pakistani people and the Pakistani state are resilient. Historically, the weakness of civilian governments has been used to justify military rule, with the military frequently being seen as Pakistan’s most resilient institution. But the previous government – while weak – completed a full term. Civilian institutions will only be strengthened gradually over time. And while the long-standing perception in Pakistan that India, rather than internal militancy, is the country’s existential threat lends further support for military rule, that perception too seems to be gradually changing.

#### No impact to Pakistan instability- their ev is hype

Hundley ’12(Before joining the Pulitzer Center, Tom Hundley was a newspaper journalist for 36 years, including nearly two decades as a foreign correspondent for the Chicago Tribune. During that time he served as the Tribune’s bureau chief in Jerusalem, Warsaw, Rome and London, reporting from more than 60 countries. He has covered three wars in the Persian Gulf, the Arab-Israeli conflict and the rise of Iran’s post-revolutionary theocracy. His work has won numerous journalism awards. He has taught at the American University in Dubai and at Dominican University in River Forest, Illinois. He has also been a Middle East correspondent for GlobalPost and a contributing writer for the Chicago News Cooperative. Tom graduated from Georgetown University and holds a master’s degree in international relations from the University of Pennsylvania. He was also National Endowment for the Humanities journalism fellow at the University of Michigan. Published September 5, 2012

With both sides armed to the teeth, **it is easy to exaggerate the fears** and much harder to pinpoint where the real dangers lie. For the United States, the nightmare scenario is that some of Pakistan's warheads or its fissile material falls into the hands of the Taliban or al Qaeda -- or, worse, that the whole country falls into the hands of the Taliban. For example, Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, a former CIA officer now at Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, has warned of the "lethal proximity between terrorists, extremists, and nuclear weapons insiders" in Pakistan. This is a reality, but on the whole, Pakistan's nuclear arsenal appears to be reasonably secure against internal threats, according to those who know the country best. To **outsiders**, Pakistan **appears** to be permanently teetering on the **brink** of collapse. The fact that large swaths of the country are literally beyond the control of the central government is not reassuring. But a weak state **does not mean** a **weak society**, and **powerful internal dynamics based** largely on kinship and tribe **make it highly unlikely** that Pakistan would **ever fall** under the control of an outfit like the Taliban. During the country's intermittent bouts of democracy, its civilian leaders have been consistently incompetent and corrupt, but **even in the worst of times,** the military has maintained a high standard of professionalism. And there is **nothing** that **matters more** to the Pakistani military than keeping the nuclear arsenal -- **its crown jewels** -- out of the hands of India, the United States, and homegrown extremists. "Pakistan struggled to acquire these weapons against the wishes of the world. Our nuclear capability comes as a result of great sacrifice. It is our most precious and powerful weapon -- for our defense, our security, and our political prestige," Talat Masood, a retired Pakistani lieutenant general, told me. "We keep them safe." Pakistan's nuclear security is in the responsibility of the Strategic Plans Division**,** which appears to function pretty much as **a separate branch** of the military. It has its **own training facility and an elaborate set of controls** and screening proceduresto keep track of **all warheads and fissile material** and to monitor **any blips** in the behavior patterns of its personnel. The 15 or so sites where weapons are stored **are the mostly heavily guarded** in the country. **Even if** some group managed to steal or commandeer a weapon, **it is highly unlikely the group would be able to use it**. The greater danger is the theft of fissile material, which could be used to make a crude bomb. "With 70 to 80 kilos of highly enriched uranium, it would be fairly easy to make one in the basement of a building in the city of your choice," said Pervez Hoodbhoy, a distinguished nuclear physicist at Islamabad's Quaid-i-Azam University. At the moment, Pakistan has a stockpile of about 2.75 tons -- or some 30 bombs' worth -- of highly enriched uranium. It does not tell Americans where it is stored. "All nuclear countries are conscious of the risks, nuclear weapons states especially so," said Gen. Ehsan ul-Haq, who speaks with the been-there-done-that authority of a man who has served as both chairman of Pakistan's Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee and head of the ISI, its controversial spy agency. "Of course there are concerns. Some are genuine, butmuch of what you read in the U.S. media is **irrational and reflective of paranoia**. Rising radicalism in Pakistan? Yes, this is true, and the military is very conscious of this." Perhaps **the most credible endorsement** of Pakistan's nuclear security regime comes from its **most steadfast enemy.** The **consensus among India's top generals and defense experts** is that Pakistan's nukes are pretty secure. "No one can be 100 percent secure, but I think they are **more than 99 percent secure**," said Shashindra Tyagi, a former chief of staff of the Indian Air Force. "They keep a very close watch on personnel. All of the steps that could be taken have been taken. This business of the Taliban taking over -- it can't be ruled out, but I think **it's unlikely**. **The** Pakistani **military understands the threats** they face better than anyone, **and** they **are smart enough to take care it."** Yogesh Joshi, an analyst at the Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses in New Delhi, agrees: "Different states have different perceptions of risk. The U.S. has contingency plans [to secure Pakistan's nukes] because its nightmare scenario is that Pakistan's weapons fall into terrorist hands. The view from India over the years is that **Pakistan,** probably **more than any other nuclear** weapons **state, has taken measures to secure its weapons.** At the political level here, there's a lot of confidence that Pakistan's nuclear weapons are secure."

### Central asia

#### Powers will work together to stabilize the region—security and economic incentives

Gresh 12 (Dr. Geoffrey F., Assistant Professor of International Security Studies at National Defense University, “Russia, China, and stabilizing South Asia”, 3/12, http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/03/12/russia\_china\_and\_stabilizing\_south\_asia)

As the U.S. begins to withdraw troops from Afghanistan, Russia and China have both declared a desire to increase their military presence throughout Central and South Asia. This new regional alignment, however, should not be viewed as a threat to U.S. strategic national interests but seen rather as concurrent with strategic and regional interests of the United States: regional peace, stability and the prevention of future terrorist safe havens in ungoverned territories. As China and Russia begin to flex their military muscles, the U.S. military should harness their expanded regional influence to promote proactively a new period of responsible multilateral support for Afghanistan and Pakistan. This past December it became clearer that Russia had begun to re-assert its regional presence when the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) granted Russia the veto power over any member state's future decision to host a foreign military. CSTO members, including Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, have become increasingly valuable U.S. partners in the Northern Distribution Network after Pakistan shut down U.S. military supply routes running from the south into Afghanistan when NATO troops killed 24 Pakistani soldiers last November in the border area of Salala. Though it appears the route may soon open again, the United States must still adopt a new strategy that works more closely with Russia and the CSTO to maintain the Northern Distribution Network long into the future, which currently accounts for about 60 percent of all cargo transiting Central Asia en route to Afghanistan. Certainly, the U.S. risks being unable to control many aspects of the Northern Distribution Network as it withdraws from the region, and this may in turn adversely affect Afghanistan's future success. However, if the United States remains concerned about leaving the region to a historically obdurate regional rival like Russia, it should also bear in mind that Russia has a vital strategic interest in the future stability of the region. Russia has approximately 15 million Muslims living within its borders, with an estimated 2 million Muslims in Moscow. Russia is fearful of what occurs on its periphery and wants to minimize the spread of Muslim extremism that may originate from an unstable Afghanistan or Pakistan. In addition, Russia does not want regional instability that threatens its oil and gas investments. In particular, Russia wants to ensure that it continues to influence the planning and implementation of the potentially lucrative natural gas pipeline that may one day traverse Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. In a recent meeting with Pakistani Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov discussed Russia's commitment to preserving peace and stability throughout the AfPak region, and rejected the use of violence by al-Qaeda and its affiliates that aim to undermine the current Afghan government. Furthermore, he pledged to bolster bilateral ties and work cooperatively with Pakistan to achieve stability in Afghanistan. A newly-elected President Vladimir Putin also recently wrote in a campaign brief that "Russia will help Afghanistan develop its economy and strengthen its military to fight terrorism and drug production." It is not lost on the U.S. government that Russia is proposing to succeed where the U.S. has struggled. However, if Russia does succeed in helping establish a secure Afghanistan and Pakistan that can prevent the spread of bases for terrorism then it is a victory for everyone. Aside from Pakistan, and in line with promoting security throughout the region, Russia announced recently that it will provide $16 million to Kyrgyzstan to assist with border security in the south. Russia also agreed recently to pay $15 million in back rent for its four military facilities across the country, including an air base, a torpedo test center on Lake Issyk-Kul, and a communications center in the south. Further, Russia signed a security pact with Tajikistan last fall to extend its basing lease for 49 years, in addition to a bilateral agreement that will enable Russia to become more integrated into Tajikistan's border security forces that oversee an 830-mile border with Afghanistan. Providing similar types of U.S. aid and security support will also help ensure that the valuable Northern Distribution Network remains open and secure for supply lines into Afghanistan. If the northern trade routes are shut down it would adversely affect aid arriving to Afghanistan and therefore jeopardize the stability of Afghanistan and the region. It would also be in opposition to Russia's regional interests. Rather than citing these examples in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan as a demonstration of how the U.S. will soon lose out in the region to a resurgent Russia, policymakers can view them as an indication of how Russian interests align with the U.S. to help maintain regional security. More importantly, if Russia wants to take a more active future role in Central Asia, the U.S. should address this shift and work directly with Russia and other CSTO members to ensure that the Northern Distribution Network remains operational in the distant future. Certainly, the U.S. should not be naïve to think that Russia will not at times oppose U.S. regional interests and that there will not be significant areas of conflict. In 2009, Russia tried to convince then President of Kyrgyzstan Kurmanbek Bakiyev to terminate the U.S. contract for its base in Manas. In this case, the U.S. fended off the threat of expulsion successfully through promises of increased U.S. military and economic aid. Continuing to maintain significant amounts of aid to the Central Asia Republics will therefore provide additional incentives to ensure the U.S. is less vulnerable to Russian whims, while at the same time remaining present and active for the benefit of regional security and the maintenance of the Northern Distribution Network. Another powerful regional player, China, also has a vested interest in the stability of the AfPak region, and has already begun to play a more active security role. It was reported this past January, for example, that China intends to establish one or more bases in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Subsequently, at the end of February, Beijing played host to the first China-Afghanistan-Pakistan trilateral dialogue to discuss regional cooperation and stability. Due to China's shared borders and vibrant trade with both Afghanistan and Pakistan -- not to mention China's estimated 8 million Turkic-speaking Muslim Uyghurs living in western Xinjiang Province -- it has a direct interest in ensuring that both Afghanistan and Pakistan remain stable long into the future. Bilateral trade between China and Pakistan, for example, increased 28 percent in the past year to approximately $8.7 billion. China also signed an oil agreement with Afghanistan in December that could be worth $7 billion over the next two decades. Additionally, China is concerned about the rise of its Uyghur separatist movement that maintains safe havens in both countries, in addition to the spread of radical Islam. The United States should push China to become more actively engaged in Pakistan's security affairs as China has a direct interest in moderating radicalism in Pakistan and keeping it stable. Indicative of Pakistan's strategic value to China, since 2002 China has financed the construction and development of Pakistan's Gwadar deep water port project. China has contributed more than $1.6 billion toward the port's development as a major shipping and soon-to-be naval hub, which is located just 250 miles from the opening of the Persian Gulf. A Pakistan Supreme Court decision in 2011 enabled China to take full control of Gwadar from a Singapore management company further establishing China's firm position in the Pakistani port city. The creation of a new Chinese military network in Pakistan between Gwadar and the FATA would enable China to oversee the transit and protection of Chinese goods and investments that travel from both the coast and interior through the Karakorum corridor to China's Xinjiang Province. China already has an estimated 4,000 troops in Gilgit Baltistan, part of the larger and disputed Kashmir, and just recently it was reported after a January 2012 trip by Pakistani Army Chief General Ashfaq Kayani to China that Pakistan is considering leasing Gilgit Baltistan to China for the next 50 years. Such a move would indeed escalate tensions with India to the south, but from a Pakistani perspective, China would be positioned better than it already is to assist with any future Pakistani national security concerns. And from a Chinese perspective, it would improve their ability to monitor any illicit Uyghur activities aimed at inciting further rebellion in western China. With interest comes responsibility, and in the wake of the recent reports predicting the establishment of a more robust Chinese military network across Pakistan, it is time that China begins to supplement its increased involvement in Pakistan by helping to maintain peace and stability throughout the entire AfPak region. Certainly after fighting two long wars, the United States can no longer be the sole world power responsible for the region, and both China and Russia have been U.S. security free-riders for too long. They have benefited financially while NATO continues to lose soldiers and accrue a massive war debt. After 11 years of war, it is time the United States work more proactively with Russia, China, Pakistan and the Central Asian Republics to create solutions for the future stability and collective security of the region. Indeed, we may not have a choice, and the United States should embrace the transformation of a new era in Eurasia's heartland.

#### Structural barriers prevent instability

Weitz 12 (Richard, writes a weekly column on Asia-Pacific strategic and security issues. He is director of the Center for Political-Military Analysis and a Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute. His commentaries have appeared in the International Herald Tribune, The Guardian and Wall Street Journal (Europe), among other publications. “Stabilizing the Stans”, 6/1, http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/stabilizing-the-stans)

Social disorder in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and other Arab countries has invariably led observers to regard Central Asia’s autocracies as potentially vulnerable to similar upheaval. Some Central Asian leaders have been in power for many years, and only Kyrgyzstan, the most impoverished of the five, has developed a competitive multi-party political system. Elsewhere, political parties are weak or are tools of the regime. But other factors make the Arab scenario less plausible in Central Asia. ­­Security forces are more closely aligned with ruling elites; independent political groups and social-media networks are less well developed; economic performance remains high in some countries; and a previous wave of revolutions produced disappointing results in Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan.

#### 2. No escalation

Collins and Wohlforth ’04(Kathleen, Prof PoliSci – Notre Dame and William, Prof Government – Dartmouth, “Defying ‘Great Game’ Expectations”, Strategic Asia 2003-4: Fragility and Crisis, p. 312-3)

Conclusion The popular great game lens for analyzing Central Asia fails to capture the declared interests of the great powers as well as the best reading of their objective interests in security and economic growth. Perhaps more importantly, it fails to explain their actual behavior on the ground, as well the specific reactions of the Central Asian states themselves. Naturally, there are competitive elements in great power relations. Each country’s policymaking community has slightly different preferences for tackling the challenges presented in the region, and the more influence they have the more able they are to shape events in concordance with those preferences. But these clashing preferences concern the means to serve ends that all the great powers share. To be sure, policy-makers in each capital would prefer that their own national firms or their own government’s budget be the beneficiaries of any economic rents that emerge from the exploitation and transshipment of the region’s natural resources. But the scale of these rents is marginal even for Russia’s oil-fueled budget. And for taxable profits to be created, the projects must make sense economically—something that is determined more by markets and firms than governments. Does it matter? The great game is an arresting metaphor that serves to draw people’s attention to an oft-neglected region. The problem is the great-game lens can distort realities on the ground, and therefore bias analysis and policy. For when great powers are locked in a competitive fight, the issues at hand matter less than their implication for the relative power of contending states. Power itself becomes the issue—one that tends to be nonnegotiable. Viewing an essential positive-sum relationship through zero sum conceptual lenses will result in missed opportunities for cooperation that leaves all players—not least the people who live in the region—poorer and more insecure. While cautious realism must remain the watchword concerning an impoverished and potentially unstable region comprised of fragile and authoritarian states, our analysis yields at least conditional and relative optimism. Given the confluence of their chief strategic interests, the major powers are in a better position to serve as a stabilizing force than analogies to the Great Game or the Cold War would suggest. It is important to stress that the region’s response to the profoundly destabilizing shock of coordinated terror attacks was increased cooperation between local governments and China and Russia, and—multipolar rhetoric notwithstanding—between both of them and the United States. If this trend is nurtured and if the initial signals about potential SCO-CSTO-NATO cooperation are pursued, another destabilizing shock might generate more rather than less cooperation among the major powers. Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan are clearly on a trajectory that portends longer-term cooperation with each of the great powers. As military and economic security interests become more entwined, there are sound reasons to conclude that “great game” politics will not shape Central Asia’s future in the same competitive and destabilizing way as they have controlled its past. To the contrary, mutual interests in Central Asia may reinforce the broader positive developments in the great powers’ relations that have taken place since September 11, as well as reinforce regional and domestic stability in Central Asia.

#### Great power cooperation, not conflict, is the trend in Central Asia

Hall & Grant ‘09 (Gregory, professor of political science at Morehouse College, Tiara, professor of government at New Mexico State University, Volume 20, Number 2, Spring 2009, “Russia, China, and the Energy-Security Politics of the Caspian Sea Region after the Cold War” project muse, jj)

Perhaps the situation is not so grave. China, Russia, and the United States all emphasize stability in Central Asia as critical for their energy security. China and Russia benefit from Western economic investments and technical assistance in developing their energy infrastructure. The trilateral trade relationships have mutual benefit in political, economic, and/or military terms. Iran, too, has much to gain from a stable CSB region. All four actors have significant ties to the region, either as energy producers/exporters, as importers, or both. So long as these actors can continue to find a way to manage the more pressing issues among them (for example, Georgia's internal stability, antiterrorism, North Korea, and Iran's nuclear power aspirations), their competition in Central Asia should not become destabilizing. [End Page 137]

#### No escalation- no vital interests for great power war in Central Asia

Weitz-Sr Fellow @ Assoc Director of Center for Future Security-2006 (Richard, “Averting a New Great Game in Central Asia,” The Washington Quarterly, Summer, twq.com/06summer/docs/06summer\_weitz.pdf)

Central Asian security affairs have become much more complex than during the original nineteenth-century great game between czarist Russia and the United Kingdom. At that time, these two governments could largely dominate local affairs, but today a variety of influential actors are involved in the region. The early 1990s witnessed a vigorous competition between Turkey and Iran for influence in Central Asia. More recently, India and Pakistan have pursued a mixture of cooperative and competitive policies in the region that have influenced and been affected by their broader relationship. The now independent Central Asian countries also invariably affect the region’s international relations as they seek to maneuver among the major powers without compromising their newfound autonomy. Although Russia, China, and the United States substantially affect regional security issues, they cannot dictate outcomes the way imperial governments frequently did a century ago. Concerns about a renewed great game are thus exaggerated. The contest for influence in the region does not directly challenge the vital national interests of China, Russia, or the United States, the most important extraregional countries in Central Asian security affairs. Unless restrained, however, competitive pressures risk impeding opportunities for beneficial cooperation among these countries. The three external great powers have incentives to compete for local allies, energy resources, and military advantage, but they also share substantial interests, especially in reducing terrorism and drug trafficking. If properly aligned, the major multilateral security organizations active in Central Asia could provide opportunities for cooperative diplomacy in a region where bilateral ties traditionally have predominated.

### 2NC – No Pak Loose Nukes

#### No impact – security upgrades

Ansari, 1/15/14 [“Study Highlights Improvements in Pakistani Nuclear Safety”, Usman, <http://www.defensenews.com/article/20140115/DEFREG03/301150021/Study-Highlights-Improvements-Pakistani-Nuclear-Safety>]

ISLAMABAD — Pakistan is the most improved nuclear weapon state when it comes to securing its nuclear assets, according to the 2014 Nuclear Threat Initiative Nuclear Materials Security Index. Analysts credit this to Pakistan’s efforts to safeguard nuclear facilities and material, as well as to increase transparency, though there is room for improvement. The report puts Pakistan in the top 10 of improved states out of a total of 25 surveyed, but the most improved of the nine nuclear weapon states. The report states Pakistan “demonstrated the largest improvement of any nuclear-armed state. Pakistan is taking steps to update its nuclear security regulations and to implement nuclear security best practices.” “Pakistan has been very transparent about its obligations and the steps taken to meet its international commitments, being a party to international conventions related to safety and security,” said Mansoor Ahmed of Quaid-i-Azam University’s Department of Defence and Strategic Studies, who specializes in Pakistan’s national deterrent and delivery program. “Pakistan’s safety and security architecture and procedures are internationally recognized and appreciated in spite of the unusually microscopic spotlight on the country’s nuclear program.” These consist of “human and personnel reliability programs, multilayered physical security of various nuclear facilities and assets, safety oversight and compliance through the autonomous [Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority] nuclear material accounting and control procedures.” In terms of physical security, Ahmed highlights the establishment of a specially trained 25,000 strong nuclear security force “to enhance physical security of fixed sites.” Pakistan’s profile with the Nuclear Threat Index states that efforts to improve the safety of Pakistan’s nuclear assets added nine points in the “security and control measures” criteria. “Pakistan’s improvement is primarily due to an increased score for on-site physical protection resulting from new laws and regulations requiring licensees to provide physical protection to nuclear sites and on-site reviews of security,” the report states. The physical security of nuclear facilities was reviewed by the Army chief, Gen. Raheel Sharif, during a Jan. 10 visit to the Strategic Planning Division (SPD). The SPD oversees all aspects of the civil and military applications of atomic energy in addition to the development, security, storage, deployment and employment of warheads, delivery systems and strategic forces, as well as Pakistan’s space programs. Former Australian defense attaché to Islamabad, Brian Cloughley, whose recent fourth edition of his “History of the Pakistan Army” includes a new chapter covering Pakistan’s nuclear assets and surrounding issues, said the nuclear facilities are safe and secure from attack. He even highlights that the US leadership and Indian military leadership have expressed similar opinions in the past, and attributes much of this to the force tasked with ensuring the physical security of the nuclear assets. “The protection force is well-trained and effective, so I consider that while there should, of course, be no relaxation in security measures, there is no reason to be concerned that there will be acquisition of nuclear material by terrorists,” Cloughley said. “One area where improvement might be needed is emergency preparedness and response in case of a nuclear accident, where both India and Pakistan lack institutional capacity as it requires specialized medical facilities, logistics and post-disaster management and rehabilitation capabilities,” Ahmed said. “This is an area which is of a nonsensitive nature, and both countries have signed an Agreement to Reduce the Risk of Nuclear Accidents in 2007 and reaffirmed it for another five years in 2012, but no publicly known practical measures are believed to have been taken by either side on a cooperative or unilateral basis.” The report states Pakistan could improve by “strengthening its laws and regulations for physical security of material during transport to reflect the latest [International Atomic Energy Agency] nuclear security guidelines, and for mitigating the insider threat” through personnel reporting “suspicious behavior and requiring constant surveillance of areas of facilities where nuclear material is located.” Analysts agree, however, that the danger from a physical attack on Pakistan’s nuclear assets often quoted in Western media is exaggerated.

#### Our ev is not just wishful thinking on behalf of Pakistani officials—it cites US experts and the nuclear threat initiative—the status quo is in the direction of greatly improved security—their ev is too pessimistic

Dawn 1/30/14, US confident of Pakistan’s nuclear security, <http://www.dawn.com/news/1083568/us-confident-of-pakistans-nuclear-security>, jj

WASHINGTON: The United States Wednesday reaffirmed its confidence in security of Pakistan’s nuclear assets, saying Islamabad is well aware of its responsibilities in this regard. “The United States is confident that Pakistan is well aware of its responsibilities with respect to nuclear security and has secured its nuclear arsenal accordingly,” the State Department said. Earlier today, commenting on the recent The New York Times story, Pakistan’s Foreign Office Spokesperson Tasnim Aslam expressed regret at a “cliched theme, conjuring up baseless scenarios.” She said the timing of this story, purportedly based on briefings by anonymous US officials, is rather intriguing, coming as it did on the eve of the ministerial level review of the strategic dialogue between Pakistan and the United States in Washington. Tasnim Aslam said that Pakistan follows the best practices and standards set by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to safeguard its nuclear assets as the country has an impeccable record of safely operating nuclear power plants for over 40 years. A statement by the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation noted: “We have stated this clearly, including in a Department of State press statement issued September 4, 2013 and in the October 23, 2013 US-Pakistan Joint Statement issued as part of the visit of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to Washington.” Most recently, the Joint Statement issued on January 27 following the US-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue Ministerial stated that “Secretary (of State John) Kerry expressed confidence in Pakistan’s commitment and dedication to nuclear security and appreciation for Pakistan’s efforts to improve its strategic trade controls,” the statement added. Kerry also recognised that Pakistan is fully engaged with the international community on nuclear safety and security issues. According to the 2014 Nuclear Threat Initiative Nuclear Materials Security Index, Pakistan has shown the most improvement recently among nine nuclear-armed states through a series of steps to update nuclear security regulations and to implement best practices. The recent NTI study predicted further improvement in Pakistan’s regulations for protection and threat prevention.

### Rest

#### No nuclear retaliation

Neely 3/21/13 Meggaen Neely is a research intern for the Project on Nuclear Issues, Center for Strategic & International Studies, 3/21/13, Doubting Deterrence of Nuclear Terrorism, <http://csis.org/blog/doubting-deterrence-nuclear-terrorism>, jj

Because of the difficulty of deterring transnational actors, many deterrence advocates shift the focus to deterring state sponsors of nuclear terrorism. The argument applies whether or not the state intended to assist nuclear terrorists. If terrorists obtain a nuclear weapon or fissile materials from a state, the theory goes, then the United States will track the weapon’s country of origin using nuclear forensics, and retaliate against that country. If this is U.S. policy, advocates predict that states will be deterred from assisting terrorists with their nuclear ambitions.¶ ¶ Yet, let’s think about the series of events that would play out if a terrorist organization detonated a weapon in the United States. Let’s assume forensics confirmed the weapon’s origin, and let’s assume, for argument’s sake, that country was Pakistan. Would the United States then retaliate with a nuclear strike? If a nuclear attack occurs within the next four years (a reasonable length of time for such predictions concerning current international and domestic politics), it seems unlikely.¶ ¶ Why? First, there’s the problem of time. Though nuclear forensics is useful, it takes time to analyze the data and determine the country of origin. Any justified response upon a state sponsor would not be swift. Second, even if the United States proved the country of origin, it would then be difficult to determine that Pakistan willingly and intentionally sponsored nuclear terrorism. If Pakistan did, then nuclear retaliation might be justified. However, if Pakistan did not, nuclear retaliation over unsecured nuclear materials would be a disproportionate response and potentially further detrimental. Should the United States launch a nuclear strike at Pakistan, Islamabad could see this as an initial hostility by the United States, and respond adversely. An obvious choice, given current tensions in South Asia, is for Pakistan to retaliate against a U.S. nuclear launch on its territory by initiating conflict with India, which could turn nuclear and increase the exchanges of nuclear weapons.¶ ¶ Hence, it seems more likely that, after the international outrage at a terrorist group’s nuclear detonation, the United States would attempt to stop the bleeding without a nuclear strike. Instead, some choices might include deploying forces to track down those that supported the suicide terrorists that detonated the weapon, pressuring Pakistan to exert its sovereignty over fringe regions such as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, and increasing the number of drone strikes in Waziristan. Given the initial attack, such measures might understandably seem more of a concession than the retaliation called for by deterrence models, even more so by the American public.¶ ¶ This is not an argument against those technologies associated with nuclear forensics. The United States and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) should continue their development and distribution.¶ ¶ Instead, I question the presumed American response that is promulgated by deterrence advocates. By looking at possibilities for a U.S. response to nuclear terrorism, a situation in which we assume that deterrence has failed, we cast doubt on the likelihood of a U.S. retaliatory nuclear strike and hence cast doubt on the credibility of a U.S. retaliatory nuclear strike as a deterrent. Would the United States launch a nuclear weapon now unless it was sure of another state’s intentional sponsorship of nuclear terrorism? Any reasonable doubt of sponsorship might stay the United States’ nuclear hand. Given the opaqueness of countries’ intentions, reasonable doubt over sponsorship is inevitable to some degree. Other countries are probably aware of U.S. hesitance in response to terrorists’ use of nuclear weapons. If this thought experiment is true, then the communication required for credible retaliatory strikes under deterrence of nuclear terrorism is missing.

#### Zero risk of Indo Pak nuclear war

Economic Times 5-17-11 (“No chance of Indo-Pak nuclear war despite 'sabre rattling': Pak nuclear scientist A Q Khan” <http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2011-05-17/news/29552014_1_nuclear-blackmail-nuclear-secrets-india-and-pakistan>, jj)

NEW YORK: Pakistan's disgraced nuclear scientist A Q Khan has said that despite "sabre rattling" between Islamabad and New Delhi, there is no chance of a nuclear war between the two neighbours. Khan, who has been accused of selling nuclear secrets to Iran, Libya and Syria, wrote in Newsweek magazine that nuclear weapons in both countries had prevented war for the last 40 years. "India doesn't need more than five weapons to hurt us badly, and we wouldn't need more than 10 to return the favour," he said. "That is why there has been no war between us for the past 40 years." "India and Pakistan understand the old principle that ensured peace in the Cold War: mutually assured destruction," he said. "The two (India and Pakistan) can't afford a nuclear war, and despite our sabre rattling, there is no chance of a nuclear war that would send us both back to the Stone Age," he said. He claimed that Pakistan had to invest in a nuclear programme "to ward off nuclear blackmail from India".

#### No Indian intervention

Sunil Dasgupta '13 Ph.D. in political science and the director of UMBC's Political Science Program and a senior fellow at Brookings, 2/25/13, "How will India respond to civil war in Pakistan," East Asia Forum, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/02/25/how-will-india-respond-to-civil-war-in-pakistan/

In 2013, prospects of another [civil war in Pakistan](http://tribune.com.pk/story/487017/the-2013-jitters/) — this time one that pits radical Islamists against the secular but authoritarian military — have led once again to questions about what India would do. What would trigger Indian intervention, and who would India support?¶ **In the context of a civil war between Islamists and the army in Pakistan**, **it is hard to imagine Pakistani refugees streaming into India and triggering intervention as the Bengalis did in 1971**. **Muslim Pakistanis do not see India as a refuge**, and Taliban fighters are likely to seek refuge in Afghanistan, especially if the United States leaves the region.¶ A more selective spillover, such as the increased threat of terrorism, is possible. **But a civil war inside Pakistan is more likely to** [**train radical attention on Pakistan itself**](http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/12/12/extremism-in-pakistan-the-more-things-change/) **than on India.**¶In fact, the real problem for India would be in Afghanistan. India has already staked a claim in the Afghan endgame, so if Islamists seek an alliance with an Afghan government favoured by India, New Delhi’s best option might be to side covertly with the Islamists against the Pakistani army. But this is unlikely, because for India to actually side with Islamists, US policy in Pakistan and Afghanistan would have to change dramatically.¶ Conversely, for India to back the Pakistani army over the Islamists, Indian leaders would need to see a full and verifiable settlement of all bilateral disputes with India, including Kashmir, and/or the imminent fall of Pakistani nuclear weapons into the hands of Islamists.¶ In the first case, [a Kashmir resolution is not only unrealistic](http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/09/14/india-and-pakistan-a-decade-since-operation-parakram/), but also likely to weaken the legitimacy of the Pakistani army itself, jeopardising the army’s prospects in the civil war. In the second case, Indian leaders would need to have independent (non-US/UK) intelligence, or alternatively see US action (such as a military raid on Pakistani nuclear facilities) that convinces them that nuclear weapons are about to pass into terrorist hands. Neither of those triggers is likely to exist in the near future.¶ As it is, India and Pakistan have gone down to the nuclear edge four times — in 1986, 1990, 1999 and 2001–02. In each case, India responded in a manner that did not escalate the conflict. Any incursion into Pakistan was extremely limited. An Indian intervention in a civil war in Pakistan would be subject to the same limitations — at least so long as the Pakistani army maintains its integrity.¶ Given the new US–India ties, the most important factor in determining the possibility and nature of Indian intervention in a possible Pakistani civil war is Washington. If the United States is able to get Kabul and Islamabad to work together against the Taliban, as it is trying to do now, then India is likely to continue its current policy or try to preserve some influence in Afghanistan, especially working with elements of the Northern Alliance.¶ India and Afghanistan already have a strategic partnership agreement in place that creates the framework for their bilateral relationship to grow, but the degree of actual cooperation will depend on how Pakistan and the Taliban react. If Indian interests in Afghanistan come under attack, New Delhi might have to pull back. The Indian government has been quite clear about not sending troops to Afghanistan.¶ If the United States shifts its policy to where it has to choose Kabul over Islamabad, in effect reviving the demand for an independent Pashtunistan, India is likely to be much more supportive of US and Afghan goals. The policy shift, however, carries the risk of a full-fledged proxy war with Pakistan in Afghanistan, but should not involve the prospect of a direct Indian intervention in Pakistan itself.¶ India is not likely to initiate an intervention that causes the Pakistani state to fail.

# 1NR

## overview

### 1NR – Climate Impact EXT

***Warming outweighs nuclear war –***

1. ***Certainty***

* Intervening actors

**Hanson et al, ‘7** [J (Goddard Institute for Space Studies), “Dangerous human-made interference with climate,” <http://www.atmos-chem-phys.net/7/2287/2007/acp-7-2287-2007.pdf>]

These stark conclusions about the threat posed by global climate change and implications for fossil fuel use are not yet appreciated by essential governing bodies, as evidenced by ongoing plans to build coal-fired power plants without CO2 capture and sequestration. **In our view, there is an acute need for science to inform society about the costs of failure to address global warming, because of a fundamental difference between the threat posed by climate change and most prior global threats. In the nuclear standoff between the Soviet Union and United States, a crisis could be precipitated only by action of one of the parties. In contrast, the present threat to the planet and civilization**, with the United States and China now the principal players (though, as Fig. 10 shows, Europe also has a large responsibility), **requires only inaction in the face of clear scientific evidence of the danger**.

***b. Magnitude***

**Hunter, ‘3** [Bob, Founder of Greenpeace, *Thermageddon: Countdown to 2030*, p. 58-9]

Even though, from the beginning, Rachel Carson had warned of worldwide chemical fallout patterns, the individuals who were most sensitive to her message believed (some still do) it must be possible to find a haven or refuge outside The System, somewhere beyond the reach of the thrashing tails of the dying urban dinosaurs. The back-to-the-land movement, with its flurry of communes being set up as close to the end of the road as possible, in remote valleys or on the shores of isolated bays, was a reenactment of the North American pioneer stage, embodying the same spirit of independence and naive faith in Utopia. **A fantasy existed that even a nuclear war was survivable if you lived far enough away from any big cities and you had a supply of seeds, some solar panels, iodine pills, a gun, and a copy of The Whole Earth Catalogue. And it was true, should the nuclear exchange be limited, that it was just possible there would be survivors out in the bush and the countryside, somewhat unscathed**. **In the face of a truly drastic climate flip of the ecosystem, unfortunately, there ultimately will be no safe, remote places left anywhere. The Pacific Northwest's coniferous forests are expected to last longer than boreal forests, as rising temperatures turn the glacial moraine into a frying pan, but with climate itself affected, everything - everywhere - is affected. The skies and air and water of even Walden Pond are already degraded and slipping further. If the sudden global heating we have triggered does indeed activate an ice age, there will be no place in the entire northern hemisphere to hide. In the worst-case situation, a runaway greenhouse effect, there would be no place on Earth, period. The fantasy of escaping to an organic farm is no longer a reasonable, let alone viable, option.** A better, more realistic hope, by the time my grandson is my age, will be to head out into space. Good luck making the final crew list, Dexter.

***c. Reversibility***

**Dunpont, ‘8** [Alan, Professor of International Security at U-Sydney, Jun, “The Strategic Implications of Climate Change,” Survival, Volume 50, Issue 3]

**War has customarily been considered the main threat to international security because of the large number of deaths it causes and the threat it poses to the functioning and survival of the state**. Judged by these criteria**, it is clear that climate change is potentially as detrimental to human life and economic and political order as traditional military threats**.57 **Environmental dangers, such as climate change**, stem not from competition between states or shifts in the balance of power; rather, they are human-induced disturbances to the fragile balance of nature. But the consequences of these disturbances **may be just as injurious to the integrity and functioning of the state and its people as those resulting from military conflict. They may also be more difficult to reverse or repair.**

**1NR – China Impact**

***That causes a US-China trade war – escalates to conflict and collapses global trade***

**Droke 10** (Clif, Editor – Momentum Strategies Report, “America and the Next Major War’, Green Faucet, 3-29, http://www.greenfaucet.com/technical-analysis/america-and-the-next-major-war/79314)

In the current phase of relative peace and stability we now enjoy, **many are questioning when the next major war may occur** and speculation is rampant as to major participants involved. Our concern here is strictly of a financial nature, however, and a discussion of the geopolitical and military variables involved in the escalation of war is beyond the scope of this commentary. **But what we can divine from financial history is that** "**hot" wars in a military sense often emerge from trade wars**. As we shall see, **the elements for what could prove to be a trade war of epic proportions are already in place** and the key figures are easily identifiable. Last Wednesday the lead headline in the Wall Street Journal stated, "Business Sours on China." It seems, according to WSJ, that **Beijing is "reassessing China's long-standing emphasis on opening its economy to foreign business**....and tilting toward promoting dominant state companies." Then there is Internet search giant Google's threat to pull out of China over concerns of censorship of its Internet search results in that country. The trouble started a few weeks ago Google announced that it no longer supports China's censoring of searches that take place on the Google platform. China has defended its extensive censorship after Google threatened to withdraw from the country. Additionally, the Obama Administration announced that it backs Google's decision to protest China's censorship efforts. In a Reuters report, Obama responded to a question as to whether **the issue would cloud U.S.-China relations** by saying that the human rights would not be "carved out" for certain countries. This marks at least the second time this year that the White House has taken a stand against China (the first conflict occurring over tire imports). **Adding yet further fuel to the controversy, the U.S.** Treasury Department is expected to issue a report in April that **may formally label China as a "*currency manipulator***," according to the latest issue of Barron's. **This would do nothing to ease tensions between the two nations and would probably lead one step closer to *a trade war* between China and the U.S.** Then there was last week's Wall Street Journal report concerning authorities in a wealthy province near Shanghai criticizing the quality of luxury clothing brands from the West, including Hermes, Tommy Hilfiger and Versace. This represents quite a change from years past when the long-standing complaint from the U.S. over the inferior quality of Chinese made merchandise. On Monday the WSJ ran an article under the headline, "American Firms Feel Shut Out In China." The paper observed that so far there's little evidence that American companies are pulling out of China but adds a growing number of multinational firms are "starting to rethink their strategy." According to a poll conducted by the American Chamber of Commerce in China, 38% of U.S. companies reported feeling unwelcome in China compared to 26% in 2009 and 23% in 2008. As if to add insult to injury, the high profile trial of four Rio Tinto executives in China is another example of the tables being turned on the West. The executives are by Chinese authorities of stealing trade secrets and taking bribes. There's a touch of irony to this charge considering that much of China's technology was stolen from Western manufacturing firms which set up shop in that country. It seems **China is flexing its economic and political muscle against the West** in a show of bravado. Yet one can't help thinking that this is exactly the sort of arrogance that typically precedes a major downfall. As the Bible states, "Pride goeth before destruction, and an haughty spirit before a fall." In his book, "Jubilee on Wall Street," author David Knox Barker devotes a chapter to how trade wars tend to be common occurrences in the long wave economic cycle of developed nations. Barker explains his belief that the industrial nations of Brazil, Russia, India and China will play a major role in pulling the world of the long wave deflationary decline as their domestic economies begin to develop and grow. "They are and will demand more foreign goods produced in the United States and other markets," he writes. Barker believes this will help the U.S. rebalance from an over weighted consumption-oriented economy to a high-end producer economy. Barker adds a caveat, however: **if protectionist policies are allowed to gain force in Washington, trade wars will almost certainly erupt** and. If this happens, says Barker, "all bets are off." He adds, "The **impact on global trade of increased protectionism and trade wars would be *catastrophic***, and what could prove to be a mild long wave [economic] winter season this time around could plunge into a global depression." Barker also observes that the **storm** **clouds of trade wars are already forming on the horizon** as we have moved further into the long wave economic "winter season." Writes Barker, "If trade wars are allowed to get under way in these final years of a long wave winter, this decline will be far deeper and darker than necessary, just as the Great Depression was far deeper and lengthier than it should have been, due to growing international trade isolationism. **He further cautions that protectionism in Washington will certainly bring retaliation from the nations that bear the brunt of punitive U.S. trade policies**. **He observes that the reaction from one nation against the protectionist policies of another is typically far worse than the original action**. He cites as an example the restriction by the U.S. of $55 million worth of cotton blouses from China in the 1980s. China retaliated by cancelling $500 million worth of orders for American rain. "**As one nation blocks trade, the nation that is hurt will surely retaliate and the entire *world will suffer***," writes Barker.

## UQ

### A2: “GOP win now”

#### Moderate Republicans will survive Tea Party primary challenges now—key to moderate the Republican party

Jennifer Rubin is an American neoconservative columnist and a blogger for the Washington Post. Previously she worked at Commentary Magazine, the Pajamas Media, Human Events, and the Weekly Standard, 1/15/14, Standard Examiner, Tea Party candidates struggling in GOP primaries, <http://www.standard.net/stories/2014/01/15/tea-party-candidates-struggling-gop-primaries>, jj

If you think the far-right political machine is more bark than bite, represents only a sliver of even GOP primary voters, is largely a money-making opposition and is harmful to GOP electoral chances, then you aren't surprised that the No. 1 target of this crowd, Minority Leader Mitch McConnell, R-Ky., is leading his tea-party challenger Matt Bevin 53 percent to 31 percent in a recent poll. Republicans backing McConnell suspect the lead may be even greater, although they are wary of setting expectations too high. One GOP insider observes, "At that point it becomes plain that SCF [Senate Conservatives Fund] is not out for winning, but out for making noise and rabble-rousing to make money and line pockets. If they were really out to win, this would not be their big race." Having declared defeating McConnell their top priority, the SCF, Madison Project and Heritage Action -- as well as far-right blogs screeching that McConnell is a Republican in name only -- have no choice but to make a go of it. If they lose big, media, candidates and donors might finally come to realize they are a paper tiger. SCF boasts that it has spent over $2 million on five Senate candidates. Of this it donated $450,383 directly to Bevin and spent $535,611 in independent expenditures for a total of $985,994. The Madison Project -- another anti-McConnell, anti-mainstream Republican outfit -- just announced it is opening five get-out-the-vote offices in Kentucky to help Bevin. Whatever that is costing, you wonder whom Madison Project is helping to try to keep above water -- Bevin or itself. We don't know whether money is coming primarily from a few donors or whether ordinary conservatives are sending their hard-earned cash. (An "average" donation tells you very little if you have just a few mega-donors and $5 from everyone else.) Sooner or later, however, people will ask whether their money is well spent and what it is accomplishing. In the case of Kentucky, all this cash is doing is forcing McConnell to spend money and time in advance of a tough general election campaign. A while back I speculated that few if any of the GOP Senate challengers would win their primaries against Republican incumbents. With Liz Cheney having dropped her run in Wyoming and Bevin far behind, that seems to be precisely what is happening. These tea-party challengers have an uphill climb, not only because the candidates by and large are unknowns but also because the product they are selling -- a shutdown, partisan gridlock and fiscal austerity -- doesn't have enough sell within the GOP base. (And if that is the case, imagine how unpopular their agenda would be to all the other voters.) Governance is in; dysfunction is out. If all these candidates flop, it will continue the trend in the GOP toward deal-making, conservative policy innovation and maybe even a GOP Senate majority. Candidates pondering a presidential run in 2016 should also take note. Voters may not be so keen on fire and brimstone at the expense of electability and reform.

#### We agree that divided government is inevtaible --- the GOP will control the house and the dems will control the senate --- it’s a question of WHICH GOP is in the House ---

Altman, 12/8-’13 (Alex Altman is a Washington correspondent for TIME. He previously worked as a writer and editor for TIME's Briefing section. A native of New York City, he has degrees from Colgate University and Northwestern University's Medill School of Journalism. Dec. 08, 2013, Time Magazine, 2014 GOP Primary War Widens, <http://swampland.time.com/2013/12/08/2014-gop-primary-war-widens/>, jj)

The outcomes of these primaries are unlikely to tip the balance of power in the Senate, because they are being fought in some of the nation’s reddest states. But they have the potential to alter the complexion of the Republican caucus if some of the upstarts can unseat more pragmatic incumbents. “2014 is going to be a heck of a primary season,” says Drew Ryun, a top official at the Madison Project. “There are going to be a lot of punches thrown.”

#### These seats are safe for Republicans --- moderates will win them now --- divided government is inevitable

Jim Malone, 12/18-13, Voice of America, Obama Has Major Stake in 2014 US Elections, <http://www.voanews.com/content/obama-has-major-stake-in-2014-us-elections/1813192.html>, jj

Lawmakers with Tea Party support got much of the blame for the shutdown, and that has sparked a new battle within the Republican Party, said Republican strategist Ford O’Connell. “Many mainstream Republicans are now pointing the finger at the Tea Party as well, not just Democrats," he said. "The Tea Party is on to the right issues. The question is: are they going to change their tactics and their messaging?” House Speaker Boehner recently lashed out at conservative groups that oppose compromise. “I think they are misleading their followers. I think they are pushing our members in places where they don’t want to be and frankly I just think that they have lost all credibility,” he said. Democrats won control of the House in 2006 but Republicans won it back in 2010. No major tide for either party was expected this year, said analyst Rhodes Cook.

“I don’t think we are going to have any big wave election like that in part because we had it, you know, in 2010. Those seats that were ready to topple have toppled," he said. "We are down basically to seats that are on pretty firm ground for the Republicans.”

#### They still flip the house—even the craziest Tea Partier could win the general election in the House

Alex Isenstadt is a reporter for POLITICO, 10/21/13, Politico, Shutdown fuels Republican primaries, <http://www.politico.com/story/2013/10/shutdown-fuels-gop-primaries-98584.html>, jj

Political handicappers expect Republicans to keep the House in 2014. But plenty of GOP lawmakers will still be slugging it out in tough races next year — they’ll just be hitting one another in a growing number of primaries propelled by the party’s nasty split over the federal shutdown and debt crisis. Nearly a dozen House Republican incumbents already have credible challengers, and conservative groups expect that number to grow in the coming months as races develop and deadlines approach to qualify for the ballot. The coming fiscal battles — there’s now a Jan. 15 deadline for funding the government and a Feb. 7 deadline to raise the debt ceiling — could add fuel to the primary fires. Redistricting whittled down the number of competitive House districts and fortified the GOP’s majority. That means much of the action next year will be in primaries, where Republicans will fight out their differences in deeply conservative, gerrymandered districts.

#### Divided government inevitable

Noam Scheiber, 2/4/14, senior editor, New Republic, “Don't Go It Alone, Obama” <http://www.newrepublic.com/article/116475/obamas-executive-action-approach-political-mistake>, jj

Let me stipulate at this point that I think most pundits—including some very smart ones—are way too pessimistic about the president’s political standing. Yes, Obama’s approval ratings have suffered a steady decline since last fall. And yes, Democrats have to defend a bunch of Senate seats in states where Obama is substantially less popular than he is nationally. But it’s hard to believe the president isn’t at or very near his political low-point. Over the next few months, the Obamacare rollout fiasco should mostly recede from memory, and public perceptions of the improving economy should start to catch up with reality. I wouldn’t exactly bet on a Democratic rout in the midterms—there’s almost no way they’ll take back the House. But I’d expect Democrats to hang on to the Senate, and Obama’s favorability move into the black by the end of the year.

#### No risk they affect the House/Senate—divided government inevitable, it’s just a question of whether the GOP seats are moderate or Tea Party

Vavreck, 10/7 [Lynn Vavreck is an associate professor of political science at UCLA. She and John Sides, on faculty at George Washington University, are co-authors of the new book "The Gamble: Choice and Chance in the 2012 Election." This article appeared originally on CNN.com on Oct. 7. ULCA Today, Will 2014 election solve anything?, <http://today.ucla.edu/portal/ut/PRN-will-2014-election-solve-anything-248838.aspx>, jj]

As the next midterm election approaches, however, there are few signs of a tsunami; 2014 seems likely to reproduce divided government and, with it, even more of the partisan polarization that has become endemic in American politics. Thus, the next election seems unlikely to change the dynamics that have produced the partial government shutdown. Loyalty to a political party is not just a feature of Congress. It is, and has always been, a pre-eminent force in American elections. Nine in 10 Americans identify with or lean toward a party, and most vote loyally for that party. In our book, "The Gamble," we document the powerful role partisanship played in the 2012 election. In partnership with YouGov, we interviewed 45,000 Americans online in December, 2011 and then interviewed most of them again after the election. Of those voters who described themselves as Republicans or Democrats that December, more than 90 percent voted for their party's candidate. Voters who were undecided in December also tended to vote in line with their underlying partisan loyalties. The same party loyalty has increasingly carried over into congressional elections as well. This is one reason why split-ticket voting has dropped so precipitously in the last 40 years. Some maintain that the 2012 election inaugurated an "Obama realignment" or "Liberal America." As we argue in "The Gamble," it was always unlikely that the election signaled Democratic or liberal ascendance. In reality, Obama won despite a sharp conservative turn in public opinion and despite being perceived as ideologically further from the average voter than Romney was. The election mainly signaled just how narrowly divided the country is. Heading into 2014, a set of cross-currents seems likely to maintain this partisan balance. Republicans have more seats to defend in the House, and history shows that the larger a party's majority, the more seats the party is likely to lose. On top of that, the dismal marks that Americans give to Congress tend to hurt the majority party in the House most. But the Democrats face their own challenges. Two key fundamentals in both presidential and midterm elections are the economy and presidential approval. At the moment, the economy is growing only slowly, and approval of Obama has dropped 8 points since January. Both factors could end up hurting congressional Democrats. Moreover, in the Senate the Democrats must try to hold seats in Republican-leaning states like Alaska, Arkansas, Montana, New Hampshire and Louisiana. When you put these factors together, Republicans are currently forecast to gain a small number of seats in both chambers, although this could be enough to give them a narrow majority in the Senate. Is the shutdown likely to change this dynamic and strengthen Obama's hand against Republicans? Probably not. Although the last big shutdown battle in 1995-96 did no favors for Newt Gingrich and House Republicans, it did not necessarily help Clinton in the eyes of voters — contrary to the conventional wisdom today. Clinton's approval was no higher immediately after the two shutdowns than before, and it is unclear whether the increase in his approval later in 1996 stemmed from the shutdown itself. Moreover, this time Americans seem willing to spread the blame for the shutdown. They are only slightly less likely to say they will blame Obama and the Democrats than blame Republicans. Indeed, during the last big debt ceiling fight with the GOP — in summer 2011 — Obama's approval rating dropped 5 points. None of this is to say that the shutdown can't damage Republicans, too. If the conservative faction of the party continues to drive policy, the dwindling, but vital, number of Republican moderates may find themselves electorally vulnerable. Political science research shows that being more ideologically extreme or partisan than their district can hurt members of Congress at the ballot box. John Boehner has to find a way to protect moderates — some of whom are clearly chafing -- and placate conservatives at the same time. Ultimately, the 2014 election seems likely to give us more of the slow grind of divided government. This will continue to hamstring both parties and frustrate Americans ready for an end to gridlock.

### A2: Too Soon/Can’t Predict

#### Have no evidence ---

#### This is a negative argument—if they win that the outcome is unpredictable or uncertain now, that’s just a reason to prefer the direction of the link—the election could go either way now, only voting aff guarantees a Tea Party win if we win our link args

#### Our disad is about which Republicans can win in the PRIMARY – and those elections are right around the corner

Julián Aguilar, The Texas Tribune, “Border Democrats See Immigration Reform Window Closing”, Sept 16th 2013, http://www.texastribune.org/2013/09/16/border-dems-window-pass-immigration-reform-closing/

Elections will certainly come in to play sooner than later, he added. “If we’re not able to put something together within the next three to five months, the primary season starts in Texas,” he said. “It breaks down and gets complicated very quickly.”

#### Now is key—the New Year means campaigning has already begun

Guebert 12/26-13 [Alan Guebert, Syndicated Columnist, Daily Republic News on Dec 26, 2013, GUEBERT: Years and seasons end, but politics are ongoing, <http://www.mitchellrepublic.com/content/guebert-years-and-seasons-end-politics-are-ongoing>, jj]

First, 2014 is an election year and everyone on Capitol Hill knows election years are for, well, elections. That means that somewhere between 40 and 60 percent of every lawmaker’s day and night will be spent raising campaign money toward re-election and raising cane against “the usual Washington gridlock.” In fact, the U.S. House set the table for just such slowdown when it hightailed out of town for Christmas two weeks before Christmas. With its collective bags packed and waiting by the door, the House passed another, one-month extension of the 2008 farm bill, itself extended for a year in January 2013.

#### Not too soon – registration and get out the vote campaigns starting now – it’s the key time

Bolder Advocacy, (BA), “Now’s the Time to Think About Voting in 2014”, Sept 24th 2013, http://bolderadvocacy.org/blog/pull-out-those-calendars-preparing-for-the-2014-midterm

Is it too soon to think about next year’s national midterm and the election of Congress, one-third of the Senate, two-thirds of state governors, and almost all state legislatures? No, definitely not. Unfortunately, most nonprofits won’t even begin considering their November 2014 plans until the end of next summer. In such a small window, there is little time to plan, much less implement effective registration, education, and get-out-the-vote activities.

#### Prefer issue specific uniqueness—it’s not too soon to predict tea party losses in the status quo

Dave Rogers 10/10, October 10, 2013, My Bay City – Michigan, SHUTDOWN WOES: Government Turmoil May Affect 2014 Congress Races, <http://www.mybaycity.com/scripts/p3_v2/P3V3-0200.cfm?P3_ArticleID=8464>, jj

The Republican role in the federal government shutdown may hurt the reelection chances of three Michigan congressmen who have had Tea Party backing, according to political observers. Polls show Republican Congressmen Tim Walberg, Kerry Bentivolio and Dan Benishek all trailing significantly behind a generic Democratic opponent, reports Steve Carmody of Michigan Radio. Tea Party darling Benishek is not about to go quietly, generating about 3,500 "likes" on Facebook after announcing he would not take his salary until the shutdown is resolved and may donate it to charity. Right Wing Watch of the People for the American Way named Walberg one of the "Ten Scariest Republicans Heading to Congress" in 2010. He has been called "the birthers' birther" for his doubts about President Obama's place of birth. Bentivolio already is being "primaried" by an Oakland County lawyer with national political connections, David Trott, 52, of Birmingham. Trott announced Sept. 4 in the Republican primary against Bentivolio, the former reindeer rancher and educator who was a dark horse winner last year. Trott plans to enter the Republican primary next year to challenge Bentivolio, from Milford, who was thrust into front-runner status in 2012 after then-U.S. Rep. Thaddeus McCotter stepped down amid a petition scandal. Tom Jensen, an official of Public Policy Polling, the Democratic-leaning firm that conducted the voter survey, said it was commissioned by MoveOn.org. Jensen says their data shows voter discontent over the shutdown may tip the balance in November 2014. Poll results painted a gloomy picture for Benishek, with voter opinions linked to the government shutdown, according to results of the Public Policy Polling survey. Benishek drew a 54 percent negative job rating, with 33 percent approving and 13 percent not sure. Some 56 percent of those surveyed indicated they would vote for a Democratic opponent while 35 percent would re-elect the incumbent. Columnist George Weeks, writing in the Traverse City Record-Eagle, noted: "Benishek's Democratic opponent undoubtedly will be Jerry Cannon, 65, former Kalkaska County sheriff (1987-2004) and retired Army National Guard major general (1977-2012) who announced last week, after having been recruited by Democratic State Chairman Lon Johnson (also a Kalkaska area guy) and the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee." Sixty-four percent of those polled by PPP, the Raleigh, NC firm, opposed shutting down the government as a way to stop the health care law, with 29 percent supporting. "Republicans have shot themselves in the foot and put themselves into a pretty bad position for next fall," Jensen told reporters. Jensen says it's not too soon to be predicting the result of an election more than a year away. "These were the sort of numbers we were starting to see in Democratic held districts at this time four years ago," says Jensen. Democrats lost control of the U.S. House in 2010, as the rise of the Tea Party powered the Republicans to victory.

### A2: Thumpers

#### Action is key—even if war powers are being discussed now, the Tea Party hasn’t capitalized on it and formulated a coherent policy—that’s key

Andrew Davis, 7-29-’13, Policy Mic, The Rand Paul vs. Chris Christie Spat Uncovers Deep Cracks in the GOP, <http://www.policymic.com/articles/57095/the-rand-paul-vs-chris-christie-spat-uncovers-deep-cracks-in-the-gop>, jj

On the libertarian side, Paul’s remarks embody a strong conservative anxiety over increasing federal power, but fail to clearly set forth an ideological basis for addressing privacy issues in the 21st century. This failure greatly limits the extent to which arguments against issues like the NSA surveillance programs can resonate over the long term with American citizens, who deal with other questionable invasions of privacy every day. In this sense, phenomena like Google logging individuals’ web traffic, a growing number of municipalities tracking license plate movements, and state DMV’s taking fingerprints when residents apply for drivers licenses all might make certain Americans uncomfortable in different ways, but remain in practice and not nearly as scrutinized as the NSA’s surveillance programs. If libertarian Republicans hope to gain traction on privacy issues in either the 2014 midterm elections or the 2016 presidential race, they will need to produce a more coherent platform on individual privacy rights that can place a wide variety of questionable government and corporate policies in a clear ideological framework that coincides with conservative values of both strong national security and the maintenance of individual liberty. On the more centrist Republican side, Christie’s remarks that deemed Paul’s libertarian views “esoteric” and goaded the Kentucky senator to “come to New Jersey and sit across the from the widows and the orphans and have [the conversation about revoking superstore sandy aid]” demonstrate a dangerous inflexibility with approval of government aid programs that may prove problematic with a larger Republican voting base. Of course, few Americans would disagree with the federal action taken earlier this year to aid the victims of Hurricane Sandy, whose homes and lives, in many cases, were literally wiped away. However, the notion that the level of this aid should somehow be immune from partisan scrutiny is unrealistic, especially in an era when Republicans are digging in their heels on a wide variety of other spending issues as a part of a larger attempt to real in the U.S.’s massive federal budget deficit. In this sense, Paul’s remarks, while rhetorically charged, are not simply “esoteric,” but do strike an important point that brings the larger efficiency of federal disaster aid into question. If Christie chooses to run for president in 2016, inflexibility on questions about government assistance programs may prove problematic in securing support during the Republican primary cycle. With these issues in mind, the recent spat between Christie and Paul brings to light some potential ideological weaknesses present in both the libertarian and establishment wings of the Republican Party. As we move ever-closer to the highly anticipated 2016 presidential elections, only time will tell if these weaknesses will need to be mediated by potential candidates like Christie and Paul in order to capture the widespread Republican support necessary for a successful presidential campaign.

## \*\*\*2NC Link Wall – Top Level

#### Plan lets them pivot towards their popular national security policies—that saves them in the midterm

Friedersdorf, 10-11-’13 [Conor Friedersdorf is a staff writer at The Atlantic, where he focuses on politics and national affairs. 10-11-’13, The Atlantic, The Tea Party Is Damaging Its Credibility in the Way It Can Least Afford, <http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/10/the-tea-party-is-damaging-its-credibility-in-the-way-it-can-least-afford/280500/>, jj]

The Tea Party ought to be able to do better. "Rand Paul is more in touch with the public mood on national security issues than a lot of G.O.P. foreign policy hands, Mike Lee has a better tax plan than any of his fellow Republican senators, Heritage Action is absolutely right about farm subsidies and the House G.O.P. leadership is wrong … I’ve been over this before, but it bears repeating: If you’re looking for policy innovation on the right, the populist wing is mostly where the action is," Ross Douthat correctly observes. "And yet none of this matters right now, because the current populist strategy isn’t going to work, isn’t going to make the populist’s ideas or the Republican Party more popular, and has marched the entire party into a cul-de-sac from which, it seems, only the uncourageous dealmaking K Street-friendly leadership types can rescue it." Pursuing a liberty-minded, small-government agenda need not involve reckless standoffs that risk America's credit, but you'd never know that from the last few weeks. It's frustrating as hell for those of us hungering for a credible Republican alternative to K Street, warmongering, and a liberty-destroying national-security state.